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Preface
This book has its roots in a late 1990s project initiated by the Interna-
tional Labor Organization in Geneva. The purpose of the project was to
answer, for 15 industrialized countries, a simple question: was collective bar-
gaining compatible with firm competitiveness and employment? The standard
neoclassical response was that, in the long run, they were incompatible, espe-
cially if competitors were not required to engage in collective bargaining. The
broader question implicit in the study was whether an industrialized society
could provide its workers a level of industrial democracy without compromis-
ing the society’s interest in the efficient production of goods and services. 
Equally important was the question of employment. The standard neo-
classical model suggests that unionization and collective bargaining will
reduce employment in the unionized sector, as unionized firms see a drop in
the demand for their goods due to relatively high prices and are encouraged to
substitute capital for relatively high-wage unionized labor. If this occurs,
wage rates in the non-union sector drop as formerly unionized workers bid
down non-union wage rates, and the burden on society is increased because
these formerly unionized employees are unable to find jobs. Thus, the notion
was that collective bargaining was incompatible with increasing employment. 
The editor of this volume was asked to do the U.S. segment of the project,
which was completed in late 1999. Each of the studies was to follow a uni-
form template: a detailed review of the literature on collective bargaining,
employment, and competitiveness, three to five case studies, and a conclusion. 
The ILO was unable to publish the 15-country study. Despite this ILO
decision, however, the editor believed that the lessons of the U.S. component
of the study would be valuable for the industrial relations community in the
United States. The review of the literature, it was believed, would be useful
for policymakers and researchers in industrial relations, and the case studies
could be a valuable learning aid for students, as well as provide insight into
plant- or site-level industrial relations for academics, policymakers, and prac-
titioners. The editor approached the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment
Research, who expressed an interest in publishing the U.S. segment.
For the Upjohn book, freed from the length constraints of the ILO
research, we made some changes in the basic ILO work. An introductory
chapter was added to place the U.S. system of industrial relations in an inter-
national context. The review of the literature was divided into chapters, now
Chapter 2 on the legal framework for collective bargaining, competitiveness,
and employment, and Chapter 3 reviewing the economics and industrial rela-
tions research on collective bargaining, competitiveness, and employment.
xii
Chapter 4 was added to explain the methodology used. The case studies,
Chapters 5–8, were strengthened to add additional economic context for the
individual bargaining relationships. Chapter 9, the conclusions, was also
lengthened. Overall, we hope the book accomplishes its goal of providing use-
ful information on the U.S. collective bargaining system.
A volume such as this requires the support of many people. Professor
Thomas Kochan of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Betty Barrett, now
with Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Peggy Kelly, Muneto Ozaki,
and Zafar Shaheed, all of the ILO, were essential to the research. Kevin Hol-
lenbeck, Rich Wyrwa, and Allison Colosky, all of the W.E. Upjohn Institute
for Employment Research, also provided their expertise and assistance. 
Most important, however, the editors and chapter authors wish to thank
the many people in the participating organizations who provided us with
access for the case studies. This work could not have been done without them.
They are as follows, listed alphabetically within their respective organiza-
tions: Alcoa—Dennis Carney, Joe Cleveland, Jon Cook, Matt Everitt, Greg
Freehling, Jim Michaud, and Bob Turner. United Steelworkers of America
Local 4895—Lloyd Anders, Bill Eckert, Larry Nolen, Stephen Srnensky.
General Motors–Lansing—John Couthen Jr., Matthew Boyle, Michael Rein-
erth, and William Scheffler. UAW Local 652—Ralph Sheppard, Art Baker,
and Fred Charles. Lear Corporation–Elsie—David Chambers, Stan Jablowski,
Julie Laxton. UAW Local 1660—Christopher Jordan, Terry Clatt, Linda
Rathbun, Jack Tyler. Sparrow Health Systems—Ollie Aldridge, Kim Alex-
ander, Debbie Barron, Evelyn Bochenek, Chris Marin, George Maier, Gary
McMillan, Dan Phillips, Fran Sklapsky, Shirley Stephenson, and Pam Tilton.
Professional Employees Council of Sparrow Hospital/Michigan Nurses Asso-
ciation—Lori Certo, Catherine Dunn, Patricia Frye, Diane Goddeeris, Gail
Jehl, Judy McLane, Terri Peaphon, and Jesusa Vasquez. Sparrow/PECSH
Mutual Gains Committee—Mary Ann Daly, Kim Ford, Jim Fischer, Ira Gins-
burg, Gail Grannell, Kathy Kacynski, John Karebian, Rita Michaels, Renee
Rivard, Gordon Taylor, and Fred Vocino. 
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Collective Bargaining in Context
Comparing the United States and Europe
Richard N. Block
Peter Berg
Michigan State University
This book is an analysis of the relationship among collective bar-
gaining, firm competitiveness, and employment protection/creation in
the United States. Collective bargaining, at its essence, is the determi-
nation of terms and conditions of employment through negotiation
between an employer and a representative of the employer’s employ-
ees acting collectively as a group; hence the term collective bargaining.
Although collective bargaining is generally contrasted with individual
bargaining, for the vast majority of employees in the United States, the
alternative to collective bargaining is unilateral determination of terms
and conditions of employment by the employer, with perhaps a small
zone of negotiations over wages or salaries and/or job duties. 
Few institutions in the United States generate as much continuing
controversy as collective bargaining. Any attempt to change the laws
surrounding collective bargaining brings out waves of lobbyists, often
attempting to invoke deep value-laden arguments to advocate or
oppose legislative changes that serve or disserve the interests of unions
and employers (Block 1997). For those who favor collective bargain-
ing, unions and collective bargaining are an indispensable element of a
democratic society. Unionism and collective bargaining provide indus-
trial democracy, a means by which employees have a voice in their
workplace lives. Only through the power associated with collective
representation can employees make that voice heard. They argue that
to be effective, such collective representation requires, at times, a will-
ingness to subordinate the interests of the individual worker to the
interests of the collectivity of workers. They would disagree that
unions and collective bargaining impair economic efficiency, arguing
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that in some circumstances unions enhance efficiency, and that the the-
oretical inefficiency argument incorporates a set of competitiveness
assumptions that rarely hold. Moreover, proponents of collective bar-
gaining would argue that even if unions impair economic efficiency, it
is only short-run impairment that disappears after employers make
adjustments in employment practices and production processes in
response to unionism (Block 1995). 
On the other hand, while those on the other side of the debate do
not, in principle, oppose voluntary unionism, they would argue, as
noted, that legally protected unionism and collective bargaining result
in economic and political distortions that are inconsistent with effi-
ciency and democracy. Collective bargaining, it is argued, gives dis-
proportionate labor market power to employees, resulting in higher
wages to unionized workers (e.g., supercompetitive wages) than they
would receive in a competitive labor market in the absence of collec-
tive bargaining. Unionism also results in lower employment in the
unionized sector than would otherwise occur, as the high unionized
wages and terms and conditions of employment discourage employers
from hiring workers. This low employment in the unionized sector
causes unemployed workers to shift to the non-union sector, resulting
in excess labor supply and lower wages for those workers. Thus, as
compared to a competitive labor market, the distortionary effects asso-
ciated with collective bargaining include lower employment for union-
ized workers, lower wages for nonunion workers, lower profits for
shareholders, and less investment and economic growth. 
Politically, to the extent that unionism requires the subordination
of the interests of individual employees to a larger group, or collectiv-
ity of employees, it can be seen as inconsistent with individual rights.
In addition, by forcing employers to negotiate with the employees’ rep-
resentative over matters affecting employment, collective bargaining
impairs the property rights of employers to allocate their resources in
the way that they see fit. 
Despite concerns raised by skeptics of unionism and collective bar-
gaining, all developed, industrialized, democratic countries have cre-
ated collective bargaining systems (U.S. Department of State 1999).
The values underlying these systems, however, differ across countries,
reflecting, to a greater or lesser extent, the views expressed above.
Although this book focuses solely on collective bargaining in the
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United States, in a world of globalization, a complete understanding of
the U.S. collective bargaining system involves placing the system in a
worldwide context. This is best done by comparing the values underly-
ing the collective bargaining system in the United States with values
underlying the collective bargaining systems in other industrialized
countries; we discuss this in the next section of this chapter. The fol-
lowing section undertakes a similar examination of Europe as an exam-
ple of industrialized democracies with collective bargaining systems
exhibiting a different set of values. The final section provides a sum-
mary. 
VALUES AND EMPLOYMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
As noted, collective bargaining may be defined as the establish-
ment of terms and conditions of the employment relationship through
negotiation between an employer and a (legally recognized) represen-
tative of the employer’s employees acting collectively as a group.
There are two key elements to collective bargaining: the collectiviza-
tion of employees and the employment relationship. In the United
States, both of these elements are associated with certain values, pre-
mises, or assumptions that determine the status of collective bargain-
ing. These values and assumptions are so ingrained in U.S. culture that
it may be difficult to recognize them as values or assumptions that may
not be universally accepted. Nevertheless, they do define how collec-
tive bargaining is viewed in the United States. Each of these elements
will be examined through the lens of values. 
Collectivism and the Employment Relationship
In the United States, a very high value has traditionally been
placed on individualism. Indeed, as has been observed in a study of
individualism and life in the United States, “individualism lies at the
very core of American culture” (Bellah et al. 1987, p. 142).
In the context of collectivizing the employment relationship, the
primacy of individualism means that the rights of individuals are gen-
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erally superior to other rights, and that individual rights take prece-
dence over other rights when there is a perceived conflict. 
American culture views the exercise of property rights as a direct
derivative of individual rights. The basic principle is that individuals
should be free to use and dispose of their property as they see fit, so
long as no laws are violated. In other words, freedom of contract is
highly valued. Individuals should be free to pursue their economic
interests, generally free from restraints.1 
While one can readily conceive of people possessing individual
rights, corporations have generally been viewed as legal individuals,
with, for the most part, the same panoply of individual rights possessed
by persons. Thus, corporations, which are fundamentally voluntary
collectivities of shareholders, may pursue their individual (corporate)
interests with the same vigor as persons.
As a result, the terms and conditions of the typical employment
relationship are established by the agreement of two individuals, the
employee and the corporation/employer, each exercising individual
rights to obtain a mutually agreeable bargain that is in their respective
interests, although neither party can include terms or conditions of
employment that are illegal. Indeed, this individual determination of
the terms and conditions of employment is the “default” or “normal”
process in the United States for establishing the terms and conditions
of employment. 
Operating in such a milieu, unions, as collectivities of employees,
are at a cultural disadvantage. Collectively determined terms and con-
ditions of employment are considered the exception to the “normal”
process of individual determination. Collectivization occurs only if a
majority of the employees in unit decide to collectivize the relationship
through the established legal procedures. Even if the employees decide
to collectivize, the choice may be rescinded at appropriate times (Har-
din and Higgins 2001). 
Over the years, there has been a great deal of legal debate and posi-
tioning, both legislatively and before legal tribunals, regarding the
proper scope of collective activity. This is because in order to act as an
effective collectivity and as a representative of all employees, a union
must necessarily aggregate the interests of all employees into a unified
position. This aggregation means that some employees may view
themselves as disadvantaged vis-à-vis the terms and conditions of
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employment (that are perceived to be) available to them in the absence
of collectivization. The point is that on occasion, the union must subor-
dinate the interests of the individual to the interests of larger group. In
addition, because of an obligation to negotiate with a union, the collec-
tive bargaining process places constraints on employer use of its prop-
erty.
The result is that unionism and collective bargaining often conflict
with two legal principles: individual employee rights and employer
property rights. With respect to individual employee rights, although
unions have been granted some privileges to pursue collective inter-
ests, there are some constraints on union behavior in circumstances in
which such behavior may be viewed as being inconsistent with individ-
ual rights, as U.S. labor policy attempts to find a balance between col-
lective action and individual rights that is consistent with its values.
Thus, on the collectivity end of the continuum, a union, when chosen
as the legal bargaining representative, represents all employees in the
unit, and no employee may agree with the employer on terms and con-
ditions of employment that are inconsistent with those on which the
employer and the union have agreed. The union and the employer are
also authorized to negotiate a union security clause, by which the
employee must become a union member or at least pay dues and fees
equal to those paid by a member. A union may also compel a member
to follow its internal rules, including rules associated with working
during a duly authorized strike. 
On the individualism end of the continuum, as noted, a union shop
provision may not compel union membership and adherence to the
union’s internal rules; it may compel only monetary payments. More-
over, those payments may be reduced by an amount that goes to politi-
cal or non–collective bargaining activities of the union. Finally, states
have the right to prohibit such provisions. Unions may not limit the
rights of persons to resign from the union, thus constraining the extent
to which working during a strike can be restrained. Unions may not use
dues and fees collected under a union security clause for political pur-
poses, as such use might be viewed as inconsistent with the employee’s
freedom of speech and association.
The conflict between employee collective activity and employer
property rights has also been an attempt to strike a proper balance. On
the employee collectivity end of the continuum, employees have the
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right to engage in organizational activity at the workplace on nonwork
time, and the employer must negotiate over terms and conditions of
employment with a union representing the employees. On the property
rights end of the continuum, the employer may generally prohibit a
union (distinct from employees) from organizing on its property and
may oppose a union organizational attempt by legal means. An
employer may also make major changes in the structure of its business
without negotiating with the union over those changes. 
The Employment Relationship
In the United States, the employment relationship has always been
viewed as primarily an economic transaction rather than a relationship
that incorporates social content. This view is exemplified by the adher-
ence of the United States to the doctrine of employment-at-will: as a
general principle, either party can terminate the employment relation-
ship at any time. In other words, the employment relationship is value-
based; it exists only so long as that relationship creates sufficient value
for both the employer and the employee. When the value created is
insufficient for just one of the parties, the relationship can be termi-
nated with no required notice.2 
It is also telling that there are few legal or societal requirements
associated with the level of terms and conditions of employment. With
the exception of the substantive requirements to pay a minimum wage
and overtime for certain employees who work more than 40 hours in a
week or 80 hours over two weeks, the bulk of U.S. employment policy,
embodied in law, generally addresses only discrimination and differen-
tial treatment as between groups of employees viewed as being favored
and employees in “protected groups.” Thus, there is no law requiring
that employers provide health insurance for employees. But the law
does prohibit employers who choose to provide health insurance from
providing greater levels of coverage for males than for females, for
example. The law does not state the wage the employer must pay, but
the law prohibits an employer from paying female employees less than
male employees, and vice versa.3 
This principle of nondiscrimination is consistent with the values
the United States places on individualism and productivity. As a gen-
eral rule, employees should be hired and rewarded based not on immu-
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table characteristics, but rather on business considerations and the
value they create. Thus, employment policy is not truly designed to
address social concerns. Rather, it is designed to ensure that the labor
market functions efficiently, with employment-related decisions based
on productivity rather than personal characteristics unrelated to value. 
VALUES AND EMPLOYMENT IN EUROPE
With a market that rivals the size of the United States, the Euro-
pean Union (EU) is a dominant force in the global economy. More-
over, with the recent monetary union and eventual expansion into
eastern Europe in the next five years, the EU will play an increasingly
important role in the industrialized economies. As a confederation of
nations, the political and regulatory frameworks within the EU differ
across countries. Some countries reflect market liberalism and a lais-
sez-faire approach to regulation, while others emphasize a collectivist
or corporatist approach to policy (Leat 1998). Despite these differences
in regulatory orientation, the European Commission has actively
sought to harmonize labor standards across member states. Harmoniz-
ing labor standards through the policy-making process and the binding
directives from the European Commission have a significant impact on
the rights of employees on issues of participation, employment secu-
rity, and collective bargaining across European countries. Moreover,
the values behind these standards reflect a different approach to collec-
tivism and individualism and the employment relationship when com-
pared with the United States. In this section, we contrast the values in
Europe regarding collectivism and the employment relationship with
those of the United States discussed previously. 
Collectivism and the Employment Relationship
In the United States, individual employees are given the right to
form a labor union or collective body to represent them at the work-
place. The existence of labor unions comes from the desire of individu-
als who vote to form or disband them. Labor unions have no legal
status at the workplace apart from that given to them by individual
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employees. In addition, their role in society is largely economic. They
represent workers in their negotiations with companies about wages
and working conditions. 
Although labor unions engage in political activity in the United
States, they are viewed no differently in the political process than any
other interest group. Labor unions in the United States are not given
special roles in policy making and are not perceived as serving a social
function. 
In contrast, collective organizations in Europe are afforded rights
apart from individuals and are given explicit roles as representative
organizations in EU policy making. In Germany, they are given rights
in the constitution to exist and carry out activities that serve their
underlying purposes (Berghahn and Karsten 1987). In addition, labor
unions across Europe do not have to win elections in order to exist or
negotiate with management. Labor unions in many European countries
often negotiate with employer associations in centralized bargaining
structures where contracts are extended to workers in all firms within
the employer association. Labor unions in some European countries
serve quasi-public roles. For example, in Sweden and Belgium, labor
unions manage the unemployment insurance system (Visser 1996). In
France, labor unions manage a number of social security funds, includ-
ing unemployment benefits and work accident insurance (Graham
2000). Moreover, in Germany, labor unions participate with employer
associations in determining the curriculum for various occupations in
the German system of vocational training (Berg 1994). 
Reflecting the role played by labor unions and employer associa-
tions within member countries, the EU has integrated the input of labor
and employer peak associations into the policy-making structure of the
EU. Prior to instituting directives, the European Commission consults
with labor and employer representatives in an effort to build consensus.
Social directives that affect the employment relationship, such as
working time or part-time work, will come into effect only after a
negotiated consensus emerges with labor and employer representa-
tives. This approach to policy making reflects the value attached to
consensus, consultation, and corporatism within Europe and the Euro-
pean Union (Sciarra 1999). 
The key point regarding the discussion above reflects the funda-
mental differences in the views of unionism between the United States
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and the EU. Whereas labor unions in the United States are viewed as
having a strictly economic function, labor unions and employer associ-
ations in Europe are commonly referred to as social partners. These
partners are engaged in a social dialogue within a social market econ-
omy. The word partners implies equality between labor and employers
in the employment relationship. While the bargaining power between
the two may not always be equal, the term social partners describes
how both labor and employers are seen as having equal legitimacy
within the society. The explicit recognition that the European economy
is a social market economy rather than simply a market economy is
reflective of how the employment relationship is viewed in Europe. 
The Employment Relationship
Unlike the United States, which gives virtually total authority to
property owners or shareholders over business and investment deci-
sions, governments in Europe are much more willing to support the
rights of stakeholders, such as labor unions and workers, to a say in
business and employment-related decisions. For example, in Germany
employees have the opportunity to elect a works council that has rights
to information, consultation, and codetermination on various employ-
ment-related issues. Management must consult with works councils on
issues regarding personnel planning, such as implementing new tech-
nology or changing the organization of work. However, on issues of
pay schemes or work schedules, management and the works council
must codetermine the policy. Similar rights of participation exist in the
Netherlands, Sweden, Belgium, France, Denmark, Austria, and Swit-
zerland.
Recognizing that these national rights to participation and consul-
tation can be diminished in a global economy where relevant corporate
decisions fall outside their jurisdiction, the EU implemented a Euro-
pean-wide works council directive in 1994 and later extended its cov-
erage to include more countries in 1997. The European Works
Councils (EWCs) are established within large, multinational compa-
nies operating in Europe. These councils do not give employees or
trade unions the same extensive rights to codetermination enjoyed by
workers in national legislation. Instead, EWCs’ main objective is to
provide employees with information and allow for consultation with
10 Block and Berg
management. The establishment of EWCs by the EU illustrates its will-
ingness to support the rights of stakeholders to have a voice in the
employment relationship between workers and companies operating in
Europe. The European Works Council Directive also shows the types
of labor and social standards the EU wants to harmonize across coun-
tries. With monetary union bringing countries closer together, greater
harmonization of labor and social standards is likely to follow. 
The EU is also strengthening the role of collective bargaining in
the implementation of European legislation. European Union directives
often use collective bargaining as an instrument of flexibility. Direc-
tives regarding health and safety and working time use collective bar-
gaining as a means of negotiating flexibility into broad multinational
legislation (Veneziani 1999). 
SUMMARY
Rather than provide the reader with a full description of collective
bargaining in the United States, the discussion in this chapter is
intended to demonstrate that the assumptions underlying work,
employment, and employee collectivism in the United States are value-
based conceptions of employment rather than universally recognized
truths. United States culture values individualism, property rights, and
a transaction view of employment, and that is reflected in American
conceptions of employment and the narrow and circumspect role of
collective bargaining and unionism in the employment relations sys-
tem. On the other hand, European culture values collectivism more
than the United States culture, and Europe is more willing than the
United States to see employment as having a social purpose as well as
an economic purpose. Thus, unions and collective bargaining play a
much greater role in the European employment system than in the
United States employment system.
Thus, as one reads the case studies in this volume, one should
understand that they reflect the U.S. collective bargaining system and
U.S. conceptions of employment. Moreover, we will better understand
the collective bargaining system in the United States when we realize
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that there are other systems in industrialized democracies with a differ-
ent set of values and assumptions. 
Notes
This research was supported in part by the International Labor Organization under con-
tract no. 5453. The views expressed in this book are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the International Labor Organization.
1. Freedom of contract is limited, as there are some “contracts” that the United
States has determined are sufficiently undesirable as to be unlawful. Thus, an
employer and an employee may not agree to pay a wage below the legal mini-
mum, even if the employee would accept such a wage. 
2. In economic terms, the value of the employment relationship will be sufficient for
the employer to maintain it when the employee’s marginal revenue product, the
additional revenue produced from an additional unit (hour) of that employee’s
labor is at least sufficient to cover the employee’s compensation. For the
employee, the value of the employment relationship will be sufficient to maintain
it when the employee’s compensation is at least equal to his or her reservation
wage, or the minimum level of compensation the employee must receive to keep
the job. The reservation wage is influenced by such factors as fixed expenses
associated with employment (e.g., commuting, child care) and by the wage rate
the employee could obtain with another employer. 
3. In contrast, there is no law prohibiting employers from discriminating against
workers on the basis of employment status. Thus, full- and part-time workers per-
forming the same work can be paid differently. 
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A discussion of the relationship between collective bargaining,
competitiveness, and employment protection and creation in the United
States can be undertaken only in the context of a thorough understand-
ing of the institutions governing and affecting the collective bargaining
in the United States. There is no actor, institution, or subsystem in the
United States that encourages the collective bargaining system to be
used for those—or any—purposes. Public policy in the United States
neither encourages nor discourages collective bargaining as a method
of establishing terms and conditions of employment. Rather, public
policy is designed to protect the choice of employees as to whether
they wish to be represented by a union or labor organization for the
purposes of collective bargaining.1 
When employees are represented for collective bargaining pur-
poses by a union, there is no government involvement in establishing
the outcomes of bargaining. As a result, the major characteristic of the
U.S. collective bargaining system is variation. From the viewpoint of
firms, competitiveness can be obtained through collective bargaining
or through other mechanisms. Put differently, there may be multiple
paths to competitiveness for a firm, and the collective bargaining sys-
tem is but one of those paths.
The main purpose of this overview is to explore the nature of the
collective bargaining environment in the United States as it relates to
the use of the collective bargaining system for encouraging competi-
tiveness and employment protection/creation. To that end, the next sec-
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tion will explore that environment. The third section will present a
brief overview of some of the literature on the incidence of the use of
the collective bargaining system in the United States as a vehicle for
competitiveness and employment protection/creation. The final section
will present a summary and conclusions.
THE ENVIRONMENT FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, 
COMPETITIVENESS, AND EMPLOYMENT 
PROTECTION/CREATION
Collective bargaining by individual firms and unions, which
affects competitiveness and employment protection/creation, is heavily
influenced by the environments in which the labor relations system
must exist. Indeed, there are several environments that exert an impact
on the relationship between collective bargaining for competitiveness
and employment protection/creation. These environments associated
with collective bargaining include the legal, political, institutional, and
economic. Each of these will be examined.
The Legal Environment
By far the most important influence on the collective bargaining
system in the United States is the law; in this case, the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) as amended in 1947 and then again in 1959.
The law establishes the overall framework for the collective bargaining
system in the United States. The influence and reach of the law derives
from the fact that it is accessible, covers almost all firms in the private
sector outside of the railroad and airline industries, and is public. The
law’s accessibility means that all have access to its process. Its broad
coverage results in a broad application, and its public nature means that
the decisions that emanate from it are known by the labor relations
community and can be used to influence other decisions and shape new
legal arguments. Therefore, parties acting through their attorneys have
a common information base on what is illegal, what is legal, and what
is debatable. 
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The law establishes the basic structure for collective bargaining,
the procedural obligations of parties to negotiate, and the matters about
which they must negotiate. Equally important, it establishes the param-
eters within which government may intercede in the bargaining process
to encourage the parties to negotiate substantive terms or conditions of
employment, such as those that influence competitiveness and employ-
ment protection/creation. 
Historical Overview of Labor Law in the United States
The basic legislation governing labor relations in the United States,
the NLRA, was enacted in 1935. Although the purposes of the act have
been the subject of much debate (Keyserling 1945; Millis and Brown
1950; Block 1995, 1997), one obvious reason for the passage of the
law was to create an orderly process for determining whether a group
of employees wished to be represented by a union for collective pur-
poses. 
An important assumption underlying the U.S. industrial relations
system was reflected in this basic purpose. Employees would only be
represented by a union if they wished to be so represented. Collective
bargaining and union representation were not presumed to be the
method by which terms and conditions of employment were normally
established. Rather, such terms and conditions of employment were
normally established by the employer unilaterally or by individual
employer negotiation with employees. 
The 1935 act also established the concept of a bargaining unit. The
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), the agency established to
administer the NLRA, was given the responsibility to determine if any
unit (such as a group of employees) was appropriate for bargaining,
and if so, whether the employees in that unit desire representation. A
bargaining unit could only be an “employer unit, craft unit, plant unit,
or subdivision thereof” (NLRA, Sec. 9(a)). In order to be considered
appropriate, the employees being considered for union representation
were required to have a “community of interest,” common employment
interests such as similar wage structure, similar tasks, and similar
supervision.
In its early years, the NLRB used card checks to determine if the
employees in an appropriate bargaining unit desired union representa-
tion. The board agent would match signed union cards to a list of
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employees provided by the employer. By the early 1940s, the board
had established the representation election as the preferred method of
determining representation (Millis and Brown 1950). Thus, by the
early 1940s, the bargaining unit could accurately be labeled an election
unit, which would be a bargaining unit only if the employees in that
unit chose a union to represent them for collective purposes.
Union representation would exist only if a majority of the employ-
ees desired to be so represented. Moreover, as the law would later
evolve, it would also be determined that the desire for unionization
must be continuing. Thus, if a majority of the employees in a bargain-
ing unit at some point decided that they no longer wished union repre-
sentation, such representation would be ended.
The result is that the legal structure in the United States creates a
unit-by-unit, workplace-by-workplace process for unionization and, as
will be seen, for bargaining. Moreover, once union representation is
established in a unit, the employer has an obligation to bargain only
with the union representing the employees in that unit. There is no obli-
gation to bargain with any other union or labor organization for
employees not in that unit, and the union or labor organization may not
negotiate for employees who are outside that unit unless those other
employees are represented by a union and agree to so negotiate, the
employees are added (accreted) to the existing bargaining unit through
a legal proceeding, or the employer agrees to negotiate with an existing
union for those employees and, if challenged, all legal standards for
unit accretion are met.
The NLRA was extensively amended in 1947 via the Taft-Hartley
Act. For the purpose of this study, the 1947 amendments changed the
1935 law in three key ways. First, the 1947 amendments established
the representation election as the preferred method of determining
whether a unit of employees wished to be represented by a union. Con-
sistent with this preference, card checks would only be used under
extraordinary circumstances, such as when a fair election was impossi-
ble due to the employer’s extensive unfair labor practices (NLRB v.
Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 [1969]). Second, the 1947 amend-
ments gave employers rights of free speech. Thereafter, employer
expressions of sentiment against unionization would not be viewed as
unlawful unless accompanied by a direct or implied threat of job loss
or promise of benefit. Third, the Taft-Hartley amendments refined the
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obligation of the employer to bargain with the union by providing that
the parties were required to meet at reasonable times and to discuss
matters related to terms and conditions of employment. On the other
hand, the amendment provided that neither party had an obligation to
agree to any proposal. As will be discussed below, these three changes
would have an impact on bargaining for competitiveness and employ-
ment protection/creation (Millis and Brown 1950; Block, Beck, and
Kruger 1996).
Lesser amendments to the NLRA were enacted in 1958 and 1974.
The 1958 amendments are relevant to this study only to the extent that
they placed some limitations on the rights of unions to engage in recog-
nized organizational picketing. The 1974 amendments brought
employees of nonprofit, private health care institutions under the
NLRA.2
Law and Bargaining Structure
One result of the system of establishing union representation on a
unit-by-unit basis is the absence of an overarching structure for collec-
tive bargaining. Because the legal bargaining units are the basic build-
ing blocks of the collective bargaining system, the result has been the
creation of a highly decentralized system of collective bargaining in
the United Sates based on the plant-by-plant, unit-by-unit certification
process. Each legal bargaining unit negotiates terms and conditions of
employment only for those employees in the bargaining unit unless all
affected parties explicitly and unambiguously agree to a more inclusive
bargaining structure. Even when such an inclusive bargaining structure
exists, any or all parties can leave the multiemployer or multiunion
structure at the termination of the collective agreement (Evening News
Association 1965; Detroit Newspaper Agency 1998).
This unit-by-unit system of establishing bargaining is important to
the relationship between collective bargaining, competitiveness, and
employment protection/creation because it creates a system under
which employers have substantial flexibility and discretion in making
decisions regarding competitiveness. The unit-by-unit representation
system and the default system of “no union” means that there is no nec-
essary relationship between unionization in the facilities of a firm. The
mere fact that one facility of an employer is unionized does not mean
that other facilities of the employer are unionized. This occurs because
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in most cases, the bargaining or election unit is the plant/facility or sub-
division thereof. Many firms have both unionized and nonunion facili-
ties, and some firms have facilities represented by different unions. On
occasion, more than one union may represent different classifications
of employees in one facility.
This system gives many employers competitiveness options away
from the union in addition to negotiating with the union. Alternatively,
multiple unions within a firm raise the possibility of employer use of
coercive comparisons, comparing the willingness of one union or local
to compromise with the willingness of other unions or locals to com-
promise. These options can provide employers with a disincentive to
compromise with unions during negotiations on matters that might be
thought to enhance competitiveness and employment protection. In the
alternative, these options can provide employers with leverage during
negotiations. Such leverage makes it less likely than otherwise that
direct employment protection or creation that would normally benefit
unions will be incorporated into collective agreements. At the same
time, such a situation can also provide unions with leverage over
employers where the union has organized a key facility.
In general, however, cooperation occurs only if both parties are
interested in cooperation. On the other hand, if one party is uninter-
ested in cooperation, the legal system will not encourage it—in fact, it
will resist it.
Law and the Bargaining Process
A central premise of collective bargaining law in the United States
is government noninterference in the bargaining process. The law does
require both parties to bargain in “good faith.” But, as amended in
1947, the NLRA explicitly states that the obligation to bargain in good
faith “does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the
making of a concession” (NLRA as amended, Section 8(d)). As the
U.S. Supreme Court noted in a key 1960 decision, commenting on the
1947 debate around legislation that would clarify the obligation to bar-
gain in the 1935 law:
the nature of the duty to bargain in good faith thus imposed upon
employers . . . was not sweepingly conceived. The Chairman of
the Senate Committee declared: “When the employees have cho-
sen their organization, when they have selected their representa-
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tives, all the bill proposes to do is to escort them to the door of
their employer and say, ‘Here they are, the legal representatives of
your employees.’ What happens behind those doors is not
inquired into, and the bill does not seek to inquire into it.”
The limitation implied by the last sentence has not been in prac-
tice maintained – practically, it could hardly have been – but the
underlying purpose of the remark has remained the most basic
purpose of the statutory provision . . . Congress was generally not
concerned with the substantive terms on which the parties con-
tracted. (NLRB v. Insurance Agents International Union, 361 U.S.
477 [1960, 484–487])
Legislation passed in 1947 is equally clear regarding what the par-
ties are obligated to do in bargaining, and what they are not obligated
to do.
To bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obliga-
tion of the employer and the representative of the employees to
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or
the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereun-
der, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any
agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obliga-
tion does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require
the making of a concession. (NLRA, Section 8d)
United States labor law does not require either party to agree to
any proposal made by the other party, including any matter
regarding competitiveness and employment protection/creation.
Labor law only requires each party to negotiate in good faith over
matters involving terms and conditions of employment, so that
parties must discuss employment protection and competitiveness,
at least to the extent that competitiveness is germane to terms and
conditions of employment. 
Thus, labor law in the United States enables the parties to use col-
lective bargaining to agree on issues relating to competitiveness and
employment protection/creation, but only if both wish to do so.
Equally important, it also enables either party not to address these
issues, if that party believes that it will be better off by declining to
agree, provided that the party negotiates in good faith. The NLRA is
indifferent to the bargaining outcomes on matters of employment pro-
20 Block
tection and competitiveness, just as it is indifferent to the outcomes on
any other specific issue. 
In addition to this laissez-faire approach to the subjects of bargain-
ing, labor law provides parties a wide range of weapons to pursue their
self-interest. As the Supreme Court noted:
(I) It must be realized that collective bargaining, under a system
where the government does not attempt to control the results of
negotiations . . . The parties—even granting the modification of
views that may come from a realization of economic interdepen-
dence—still proceed from contrary and to an extent antagonistic
viewpoints and concepts of self-interest. The system has not
reached the ideal of the philosophic notion that perfect under-
standing among people would lead to perfect agreement among
them on values. The presence of economic weapons in reserve,
and their actual exercise on occasion by the parties, is part and
parcel of the system that the Wagner and Taft–Hartley Acts have
recognized. Abstract logical analysis might find inconsistency
between the command of the statute to negotiate toward an agree-
ment in good faith and the legitimacy of the use of economic
weapons, frequently having the most serious effect upon individ-
ual workers and productive enterprises, to induce one party to
come to the terms desired by the other. But the truth of the matter
is that at the present statutory stage of our national labor relations
policy, the two factors—necessity for good-faith bargaining
between parties, and the availability of economic pressure devices
to each to make the other party incline to agree on one’s terms—
exist side by side. (NLRB v. Insurance Agents International
Union, 361 U.S. [1960, 488–489]) 
This panoply of economic weapons includes strikes by unions, and
lockouts and the use permanent replacements by employers (NLRB v.
MacKay Radio and Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 477 [1938]; American
Shipbuilding v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 [1965]; TWA v. Independent Fed-
eration of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426 [1989]). Unions can only
obtain employment protection when employers see it as in their interest
to grant it, or when they are able to extract it by force. Thus, if one
party wishes to resist the use of the collective bargaining process to
encourage competitiveness and employment protection/creation, the
law permits that party to use the weapons to do so.
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Law and the Obligation to Bargain over Substantive Matters
The NLRA as amended requires employers and unions to bargain
in good faith over matters involving wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment. In 1958, the U.S. Supreme Court decided
that neither party had an obligation to bargain over matters not relating
to terms or conditions of employment (NLRB v. Wooster Division of
Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 [1958]). In this case, the Court cre-
ated implicitly three categories of subjects: mandatory, permissive, and
unlawful. Mandatory subjects were those relating to terms and condi-
tions of employment that the parties were required to discuss, although
there was no obligation to agree. Permissive subjects were those that
the parties could discuss if both parties so desired; however, neither
party was under an obligation to discuss them. Unlawful subjects were
not permitted to be discussed or incorporated into a collective agree-
ment. A later decision by a lower court, permitted to stand by the
Supreme Court, reinforced the distinction between mandatory and per-
missive subjects of bargaining by holding that one party could not
force another party to negotiate over a nonmandatory item by with-
holding agreement on a mandatory item subject to agreement on the
nonmandatory item. (International Union of Marine Workers v. NLRB,
320 F.2d 615, 3rd cir.; [1963]) 
The importance of these decisions soon became clear. Employers
need only bargain over matters involving terms and conditions of
employment, which, in turn, meant that they could act unilaterally in
matters not involving terms and conditions of employment. There
ensued extensive litigation over the type of decisions that would be
considered terms and conditions of employment (NLRB v. Adams
Dairy, Inc. 350 F.2d 108 [CA 8; 1965]; NLRB v. Royal Plating and
Polishing Co. 350 F.2d 191 [CA 3; 1965]; First National Maintenance
Corp. v. NLRB 452 U.S. 668 [1981]). To the extent that employers
were able to use the legal system to remove matters from the category
“terms and conditions of employment,” their flexibility would be sub-
stantially enhanced, and they could make decisions without negotiating
with a union about those decisions. On the other hand, if a matter was
determined to be a “term or condition of employment,” employers
were required to negotiate with the union over decisions involving
those matters.
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The most heated legal battles were fought over decisions that were
traditionally considered in the United States to be the prerogative of
management, but that also had an effect on employment. In the first
key post–Borg-Warner case, Fibreboard v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203
(1964), the Supreme Court determined that the employer’s decision to
contract out its maintenance work that had previously been done by
bargaining unit employees was a mandatory subject of bargaining. In
this case, the firm had replaced its unionized employees with those of a
contractor. The company had determined that it cost less to have the
maintenance work done by a contractor than the bargaining unit
employees, and the employer believed that the union would not agree
to a contract that resulted in reduced cost.
The Court agreed with the board that this subcontracting was
merely the replacement of one group of employees with another based
solely on labor cost. Both groups of employees would be doing pre-
cisely the same work, under the same conditions, with the same tools.
It was a mere replacement of one group of employees for another. In
deciding this case, however, the Court also observed:
The subject matter of the present dispute is well within the literal
meaning of the phrase “terms and conditions of employment.” A
stipulation with respect to the contracting out of work performed
by members of the bargaining unit might appropriately be called a
‘condition of employment.’ The words even more plainly cover
termination of employment which, as the facts of this case indi-
cate, necessarily results from the contracting out of work per-
formed by members of the established bargaining unit. (379 U.S.
203, 210)
This last sentence seemed to suggest that any employer decision
that resulted in the termination of employment was a mandatory sub-
ject of bargaining. On the other hand, the facts of Fibreboard were suf-
ficiently narrow as to generate legal doubt regarding whether that last
statement applied to any employer decision, or only to contracting out
decisions similar to that taken in Fibreboard, the mere replacement of
one group of employees with another group, with the decision to
replace based solely on labor costs.
Seventeen years later, the Supreme Court appeared to adopt a posi-
tion opposite to Fibreboard in First National Maintenance Corpora-
tion v. NLRB. In that case, the employer, who provided cleaning and
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maintenance services for commercial customers, refused to bargain
with its unionized employees about a decision to withdraw from a con-
tract at Greenpark, a nursing home. The dispute with Greenpark was
solely over the size of the fee that First National Maintenance would
receive. In deciding that the employer had no obligation to bargain
over the decision to withdraw from its Greenpark contract, the Court
observed:
In establishing what issues must be submitted to the process of
bargaining, Congress had no expectation that the elected union
representative would become an equal partner in the running of
the business enterprise in which the union’s members are
employed. Despite the deliberate open-endedness of the statutory
language, there is an undeniable limit to the subjects about which
bargaining must take place: . . .
(The Employer) contends it had no duty to bargain about its deci-
sion to terminate its operations at Greenpark. This contention
requires that we determine whether the decision itself should be
considered part of petitioner’s retained freedom to manage its
affairs unrelated to employment. The aim of . . . labeling a matter
a mandatory subject of bargaining, rather than simply permitting,
but not requiring, bargaining, is to “promote the fundamental pur-
pose of the Act by bringing a problem of vital concern to labor
and management within the framework established by Congress
as most conducive to industrial peace,” . . . The concept of manda-
tory bargaining is premised on the belief that collective discus-
sions backed by the parties’ economic weapons will result in
decisions that are better for both management and labor and for
society as a whole . . . This will be true, however, only if the sub-
ject proposed for discussion is amenable to resolution through the
bargaining process. Management must be free from the con-
straints of the bargaining process . . . to the extent essential for the
running of a profitable business. It also must have some degree of
certainty beforehand as to when it may proceed to reach decisions
without fear of later evaluations labeling its conduct an unfair
labor practice. Congress did not explicitly state what issues of
mutual concern to union and management it intended to exclude
from mandatory bargaining. Nonetheless, in view of an
employer’s need for unencumbered decision making, bargaining
over management decisions that have a substantial impact on the
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continued availability of employment should be required only if
the benefit, for labor–management relations and the collective-
bargaining process, outweighs the burden placed on the conduct
of the business. (452 U.S. 666, 674–679)
In other words, if the employer believed that its competitive inter-
ests, the conduct of business, would be impaired by a requirement that
it must bargain with the union over the decision, and it prevailed in the
legal system, there would be no bargaining obligation. In the First
National Maintenance view of bargaining, collective bargaining is not
necessarily a vehicle that can be used by a firm to attain competitive-
ness. Bargaining is just as frequently a barrier to firm competitiveness.
In this view, competitiveness is solely a management interest, rather
than a joint interest of management and the union.
In deciding First National Maintenance, the Court determined that
all management decisions could be characterized as one of three types
with respect to bargaining: type I, decisions that had a substantial effect
on the employer but only a minimal effect or indirect effect on the
employment interests of employees (e.g., pricing, financing, advertis-
ing); type II, decisions that affected solely employment (e.g., wages,
working hours, benefits); and type III, decisions that had a substantial
effect on employment and on the employer (e.g., investment, produc-
tion process, work location, product elimination). Type I decisions
were part of the inherent freedom on the part of management to man-
age its affairs unrelated to employment, and there was no obligation on
the part of the management to bargain over these decisions; type II
decisions carried a bargaining obligation; and type III decisions were
the difficult ones. Those were the ones in which the board would be
required to determine whether the benefits from bargaining out-
weighed the costs the bargaining obligation placed on management in
the conduct of its business (First National Maintenance v. NLRB).
These decisions would also be the ones that would most likely directly
affect competitiveness and employment protection/creation.
Like Fibreboard, First National Maintenance was a case involving
a narrow set of facts wrapped in broad language. In Fibreboard, the
Court found that the employer’s decision to subcontract the work done
by the unionized employees was based solely on labor costs, and found
that the employer was obligated to bargain over the decision. On the
other hand, in First National Maintenance, the Court found that the
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employer’s decision to terminate its maintenance and cleaning contract
with the nursing home had nothing to do with labor costs; therefore, the
employer was not obligated to bargain with the union over the deci-
sion.
The question then became one of interpretation. Under what cir-
cumstances would the benefits to collective bargaining outweigh the
burdens placed on the conduct of business so that bargaining would be
required? Did the circumstances of a particular case bring it closer to
Fibreboard, with its bargaining requirement, or to First National
Maintenance, with no bargaining requirement? Ten years after First
National Maintenance, the NLRB answered this question in Dubuque
Packing Company, 303 NLRB No. 66, 1991 (enf ’d 143 LRRM 301
[DC Cir., 1993]). In this case, the employer, a meatpacking firm,
moved its hog kill operation from a location in Iowa to a location in
Illinois. The question in the case was whether the employer had an
obligation to bargain over this change. The Court distinguished
between an employer decision that resulted in a basic change in the
nature of the business, and one that did not result in such a change. The
former decision would not trigger a bargaining obligation, but the latter
would.
The Court decided that the employer decision in Dubuque was not
a basic change in the nature of the business because it was a decision to
relocate existing work rather than a change in the nature of the work
the firm was doing. It was a decision regarding where the firm should
be in a business (in this case, hog killing), not whether it should be in a
business. It was not new work that the firm was undertaking, nor was
the work being done in a new and different way. Moreover, the Court
found that labor costs were a factor in the decision to move; therefore,
bargaining could possibly have influenced the company’s decision to
relocate the work.
The foregoing discussion indicates that changes in capital structure
or product mix of the firm that were made for the purpose of increasing
firm competitiveness were generally not considered to be negotiable
items with the union, even if such changes resulted in employment
reductions. In such circumstances, the law permitted a decoupling of
employer concerns with competitiveness and union concerns with job
protection and creation. The law regarding the obligation to bargain
permits employers who so choose to avoid discussions with a union
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representing their employees by stating that the decisions are type I
decisions or type III decisions, which are basic changes in the nature of
the business. Disagreements are resolved before the NLRB, resulting
in litigation rather than negotiation. 
The result of all this is that the law in the United States does not
encourage companies and unions to negotiate over matters relating to
competitiveness and job protection/creation. The focus of the law is not
on problem solving or on linking the issues of competitiveness and job
security. Rather, the focus is on the individual employer decision and
whether or not the employer has the right to make that decision without
negotiating with the union about it. Bargaining over competitiveness
and employment protection/creation does occur, but not because the
law encourages it—it occurs because both parties want it to, or because
the employer believes that it cannot make a sufficiently strong case
before the NLRB and the courts to avoid bargaining with the union. 
The Political Environment
There is little government involvement in the bargaining process,
which is indicated by the language quoted earlier from the insurance
agents case. The Taft-Hartley Act (1947) has created the Federal Medi-
ation and Conciliation Service (FMCS), and most states have created
comparable agencies. Among the missions of the FMCS and the state
agencies is the encouragement of labor and management to resolve
their disputes. In addition, the FMCS provides training and other
expert support for parties that wish to move toward a cooperative rela-
tionship (Block, Beck, and Kruger 1996). There is also a legal require-
ment in the NLRA that the FMCS and the state agency be notified if
there is a labor dispute that has not resulted in an agreement. Although
the FMCS and/or the state agency may contact the parties and offer
their services, there is no legal requirement that the parties avail them-
selves of these services; they are completely voluntary. Indeed, if only
one party declines to use the services, then the FMCS/state agency has
no role.
This minimalist government involvement in bargaining in the
United States may be contrasted with the situation in Canada, its larg-
est trading partner. While Canadian provinces have extensive require-
ments for governmental mediation and conciliation before a work
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stoppage may be commenced, the United States has no requirements
(outside railroads and airlines) for prestrike or prelockout governmen-
tal intervention in the absence of a national emergency. Thus, there is
no requirement for a neutral, ameliorative influence in negotiations that
may encourage otherwise recalcitrant parties to consider jointly
addressing competitiveness and employment protection/creation
(Block 1997).
The Institutional Environment
Just as there is no centralized corporatist structure in the United
States to encourage the use of the collective bargaining systems for
competitiveness and employment protection and creation, there is
nothing in the institutional environment that encourages such a result.
The two major actors, employers and unions, operate within decentral-
ized internal systems. Each of the actors addresses its own internal
interests in collective bargaining. The result is additional impetus for
decentralization and variation in collective bargaining outcomes. 
Employer Institutions
In the United States, there are no overarching employer institutions
that can implement or encourage on a broad-based scale the use of col-
lective bargaining for encouraging competitiveness and employment
protection/creation. Consistent with the principle of decentralized col-
lective bargaining, and in contrast to some other industrialized coun-
tries (Sisson 1987; Pellegrini 1998; Furstenberg 1998; Hammerstrom
and Nilsson 1998), employers in the United States generally do not
form coalitions or work collectively to bargain with unions at all, much
less to encourage the use of the collective bargaining system as a vehi-
cle for competitiveness and employment protection/creation. The
structure of the system is that each employer makes a decision on the
matter that it believes is in its best interest.3 Employers in the United
States are competitive firms first and employers second. They often use
their labor relations systems as a vehicle for competitive advantage vis-
à-vis other firms. Thus, if they believe that collective bargaining can be
used to enhance competitiveness, they will so use it. On the other hand,
if employers believe that collective bargaining makes it more difficult
than otherwise to be competitive, they will resist collective bargaining.
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Similarly, there is no employer institution that encourages the use of
collective bargaining for employment protection.
The employer institutions that do exist, such as the Labor Policy
Association, are primarily political lobbying organizations that dissem-
inate information to the public and policymakers and support a point of
view on labor and employment policy issues. The Labor Policy Associ-
ation describes itself as “the nation’s leading public policy association
of senior human resource executives, representing more than 250
major corporations doing business in the United States.” Among the
items on its agenda is “to encourage legislative and regulatory bodies
to improve labor and employment policies in order to enhance the
competitiveness of companies doing business in the United States and
enable employee friendly workplace practices” (Labor Policy Associa-
tion 2001). Other organizations aim to keep labor relations and human
resources management practitioners up to date. The Employment Pol-
icy Foundation, for example, is a “research and education foundation
that promotes sound employment policy.” It is supported by over 130
leading companies. Similarly, the Society for Human Resource Man-
agement is an information and educational organization.
Union Structures
Just as there is decentralization among employers, there is also
decentralization among unions. The American Federation of Labor
(AFL), established in 1881 as Federation of Unions, was established on
the principle of international union autonomy in collective bargaining
(Brooks 1971). Although the Congress of Industrial Organizations
(CIO), established in 1938, was generally more centralized than the
rival AFL, it too left collective bargaining to the affiliate organizations
(Bernstein 1969). This principle was maintained when the two organi-
zations merged in 1955 to form the AFL-CIO, and it continues in exist-
ence today. Thus, just as there is no centralized system or structure to
encourage employers to move toward, there is no structure to encour-
age unions to consider the use of collective bargaining for competitive-
ness.
The level of the national (or international)4 union in the United
States represents a mixture of union structures and centralization and
decentralization. The structural characteristic common to almost all
unions in the United States is a local union chartered by the national
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union. Thus, at first blush, one might think that the local union is under
the control of the national union, which could be a force for encourag-
ing locals to use collective bargaining as a vehicle for competitiveness.
On the other hand, it is also true that there is wide variation in the
nature of the relationship between local unions and the parent national,
and the amount of autonomy the local has in collective bargaining. In
general, when the negotiations of one local of a national union appear
to affect the interests of another local of a national union, the national
union will attempt to exert some control over the local collective bar-
gaining activities. In addition, most national unions retain the right in
their constitutions to approve collective agreements negotiated by their
local unions. This provides the national with some ultimate control
over the outcomes of bargaining (Fiorito, Gramm, and Hendricks
1991).
Thus, locals that negotiate for only one employer may have an
interest in negotiating for increased competitiveness for that employer.
Such impetus, however, must come from the local itself. The national
union is not likely to encourage it. Whether the national union discour-
ages it depends on whether the national perceives that a contract places
other locals at a disadvantage.
Where multiple locals of the same union negotiate with the same
employer, the national union will normally create a structure to
develop common bargaining proposals. Such a structure can facilitate
the use of collective bargaining to the extent the locals have an interest
in doing so. Such a structure usually results in a multiplant, multilocal
agreement covering wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employ-
ment. It may also create structures that encourage competitiveness,
such as in the GM–UAW national agreement. Similarly, in the Alcoa
case, we see the national union agreeing with corporate leadership on a
partnership agreement.
Such bargaining structures must be implemented at the plant and
local level. This may be done through a separate plant agreement, as in
the GM–UAW case, or by administration of the master agreement, as
in the Alcoa–Steelworkers case. The major concern of the international
is that the local does not gain work at the expense of the other locals by
a reduction of standards. In the absence of such a concern, the national
union will generally provide the locals with autonomy. 
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Joint and Governmental Structures
There is only one formal overarching joint or governmental struc-
ture that encourages the parties to use collective bargaining to encour-
age competitiveness and employment protection/creation. The
Collective Bargaining Forum was established in 1984 by a group of
corporate chief executive officers and presidents of international
unions under the auspices of the United States Department of Labor. Its
purpose was to “address the role of collective bargaining in helping the
United States maintain a rising standard of living in an increasingly
competitive world economy” (Collective Bargaining Forum 1988). In
April 1999, the forum issued a report entitled Principles for New
Employment Relationships, which continued the theme of the impor-
tance of collective bargaining and mutual respect between employers
and unions. Among the principles to which the report urged adherence
were:
acceptance in practice by union leaders and members of their
responsibility to work with management to improve the economic
performance of their enterprises in ways that serve the interests of
workers, consumers, shareholders, and society and acceptance by
corporations of employment security, the continuity of employ-
ment for its workforce, as a major policy objective that will figure
as importantly in the planning process as product development,
marketing, and capital requirements. (Collective Bargaining
Forum 1999)
This report was announced by the vice president of the United
States at a White House ceremony. It is noteworthy, however, that the
president of the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), a
member of the forum, did not sign the report (Collective Bargaining
Forum 1999).
This discussion indicates the extent of decentralization in the U.S.
industrial relations system, both among the actors and between the
actors and government (Collective Bargaining Forum 1999). That the
NAM president chose not to sign the report, although his management
colleagues were willing to do so, suggests that while executives of
individual firms were willing to sign, the representative of a broad
cross-section of industry was unwilling to agree to such principles on
behalf of his constituency. This was the case even with the prestige of a
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vice-presidential announcement. Again, this reinforces the principle
that such overarching structures can do nothing more in the United
States than publicize the view that companies and unions should use
the collective bargaining process to enhance competitiveness and
employment protection/creation.
The Economic Environment
Economic policy in the United States over the last 20 years has
generally taken a laissez-faire approach to employment and competi-
tiveness. There has been little direct intervention in the marketplace to
affect either of these. Rather, U.S. economic policy has been based on
the principle that markets should be permitted to work, and that firms
in general should be unconstrained in their options to allocate
resources to their most productive uses, with a corresponding maximi-
zation of shareholder wealth.
Monetary policy has been based on limiting inflation, enhancing
the operation of the market by reducing an important source of uncer-
tainty. Concerns about job security have helped to restrain wage
increases and, therefore, inflation (Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System 1997).
Fiscal policy has been generally non-existent. For much of the last
20 years, taxes and government spending have been part of an ideolog-
ical and political debate rather than an economic debate. This ideologi-
cal/political debate is an aspect of a broader debate in the United States
over the wisdom of government involvement in the economy.
Trade policy has advocated open markets and the reduction of bar-
riers in the United States and among its trading partners (U.S. Trade
Representative, Office of, 1999). It is true that the U.S. government
will act, at times, to support domestic industries, such as the steel
industry, that can persuade policymakers that it may be the victim of
unfair trade practices by foreign competitors. Thus, the government
has on occasion advocated for protection based on the position that an
industry has been victimized by unfair trade practices (Lucentini
1999). But the general thrust of U.S. economic policy has been to open
its markets and to expect other countries to do the same (U.S. Trade
Representative, Office of, 1999).
The impact of such economic policies on collective bargaining in
the United States can best be characterized as reinforcing the variation
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that exists in law and the decentralization that the actors have helped to
create. The market approach of the U.S. economic policy has encour-
aged firms to respond to the economic environment by following strat-
egies that are viewed as being in the best interests of the individual
shareholders of the firm. These responses are individualistic and firm
specific rather than coordinated among firms. The individual collective
bargaining system of each firm has been forced to adjust to these firm
strategies enabled by U.S. economic policies.
The foregoing discussion raises an obvious question: given the
absence of systemic encouragement in the United States of the use of
the collective bargaining system for competitiveness and employment
protection, how frequently is the collective bargaining system used?
While there have been case studies and anecdotal information regard-
ing the relationship, they do not address the more general question of
incidence.
Despite the absence of a broad-based data set on the incidence of
innovations, there has been work that attempted to estimate the fre-
quency of such innovations. Summarizing studies published in the
1980s Voos and Eaton (1992) observed that the evidence suggested
that up to 65 percent of unionized firms in the surveys examined had
created some form of innovation that could be considered to have a
competitiveness-based rationale. The most frequent innovations were
information sharing and employee surveys, at over 60 percent of the
surveyed unionized firms. Fifty-one percent of the firms and unions in
one survey had created quality circles, 29–46 percent had instituted
some profit sharing, and 40 percent had established at least one partici-
patory program. Reanalyzing data from a survey done by the U.S. Gen-
eral Accounting Office, Voos and Eaton determined that some form of
participation was occurring in 79 percent of the unionized firms. Gain
sharing was the least frequent innovation, occurring in 33 percent of
the surveyed firms.
A different view of the frequency of use of collective bargaining as
a vehicle for encouraging competitiveness and employment protection/
creation can be obtained by examining a volume published by the
Industrial Relations Research Association (Voos 1994). This book
examined collective bargaining in the 1980s and early 1990s in many
of the unionized industries in the United States that have been affected
by global competition and domestic market deregulation. Among the
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industries examined were paper, meatpacking, aerospace, steel, auto
assembly, auto parts, trucking, telecommunications, and textile. A
summary of the findings of these industry studies will provide some
rough sense of the frequency of the use of collective bargaining as a
vehicle for competitiveness and employment protection/creation. In a
sense, the findings of this study would represent a lower bound on the
incidence of the use of collective bargaining, because its researchers
focused primarily on the large unionized firms and because the studies
were not designed to examine the phenomenon. Thus, absence of a dis-
cussion of the use of collective bargaining for purposes of competitive-
ness and employment protection/creation does not necessarily mean
that it was not so used in that industry. It is possible that the researcher
simply did not address it. Nevertheless, the studies in this volume pro-
vide useful data.
Table 2.1 presents a summary of the results of the studies in the
volume. The left-hand column displays the processes by which the out-
comes were obtained, the outcomes in the form of shop floor changes,
and the contexts/environments in which these outcomes occurred. An
outcome was considered to have occurred if it appeared in one of the
major firms in the industry.
The great diversity in U.S. collective bargaining has been docu-
mented elsewhere (Block, Beck, and Kruger 1996), and this diversity is
evident in analyzing the incidence of the use of collective bargaining as
a vehicle for addressing issues of competitiveness and job protection/
creation. In some industries, the collective bargaining system has been
used a great deal to address these problems; in others, less so. Paper,
steel, aerospace, auto assembly, and telecommunications have all used
the collective bargaining system as a vehicle for increasing firm com-
petitiveness in at least one of the firms in the industry. This has been
less the case for auto parts, motor carrier transportation, meatpacking,
and textiles.
Competitiveness
With respect to competitiveness, the table suggests that auto
assembly and steel are ahead of the other industries as sectors in which
at least one of the major firms and unions is using the collective bar-
gaining system as a tool to increase competitiveness. Auto assembly
34Table 2.1 Incidence/Frequency of the Use of Collective Bargaining as a Means of Encouraging Firm 
Competitiveness and Employment Protection/Creation in the United States, 1980–1992
Paper
Meat- 
packing
Aero-
space Steel
Auto 
assembly
Auto 
parts
Motor 
carrier
Telecom-
munication Textiles
Hard bargaining/conflict x x
Adversarial/arm’s length x
Outcomes
Concessions
 Lump sum bonuses x
 Two-tier wage systems
High-level participation x
Shop-floor changes
Imposed after hard barg.
Elim. weekend OT x
Production teams x
Participative prog. x
Flex. between prod. and maint. x
Greater subcontracting rights x
EE involvement x
Quality circles x
Long contracts x x
Jointly agreed-upon competitiveness
Elim. weekend OT
Production teams x
Participative prog. x
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Flex. classifications x x
Greater subcontracting rights x
EE involvement x
QWL and training x x
TQMS x
Consultation on tech. change v x
Information sharing x
Company-financed training x x
Profit sharing x x
Work restructuring x
Joint LM comms at all levels x
Seat on board x
Guaranteed income stream x
Pay for knowledge x
EE involvement 
Long-term contracts x
EE assignments, vacation, etc. x x
Product development
Variable pay x
Manufacturing methods
Employment protection/creation
Employment guarantee x
Employment security x x x
(continued)
36Table 2.1 (continued)
Paper
Meat- 
packing
Aero-
space Steel
Auto 
assembly
Auto 
parts
Motor 
carrier
Telecom-
munication Textiles
Context/environment
Regulatory
Antitrust litigation x
Environment x x
OSHA/safety regs. x
Import controls (joint pressure) x x
Deregulation x x
Divestiture x
Globalization
Value of dollar affects exports x
Corporate structure
Mergers and acquistions
 Debt x
 Uniform TCE “downward” x
Decentralization x
Technology
Computerization x
Market structure
New Entrants x x
Customers
37
Deregulation x
Government spending x
SOURCE: Voos (1994).
38 Block
has instituted production teams, flexible classifications, joint training,
pay for knowledge, and extensive employee involvement. The steel
industry, primarily National Steel, has formal information sharing,
company-financed training, profit sharing, work restructuring, and
joint labor–management committees at all levels. In both of these
cases, such changes were jointly agreed upon rather than being forced
on the union by hard employer bargaining. The telecommunications
industry has instituted company-financed training and variable pay.
Similarly, aerospace has instituted consultation on technological
change, total quality management systems, and quality of work life
systems with training.
The paper industry has also used collective bargaining as a vehicle
for increasing firm competitiveness. A major difference between the
paper industry and the auto assembly, steel, telecommunications, and
aerospace industries was the process by which the changes in the tradi-
tional collective bargaining system were implemented. In paper, the
changes were made after hard bargaining by employers, and followed
de-unionization campaigns by some paper companies in the late 1970s
and early 1980s. 
On the other hand, there was no substantial use of collective bar-
gaining as a vehicle to increase in competitiveness in the meatpacking,
auto parts, and motor carrier industries. All of these industries were
characterized by strong de-unionization movements or substantial non-
union sectors.
Recently, Gray, Myers, and Myers (1999) examined the U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics file of collective agreements covering 1,000
workers or more that expired between September 1, 1997, and Septem-
ber 30, 2007. Of the 1,041 agreements in the study, 154 (or 14.8 per-
cent) covering 854,803 workers contained contract provisions
requiring high-performance work practices, generally designed to
increase productivity and quality, reduce costs, increase the focus on
the customer, and ultimately, improve the firm’s competitiveness.
These include continuous improvement and employee involvement
programs, team concept, job security thorough training and multiskill-
ing, creation of an oversight committee, and no layoffs due to the
implementation of new work practices.
Two recent studies provide insight into whether unionization
affects the frequency of innovative work practices. Based on a study
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using a sample of 664 establishments in 1992 from the Dun and Brad-
street establishment file, Osterman (1994) found that roughly two-
thirds of the establishments in which 50 percent of the core workers
(defined as those workers who are actually involved in making the
product produced by, or delivering the service provided by, the estab-
lishment) participate had at least one of four identified practices
(teams, job rotation, total quality management, and quality circles).
There was no evidence that collective bargaining was related to the use
of such programs. Gittleman, Horrigan, and Joyce (1998) also found no
union effect on the incidence of work practices. Their estimates, based
on a data set from the U.S. Department of Labor, found that 42 percent
of all establishments, but about 70 percent of establishments with 50 or
more employees, had one of six practices.5 
Employment Protection/Creation
The U.S. collective bargaining system has not been able to generate
widespread employment guarantees. Rather, employment security and
job protection is obtained through the success of the firm. Put differ-
ently, there is very little administered job protection or job security
developed through the U.S. collective bargaining system. In general,
job security is market-based. This phenomenon is illustrated in Table
2.1.
The results presented by Gray, Myers, and Myers (1999) support
the assertion that administered job security is rare in the United States.
Of the agreements covering 1,000 workers or more, only 22 of the
agreements (2.1 percent) covering 123,811 workers had explicit provi-
sions prohibiting layoffs, and only 14 agreements (1.3 percent) cover-
ing 32,537 workers had no subcontracting provisions.
The most well-developed job security system in the United States
is in the automobile assembly industry in the 1996 agreement between
General Motors (GM) and the United Auto Workers (UAW) Union, in
which both parties negotiated a system of secured employment levels
(SELs). According to the agreement, the SEL system prohibits layoffs
for any reason except market-related volume reductions, reasons
beyond the control of the corporation (“acts of God”), sale of part of
the corporation, model change or plant rearrangement, or layoff of an
employee recalled to a temporary vacancy. National Steel and the
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United Steelworkers of America, as part of their cooperative partner-
ship, have negotiated job security over the life of the collective agree-
ment (Arthur and Smith 1994).
Conclusion on Incidence
The results of this analysis indicate that while there has been much
written about new work practices and the use of collective bargaining
as a means for improving firm competitiveness in the United States,
multiple provisions encouraging or requiring the parties to create spe-
cial structures for competitiveness are found only in a minority of
major collective agreements. There continues to be a bias in the U.S.
collective bargaining system toward retaining the formalism in the tra-
ditional, adversarial U.S. model of collective bargaining. As unioniza-
tion does not appear to be related to the frequency of such practices, it
suggests that the preference of the parties to collective bargaining for
the traditional model is comparable to the extent of the preference to
maintain the traditional hierarchical system of work organization. 
This does not mean that unions and employers are not working
toward competitiveness. As the case studies demonstrate, such efforts
are often ad hoc and not incorporated into agreements. Indeed, parties
often prefer to avoid placing such programs in the collective agreement
because placing them in the agreement reduces the flexibility of either
party to pull out if it wishes. In essence, placing the cooperative pro-
cess within the requirements of the legally enforceable collective
agreement is inconsistent with the essential voluntariness of coopera-
tion. Nevertheless, these results suggest that formal collective bargain-
ing provisions addressing competitiveness and employment protection/
creation efforts are not as common as might be thought based on the
literature. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
There are no societal institutions in the United States that encour-
age unions and employers to use the collective bargaining system for
purposes of firm competitiveness and employee job security. While the
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law enables collective bargaining to be used for this purpose, the law
does not require it. In addition, the decentralized structure of unioniza-
tion permits employers to explore competitiveness options away from
the union. Legal ambiguity about whether firm investment decisions
are negotiable, along with associated litigation, reduces the likelihood
that collective bargaining will be used to address competitiveness and
job security.
Government in the United States generally has little involvement
in collective bargaining, as bargaining is seen as a matter for the par-
ties. Nongovernmental aggregating institutions for management are
lobbying, advocacy, or educational organizations, and do not encour-
age collective bargaining as a vehicle for addressing competitive and
job security. On the union side, although union structures may have the
potential for encouraging use of bargaining for competitiveness and
job security, decentralized bargaining makes it difficult for high-level
union structures to impose outcome preferences on lower-level struc-
tures.
The result of this is great variability in the extent to which firms
and industries use collective bargaining to address issues of firm com-
petitiveness and job security. Some firms and industries have actively
used their bargaining systems to pursue competitiveness; others have
not. Job security is rarely provided explicitly; rather, it is linked to
competitiveness.
Notes
The author thanks Ms. Betty Barrett for her research assistance.
1. Whether public policy in the United States succeeds in protecting that choice is a
matter of debate. See, for example, U.S. Departments of Commerce and Labor
(1994) and Block, Beck, and Kruger (1996).
2. Employees of private, for-profit health care institutions had been previously cov-
ered through the board’s normal exercise of jurisdiction.
3. A notable exception to this rule is in over-the-road trucking and automobile haul-
ing. See Belzer (1994).
4. The highest union level in the United States often designates itself an international
union, perhaps because it may have membership in Canada.
5. See Appelbaum and Batt (1994) for a review of survey evidence on the incidence
of new work systems in the United States without taking into account unioniza-
tion. Appelbaum and Batt indicate that up to 85 percent of the firms in the United
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States had at least one practice in one facility, but the percentage dropped to as
low as 25 percent on multiple practices.
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How does collective bargaining affect the performance of the firm?
Does it improve or worsen productivity? Does collective bargaining
inherently increase costs? Are organized firms less profitable than
those which are not organized? Does union organization lower stock-
holder returns and discourage new investment? Are organized firms
more likely to fail than non-union firms? These questions have been a
topic of research, and of controversy, for more than a century. For most
of this period, researchers have sought to answer these questions
through detailed institutional analyses of firms and industries with
Union Policies and Industrial Management (Slichter 1941), which pro-
vides a landmark example. In the last 20 years, econometric methods
have been brought to bear on these questions. Beginning with “Trade
Unions in the Production Process” (Brown and Medoff 1978), more
than 60 published articles have examined some aspect of the collective
bargaining/firm performance relationship in the United States. The lit-
erature has grown sufficiently large—and remained controversial—
that there are four extant reviews: Hirsch and Addison (1986), Addison
and Hirsch (1989), Belman (1992), and Kuhn (1998).
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GENERAL THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Standard static economic models provide little room for unions to
have a positive effect on firm performance. In the static model, firms in
competitive industries operate on their efficiency frontiers. Unions,
interlopers in an already efficient production process, affect firms by
increasing compensation and negotiating rules that reduce the flexibil-
ity of work practices. Both lead to higher production costs and lower
profits. Higher wages and benefits of organized firms increase costs
and reduce profits, although these effects may be partially counteracted
if firms use their escalated compensation to attract more productive
employees. The labor productivity of organized firms may also be
higher than that of unorganized firms if they adjust to escalated labor
costs by substituting capital for more expensive labor. Despite such
adaptations, organized firms are seen as experiencing higher produc-
tion costs and reduced profits, because they have been moved away
from the profit-maximizing combination of inputs. The effects of
higher compensation are magnified where unions negotiate work rules
that limit management flexibility. Such rules move firms inside their
efficiency frontier, further degrading firm performance. The lower
profits and consequent lower rates of return on investment realized by
organized firms lead to lower levels of investment and increase the
likelihood of firms’ failure.
An implicit assumption of these models, one required for firms to
operate on their efficiency frontier, is that employee effort is fully
under the control of the firm and therefore maximized (Altman 2000).
While this reasonably holds where managers and owners have com-
plete information on their employees’ actions and can impose sanc-
tions in the absence of maximum efforts, in situations in which the
marginal transaction costs of writing effort-specific labor contracts,
metering and monitoring employees, and enforcing the contracts
exceed their marginal benefits (which is likely to be the case in the vast
majority of firms), employees will be afforded some discretion over
their work efforts. It is probable that firms can monitor and control the
physical effort expended by employees. Employee discretion over
effort is likely to be greatest, however, and most difficult for firms to
monitor when that effort involves sharing employee-specific informa-
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tion with the firm that can be used to enhance firm performance. Firms
which, because of the nature of their employment relationship, fail to
elicit the full discretionary information-sharing effort of their employ-
ees will suffer some degree of x-inefficiency and operate inside their
efficiency frontier. The lesser technical efficiency of such firms may,
however, be balanced by reduced direct labor costs if their “employ-
ment package” is less generous than that of firms which better elicit
employee effort and have higher output per unit of labor input. Where
employees have some control over work effort, different approaches to
the employment relationship may successfully coexist and be equally
effective at minimizing costs. 
If a firm is operating below its efficiency frontier, there may be
conditions under which unions would enhance firm performance.
Building on Altman’s approach, unionization may be viewed as a reor-
ganization of the production process, providing advantages and disad-
vantages for the firm. On the one hand, unions may have all the
negative efficiency effects contemplated by the leaner, traditional eco-
nomic theories. On the other hand, the representative and protective
functions of unions may provide opportunities for firms to better their
performance by eliciting greater commitment and information-sharing
effort from their employees than would be forthcoming in the absence
of a union. Employee information sharing is likely to be greater in a
unionized than in a non-union setting for two reasons: 1) collective
bargaining mandates negotiation and contact between the employer
and elected employee representatives, thus providing established chan-
nels that are accepted by employees; and 2) employees can negotiate
over the “price” to be paid for this information, perhaps in the form of
increased compensation, or guarantees that they will not be disadvan-
taged. In regimes lacking employee representation, the rules of the
workplace are often uncertain and their interpretation is, in the final
analysis, made unilaterally by an interested party. Under such condi-
tions, employees are likely to try to secure and improve their position
through opportunistic behavior such as reserving knowledge that is
potentially useful to the firm. Such behavior is less necessary where
there is employee representation, as there are established interpreta-
tions of rules and a structure that provides substantive and procedural
due process.1 Thus, unions and collective bargaining may improve firm
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performance by providing employee collective voice to which employ-
ers are legally required to listen.
In a non-union setting, with no formal, legally mandated voice
mechanism, employees’ fundamental means of communicating dissat-
isfaction with the employment relationship is through exit. This is
costly, as the firm loses trained and productive employees. In contrast,
unions provide a protected forum through which employees can make
their views known to their employer and reduce the impetus for
employees to leave the firm. The representative function of the union
also provides a structure through which the employer can elicit a frank
response to contemplated changes in the employment relationship and
seek employees’ untrammeled consent. Collective voice is particularly
important where the labor force has divergent interests, and where
changes in production arrangements and employment policies will
have divergent effects on the labor force. Collective organization pro-
vides a means through which employees can negotiate among them-
selves and develop a mutually acceptable arrangement with the
employer. 
Unionization may also improve firm performance by forcing
improvements in managerial performance. The costs of poor manage-
ment may be mitigated in a non-union workplace as bad production
planning, and inconsistent labor policies may be offset by low pay and
exceptional flexibility in the deployment of labor. Such solutions are
more expensive—if not unavailable—under collective bargaining,
where inordinate and ill-considered use of overtime, sudden shifts in
employment, and inconsistencies in the application of rules are limited
by the agreement. In order to survive and profit, organized firms have
to improve their planning of production and the quality of their super-
vision, in essence being “shocked” into efficient production practices.
Unions may also solve problems related to information, transaction
costs, and public goods through the hiring and training of employees.
In industries such as construction, where the term of employment with
any individual employer is short and there is substantial occupational
skill and knowledge, firms will be reluctant to undertake training as
they are unlikely to recover their costs. Unions potentially provide a
structure under which employers can collectively finance training pro-
grams for employees who will, over their working lives, be shared
among those firms. The union may also play an oversight role, ensur-
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ing that employers adhere to the training regime required to provide
appropriately skilled employees. In labor markets where employees are
transient among firms, unions may also serve to certify the skills of
employees and reduce the time and expenditure required to locate
appropriately skilled employees. 
A similar public goods situation might also exist outside construc-
tion. The longer employer tenure of unionized employees increases the
return from firm-specific training, as unionized employees are less
likely than their non-union counterparts to quit and take their training
elsewhere (see Freeman and Medoff 1986).
A final suggestion of the literature is that industrial relations cli-
mate rather than union organization, per se, is the key variable in deter-
mining the effect of collective bargaining on organizational
performance. Collective organization can provide a mechanism
through which managers and employees propose, discuss, and agree
upon the organization of the firm. In such circumstances, the firm is
likely to be more efficient than one in which decisions are taken unilat-
erally by management. In contrast, where relations between managers
and employees are conflictual, collective organization becomes a tool
in that conflict. It may be that the nature of the employment relation-
ship, the level of trust between the parties, the history of unilateralism
or mutuality, and the parties’ acceptance of the legitimacy of one
another’s goals play key roles in determining the effectiveness of an
organization, whether unionized or non-union, as well as the effective-
ness of collective bargaining on organizational performance.
The foregoing theoretical discussion points out that the efficiency
effects may not be as straightforward as traditional, lean economic the-
ories would predict. While collective bargaining and unionization may
negatively affect firms’ efficiency on the production frontier, it is not
likely that very many firms operate on that frontier at all times. Once
the assumption of efficient production in the absence of a union is
relaxed, it is possible to conceive of situations in which the presence of
a union might enhance efficiency, or be associated with no effect.
Thus, the predicted effects of unions on firm performance are not
unambiguously negative. The matter is best determined by empirical
work, and it is to that work that this chapter now turns. 
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EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
AND ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE
Empirical research on the effect of collective bargaining on organi-
zational performance typically addresses one of four broad topics: 1)
the effect on firm productivity and costs; 2) the effect on productivity
growth; 3) the effect on firm profits, investment, and survival; and 4)
the role of industrial relations climate on organizational outcomes.
Drawing on Belman (1992) and on Kuhn (1998), we review the litera-
ture on the United States up to the early 1990s and supplement this
with a discussion of more recent research.2
Effects on Productivity and Costs
The effect of unions on firm productivity and costs has been stud-
ied by comparisons across industries, within industries, and within
firms. While the former has the advantage of providing more general
answers to the question of interest, the more narrowly defined within-
industry and within-firm studies are advantageous in using measure-
ment of inputs and outputs and models that better reflect the industry or
organization under study. For example, while inter-industry studies
must use price-based measures of output, such as value added, industry
studies may use physical as well as price-based measures of output.
There are only two inter-industry studies of productivity and costs:
Brown and Medoff (1978) and Clark (1984). The former, which con-
siders the effect of union density on state by industry-value added, sug-
gests that organized establishments are between 19.5 and 24 percent
more productive, depending on the controls incorporated into the
model. Using a product line data set for 250 large firms, Clark finds a
small, economically inconsequential union effect on productivity. Bel-
man (1992) suggests that the difference between these findings might
be reconciled if positive productivity effects are the consequence of
shock effects in less well managed small and mid-sized firms. Larger
firms, such as those found in Clark’s sample, may already be well man-
aged and so do not benefit from organization. Neither study indicates
that unions have a consistently negative effect on productivity, as sug-
gested by standard theory.
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Intra-industry studies of the effect of unions on productivity and
costs are more prevalent than inter-industry studies. These include the
cement industry (Clark 1980a,b), construction (Allen 1984, 1986a,b,
1988b; Cavalluzzo and Baldwin 1993), hospitals (Sloan and Adamache
1984; Register 1988), banking (Graddy and Hall 1985), coal (Conner-
ton, Freeman, and Medoff 1983; Boal 1990; Boal and Pencavel 1994;
Byrnes et al. 1987), wooden furniture (Frantz 1976), machining
(Kelley and Xue 1990), steel finishing (Ichniowski and Shaw 1995),
and trucking (Delery et al. 2000). Considering the studies prior to
1992, Belman (1992) concluded that the effects of unions on produc-
tivity and costs vary by industry and by the period under consideration.
There is scant evidence that unions act to reduce productivity. The only
consistent negative finding was in the banking sector, while there is
substantial evidence that unions act to improve productivity in many
industries. Clark’s work on cement plants finds that organization is
associated with a productivity shock effect of 7 to 12 percent. The
extensive work on construction by Allen suggests that organization is
associated with higher productivity, particularly on projects that
require higher-skilled workers.
Union effects on costs are less clear-cut than union effects on pro-
ductivity. Unions reduce unit costs in private construction but are asso-
ciated with higher unit costs in public construction. Later work by
Cavalluzzo and Baldwin (1993) suggests that labor productivity was
38 percent higher on organized construction sites. The outcomes in
construction are of particular interest because of the role that building
trades unions play in the training process and in reducing employer
search costs.
Extractive industries have a reputation for conflictual labor rela-
tions, and studies of bituminous coal confirm the centrality of indus-
trial conflict in determining unions’ effect on productivity (Kerr,
Harbison, and Dunlop 1960). Byrnes et al. (1987) found that organized
surface mines were more productive than their non-union counterparts.
Connerton, Freeman, and Medoff (1983) found that the effect of
unions on mine productivity varied: in periods of labor peace, orga-
nized mines were 30 percent more productive than non-union mines; in
periods of industrial conflict, organized mines were 15 percent less
productive than non-union mines. Boal (1990) considers the effect of
unions on productivity in the 1920s, while Boal and Pencavel (1994)
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examine the effect on days of operation from 1897 to 1937. The first
finds that unions did not affect productivity in larger mines in the
1920s but were associated with lower productivity in smaller mines.
Boal suggests that this is the result of the lesser sophistication in labor
relations in smaller mines. Boal and Pencavel find no relationship
between unionization and days of operation except for the period from
1921 to 1930, when mines in fully organized counties had 25 percent
fewer operating days than mines in unorganized counties. Although the
authors suggest that this is the result of unions’ limitation of days of
work, this was also a period of intense conflict—conflict that eventu-
ally led to federal military intervention, as the industry in West Vir-
ginia de-unionized. The negative effect of organization on operating
days is then as likely to have reflected the events around the long
strike, such as the Matewan Massacre and the Battle of Beal Mountain
as a commitment to limiting working days.3
Bronars, Deere, and Tracy (1994) and Hirsch (1991b) are unique in
using Compustat data to examine the effect of unions on multiple mea-
sures of firm performance, including profitability, investment, sales,
employment growth, and productivity.4 Bronars, Deere, and Tracy use
the union contract files of the Bureau of Labor Statistics to obtain
matching data on the extent of organization by firm. The authors test
several specifications and compare results obtained with their firm
level unionization measure with the use of more aggregate measures of
union density. Although results vary considerably by specifications,
the findings suggest that firms with higher unionization have higher
productivity in manufacturing, suggesting that unionized employers
offset the union wage and benefit premium through improved produc-
tivity. Outside manufacturing, the relationship is too sensitive to speci-
fication, functional form, and period to support any conclusions about
union effects.5 This research considers whether unions influence other
aspects of firm performance, including capital expenditures, capital-to-
labor ratios, advertising-to-sales ratios, and investment in research and
development, and it finds little evidence for any effect.
In contrast, Hirsch (1991b) finds that organized firms are substan-
tially less productive than similar non-union firms. Data on unioniza-
tion were obtained from a survey of Compustat firms. Initial estimates
indicate that firms with the average level of organization (42.3 percent)
would have 3.5 percent lower factor productivity as measured by value
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added per employee. The results are sensitive to inclusion of industry
controls. Models with no controls for industry indicate much larger
negative union productivity effects; estimates from models that include
highly disaggregate measures of industry find union productivity
effects in the range of –1 to –1.5 percent. Conflation of industry effects
with firm unionization is also apparent in the preferred estimate, which
incorporates measures of the characteristics of two-digit industry,
including a measure of industry union density. The coefficient on
industry density is positive and sufficiently large in magnitude: a 10-
percentage-point increase in industry density would be associated with
a 2.8-percentage-point increase in firm productivity, to potentially off-
set the negative effect of firm union density. Hirsch speculates that this
effect is due to escalated product prices in heavily organized industries
or incomplete specification of the determinants of productivity corre-
lated with industry density. The sensitivity of the estimates to industry
controls may, however, reflect measurement problems in the construc-
tion of the dependent variable, value added per employee, suggesting
that the estimates of union effects may be inaccurate.6
Two recent studies provide indirect evidence of a negative union
productivity effect in steel and in trucking. Ichniowski and Shaw’s
1995 study of steel finishing lines focuses on the determinants and con-
sequences of human resource management practices. They find that
human resource management (HRM) practices cluster on a continuum
from traditional to new and that the cluster of the newest practices is
associated with a 6 percent higher ratio of actual to scheduled operat-
ing time. Organized plants, however, are substantially less likely to
adopt new HRM practices. Although the authors do not test the effect
of unions on operating time per se, by reducing the likelihood that
firms adopt more efficient HRM practices, unions are potentially asso-
ciated with lower productivity. Delery et al. (2000) examine the
premise that organized firms have lower turnover and quit rates among
trucking firms with 30 or more employees. Their evidence suggests
that, after accounting for the effect of unions on wages, neither unions
nor “voice” procedures are associated with reduced turnover or quits.7
Taken together, current studies remain favorable to the view that
collective bargaining typically has a favorable positive effect on the
productivity performance of the firm, suggesting that non-union firms
rarely operate at maximum efficiency. The union effects, however,
54 Belman and Block
vary considerably by industry and by time period, and they are sensi-
tive to the degree of conflict between employees and employers.
Where it has been studied, the effect of unions on costs is typically less
favorable as gains in productivity are offset by escalated compensation
costs.
Effects on Profitability, Investment, and Firm Failure
While studies of productivity and costs are fundamentally about
the effect of collective bargaining on firm efficiency, studies of profit-
ability consider both the efficiency and distributional effects of bar-
gaining. Although any negative effect on profits may originate in
reduced efficiency, it may also result from unions using bargaining
power to claim part of the profits typically going to shareholders.
Research interest has focused on the subsidiary issue of the circum-
stances under which unions can claim a share of firm profits. In com-
petitive markets, unions’ claim of a share of capital income would
result, in time, in the firm going out of business as new capital was
diverted from reinvestment in the company. Once the assumption of
competitive markets is relaxed, however, the long-run results of union
diversion of profits to compensation become difficult to predict. For
example, where a firm realizes rents from market power in imperfectly
competitive markets, the firm may generate sufficient profits to main-
tain investment at an optimal level. In such a situation, the union com-
pensation premium may be a diversion from other uses of profits, such
as dividends. In addition, unions may be able to claim quasi-rents from
physical investment where such investment is not readily reversed and
is long lived. 
Studies of profitability, the most common topic of research, may
be divided between those that use firm data to construct measures such
as price/cost margins ([sales – payroll – materials costs] / sales) and
Tobin’s q (value of firms equity and debt / replacement cost of assets),
and those that use stock market data to assess the effect of changes in
union status and collective bargaining outcomes on the valuation of
firm stocks. An almost universal result from these studies is that unions
are associated with reduced profitability. What remains at issue is cir-
cumstances under which unions are able to claim a share of firm prof-
its.
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Freeman (1983), Freeman and Medoff (1984), Karier (1985,
1988), and Voos and Mishel (1986) have estimated the effect of unions
on profitability using industry data obtained from the U.S. Census.
Although such studies suffer the disadvantage of using data averaged
across firms within an industry, the data reflect firms’ domestic (U.S.)
operations, simplifying the specification of equations and providing an
appropriate match between dependent and explanatory variables. Free-
man and Freeman and Medoff find that price/cost margins are reduced
between 0 and 37 percent and return on capital was reduced between 9
and 32 percent in the presence of unions, but that unions did not reduce
firms’ profitability in competitive markets. Karier finds similar results
with unions reducing price/cost margins by 14 percent in highly
monopolized markets but having no effect in competitive markets.
Voos and Mishel find that unions reduce price/cost margins by
between 22 and 35 percent but do not consider the effect of competi-
tiveness of the market.
Studies of firms are potentially superior to industry studies,
because the lower level of aggregation may allow researchers to better
isolate the mechanisms through which unions affect profitability. This
advantage is purchased at the cost of challenges in collection of data.
Data on the firm unionization are not available from standard sources;
researchers must locate appropriate sources and compile the data.
Becker and Olson (1992) used pension data collected by the U.S.
Department of Labor to estimate union density for large firms; Hirsch
(1991a) conducted a survey of Compustat firms that collected data on
organization; Bronars, Deere, and Tracy (1994) use data from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics collective bargaining agreement file to
determine unionization levels within the firm. All of these approaches
result in partial samples of the population of firms. Hirsch reports
obtaining data from 620 of 1,900 Compustat firms initially surveyed,
and Bronars et al. sample sizes range from 120 to 130, less than 10 per-
cent of the Compustat firms. Such extensive incomplete coverage
raises the potential for substantial nonrandomness in the sample and
consequent bias in the estimates.8 A second daunting problem is that
because measures of firm profitability include profits from overseas
operations, the models need to incorporate controls for the extent and
performance of overseas operations. The absence of controls for for-
eign operations from any of the firm estimates shadows this literature.9
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Finally, Standard & Poor’s Compustat data are limited to very large
firms and, as such, are unrepresentative of the economy as a whole.
Belman (1992) reviews studies by Salinger (1984), Clark (1984),
Hirsch and Connolly (1987), Connolly, Hirsch, and Hirschy (1986),
Becker and Olson (1992), Voos and Mishel (1986), and Allen
(1988a,b). As with the industry studies, these studies suggest that orga-
nized firms have lower price/cost margins and lower q’s than firms that
are not organized. For example, Clark found that unions reduced
returns on sales by 16 percent while reducing returns on capital by 19
percent. As in the industry studies, another issue is whether unions
reduce the profits of all firms, or only of firms that are earning eco-
nomic rents. Salinger’s work suggests that unions reduce monopoly
rents. Hirsch and Connolly (1987), however, do not support this con-
clusion. They find that unions capture rents from sunk research and
development investments. These results are specific to Tobin’s q but
are not found when price/cost margins are the dependent variable.10
Becker and Olson (1992) also find that the negative relationship
between unionization and profits is related to union capture of rents on
intangibles, but, as with Hirsch’s research, these results are sensitive to
the measure of profit. In contrast to other studies, Allen finds that
unions do not reduce profits in construction. The unique nature of
unionism in construction, which results in substantial employer savings
in recruitment and training costs in a transient labor market for gener-
ally skilled employees, may account for this difference.
More recent research is provided by Hirsch (1990, 1991a,b, 1992),
Hirsch and Morgan (1994), and Bronars, Deere, and Tracy (1994). Hir-
sch’s extensive work on this issue builds on his survey of firms in the
Compustat database to determine the company’s extent of unionization
in the 1970s and 1980s.11 These data were then matched to Compustat
panels on firms to measure the relationship between firm unionization
and various measures of firm performance between 1972 and 1980.
Depending on the specification used, Tobin’s q is 20 percent lower,
and return on capital, π, is 14 percent lower in the typical union firm
(with union density of 42.3 percent). Estimates of the effect of unions
on profits are, however, sensitive to controls for industry, particularly
to inclusion of industry indicator variables. In the presence of such
indicators, the coefficient on firm density becomes nonsignificant for q
and becomes small and only marginally significant for π.12 Further esti-
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mates suggest that the reduced profitability of organized firms may be
attributed to unions appropriating rents from firms’ investments in
research and development and fixed capital and that, as a result, orga-
nized firms may invest less than unorganized firms in research and
development and fixed capital.13 These results are consistent with
unions capturing rents where firms are unable to protect those rents
from partial appropriation through collective bargaining. Building on
prior work by Becker and Olson (1986), Hirsch and Morgan (1994)
find that shareholder risks decline with the extent of union coverage in
the 1970s. They found that highly unionized firms had lower returns
during this period but that this relationship between shareholder returns
and coverage broke down in the 1980s.
Bronars, Deere, and Tracy (1994) also examine the effect of union-
ization on profitability for three measures of profitability: Tobin’s q,
the ratio of excess market valuation to sales, and the ratio of net operat-
ing income to sales, using several specifications. Focusing on the spec-
ifications that include controls for industry and firm characteristics,
there is no evidence that Tobin’s q or the ratio of excess valuation to
sales is lower among organized firms in the manufacturing sector, but
the net operating income to sales ratio in fully organized firms is esti-
mated to be 3 to 4 percent below that of an otherwise similar non-union
firm. Among the nonmanufacturing firms, Tobin’s q in a completely
organized firm would be 18 to 22 percent below that of a similar unor-
ganized firm, but there is no significant union effect on the other mea-
sures of profitability. First, differencing of the data eliminates any
meaningful statistical relationship between unionization and profitabil-
ity except for a negative effect for the ratio of excess market valuation
to sales in nonmanufacturing. The sensitivity of the estimates to the
sector, measure of profitability, and specification of the variables sug-
gests that although some specifications of the profits equation produce
the expected negative relationship, that relationship is tenuous, particu-
larly in the manufacturing sector.14 
Stock market studies consider the effect of events related to collec-
tive bargaining on the market value of firms. Under the assumption that
stock markets are efficient processors of information, changes in stock
valuation in response to new information reflect the expected effect of
these shifts on the performance of the firm. Changes in stock valuation
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in response to strikes, representation elections, and settlement of con-
tracts will then reflect unions’ effect on firm outcomes.
Events that are viewed as favorable to unions are generally associ-
ated with a reduction in the market valuation of the firm’s stock.
Rubeck and Zimmerman (1984) find a decline in stock valuation both
when a petition for a representation election is filed and when the elec-
tion is held. Stock valuation declines between 1.3 percent if the union
loses and 3.8 percent if it wins. Both Greer, Martin, and Reusser (1980)
and Becker and Olson (1986) found a decline in stock valuation fol-
lowing a strike. In contrast, concessionary contracts were associated
with an increase in stock valuation (Becker 1987). Although these
results might indicate that stockholders expect organized firms would
operate less efficiently, it may also reflect a belief that union success
will lead to the redistribution of profits from stockholders to employ-
ees. There is also internal evidence in these studies that profit declines
preceded organization and that union activity might be a response to
worsening economic performance. 
Freeman and Kleiner (1999) consider the effect of organization on
the survival of firms. In the first part of this study, the authors use
Compustat data to examine the likelihood of a firm going out of busi-
ness. Using a modest set of controls, the authors find that organization
itself reduces the likelihood of a firm becoming insolvent but that the
likelihood of insolvency rises with the level of organization. The most
highly organized firms have a 23 percent likelihood of becoming insol-
vent, relative to a 19 percent probability of insolvency for non-union
firms, for the period under consideration. In the second part of the
study, the displaced worker supplement of the Current Population Sur-
vey is used to determine the effect of union membership on the proba-
bility that an employee was displaced by the permanent closure of a
plant. Freeman and Kleiner’s estimates indicate that union membership
is unrelated to plant closing or any form of displacement. They suggest
that these results are consistent with the hypothesis that unions behave
in an economically rational manner in not increasing wages to the point
at which the firm, plant, or business lines close down.
Taken together, the studies of the effect of collective bargaining on
profits, investment, and firm failure suggest that unions do not fully
pay for their higher wages and benefits through increasing productivity
and reducing costs. They act to redistribute part of the shareholders’
The Impact of Collective Bargaining on Competitiveness and Employment 59
earnings to employees, but this redistribution occurs where firms are
earning rents or quasi-rents. However, the redistribution is not so large
as to endanger the economic viability of the firm.
Collective Bargaining Practices and Competitiveness
The previous discussion focused on the effect of the mere inci-
dence of collective bargaining on organizational outcomes that might
be associated with the competitiveness of the firm. There is no reason
to believe, however, that the existence of a bargaining relationship per
se would necessarily result in improved firm competitiveness. Collec-
tive bargaining traditionalists might contend that the major purpose of
collective bargaining is to provide employees with workplace repre-
sentation rather than to encourage firm competitiveness. To the extent
that this is the case, only when the union and the employer believe it is
in their mutual interests to move the process toward encouraging com-
petitiveness will it be used that way.
Since the early 1980s, many firms and unions have moved toward
innovative collective bargaining and cooperative relationships as a
means for fostering improved firm competitiveness and increased
employment protection and job creation (Kochan, Katz, and McKersie
1986; Block, Beck, and Kruger 1996). A literature has developed that
has examined the success of these innovations, and much of the pre-
1990s literature is included in Belman’s 1992 review. A series of stud-
ies of General Motors (Katz, Kochan, and Gobielle 1983; Kochan,
Katz, and Mower 1985; Katz, Kochan, and Weber 1985) investigated
the relationship between innovative industrial relations programs,
industrial relations outcomes, and plant-level economic performance.
They suggest that such programs have positive effects on the quality of
production and a weaker but positive effect on labor efficiency (pro-
ductivity). These studies also find that higher levels of conflict, such as
escalated levels of grievance filing and disciplinary activity, are associ-
ated with reduced product quality and productivity. Schuster (1983)
examined the impact of profit-sharing plans, gain-sharing plans, labor–
management committees, quality circles, and quality of work life pro-
gram on productivity (sales per employee hour worked), employment,
product quality, absenteeism, voluntary turnover, tardiness, grievances,
and employment security with a before-and-after study of 38 firms in
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the eastern United States. Such programs had a positive impact on pro-
ductivity but little effect on product quality, employment, turnover,
absenteeism, tardiness, and the grievance rate. There was a strong link-
age between employment security guarantees and firms’ economic per-
formance, but only 3 of 38 firms provided such guarantees.
Rubinstein (2000) examined the difference in first-time product
quality associated with union and non-union at the comanaged Saturn
plant in Tennessee. Rubinstein found that the communications net-
works associated with union managers were associated with higher
first-time quality than the communications networks associated with
non-union managers. 
Several studies suggest that the availability of formal procedures
for resolving grievances is associated with improved firm performance
but that escalated levels of grievance activity are associated with lower
productivity and product quality (Norsworthy and Zabala 1985; Ich-
niowski and Lewin 1987; Ichniowski 1986; Goldberg and Brett 1979;
Spencer 1986). Ichniowski finds that the absence of a mechanism for
resolving grievances in a non-union paper mill resulted in the firm
operating 19.5 percent below full labor efficiency. 
Although the relationship between the quality of the collective bar-
gaining relationship and firm performance has not been widely studied
in the 1990s, there have been several notable additions to the literature.
In a survey based on 194 plant mangers, 74 union officers, and 135
headquarters personnel associated with the same firms, Cooke (1990)
found that high union leader involvement and frequent team meetings
were associated with perceived improvements (“much improvement”)
in quality, productivity, and supervisor–employee relations. Measures
of technological displacement had a mixed effect on these outcomes,
while concession bargaining measures were unrelated. In a study of
194 manufacturing firms throughout the United States and 131 manu-
facturing firms in Michigan, Cooke (1992) found that unionized firms
with jointly administered employee participation programs achieved
greater improvement on a subjective measure of product quality than
unionized firms without such programs, and that unionized firms with
jointly administered programs achieve quality gains equal to non-union
firms with participation programs. Subcontracting was found to have a
negative spillover on quality: firms that used subcontracting suffered
reduced product quality relative to firms that did not subcontract. Sum-
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marizing these findings, Cooke suggests that labor–management cli-
mate was a key determinant of quality. 
In a study of the economic impact of the change in the collective
bargaining relationship between Xerox and the Amalgamated Clothing
and Textile Workers, Cutcher-Gershenfeld (1991) finds that work
areas that could be identified as traditional (adversarial) were associ-
ated with significantly higher product costs, greater losses to scrap,
greater productivity variation, and lower net return (a measure of actual
vs. standard labor hours for producing a part) than work areas identi-
fied as transformational or transitional (work areas that exhibited less
measured conflict, greater speed of conflict resolution, problem solv-
ing, worker autonomy, and worker-initiated changes).
Kelley and Harrison (1992) report that the presence of labor–man-
agement committees in a sample of small unionized machining plants
was associated with lower levels of productivity and greater job inse-
curity. They suggest that this unexpectedly negative relationship is the
result of omitted mediating variables, such as vulnerability to foreign
competition. In their view, the adoption of labor–management commit-
tees is not random but a response to poor economic performance by the
firm. The presence of these committees may proxy for omitted vari-
ables that are the true source poor performance.
The current literature provides considerable favorable evidence on
the effect of innovative work structures on organizational performance.
Evidence on the role of unions in promoting or impeding the imple-
mentation of new work practices is mixed. Ichniowski and Shaw
(1995) find that organized steel finishing lines are less likely to adopt
the most advanced combination of work practices. Osterman (1994)
finds more mixed results in a study of the adoption of innovative work
practices, where such practices are defined by the adoption of teams,
job rotation, quality circles, and total quality management. The effect
of unions on innovation depends greatly on the construction of the
independent variable, with the estimated effect varying from positive
and weakly significant to nonsignificant to negative and weakly signif-
icant. Eaton and Voos (1992) suggest that the unions play an important
role in obtaining the genuine consent and participation of the labor
force, and that this makes adoption of workplace innovations both
more likely and effective. They suggest that, with the exception of
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profit-sharing plans, organized plants are more likely to adopt work-
place innovations than non-union plants.
Evidence on the effect of unions on training is mixed. Unions
appear to have little effect on the amount of training in small firms, but
they are associated with longer duration and total hours of training and
a greater use of formal training programs in a more representative
cross-section of firms. In a study of the effect of government subsidies
on firm training, Holzer et al. (1993) found that the presence of a union
did not affect the amount of annual quality-related training hours
offered by a population of small manufacturing firms in the years
1987–1989; training hours were determined primarily by whether the
firm received a government subsidy. In addition, there was no evidence
suggesting that the presence of a union affected the success of that
training, measured by a change in the scrap rate. Using a 1992 survey
of the Small Business Administration, Black, Noel, and Wang (1999)
find that weekly hours of formal and informal training are not affected
by the union status of firms. Organized firms, however, provide more
weeks of on- and off-site formal training than otherwise comparable
firms. A larger fraction of the training provided by organized firms is
formal, while non-union firms provide a larger fraction of their training
as informal training by managers or co-workers.
Summarizing the knowledge as of the early 1990s, Belman (1992)
wrote:
There is substantial variation in the effect of unions on firm per-
formance and this variation is caused by differences in the rela-
tionship between labor and management. Low trust/high conflict
environments, rather than unions, are the source of reduced pro-
ductivity. Higher levels of trust are associated with reduced strife
and, consequently, with both greater productivity and higher prod-
uct quality. Further, although the level of conflict is affected by
the conditions and history of a plant, firm and industry, the parties
can reduce the level of conflict and share the gains from improved
efficiency and quality. (Pp. 69–70)
Current evidence supports the view that special efforts by labor
and management to address issues of competitiveness improve product
quality and productivity but their effects may not be large. Rarely is
labor relations the basis on which the firm maintains its position in the
product (Block et al. 1987). Thus, labor relations is a contributor to
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firm competitiveness, but it is not reasonable to expect labor relations
to be the leading determinant of corporate performance. 
Collective Bargaining and Employment
Standard static neoclassical economic theory predicts that collec-
tive bargaining is associated with lower levels of employment,
although more developed theories suggest different possibilities. In the
standard theory, collective bargaining imposes labor costs on employ-
ers above what they would otherwise incur. Assuming competitive
product and labor markets and operation on its production frontier, a
firm will respond to above-market labor costs associated with collec-
tive bargaining by substituting capital for labor, thereby reducing
employment. If the firm is unable to substitute capital for labor, it
would operate below the level of maximum efficiency, with lower
employment than otherwise due to forgone revenues.
Contract curve or efficient contract theory suggests a somewhat
different result, as the union does not simply set a monopoly wage.
Rather, the union bargains with the firm for a wage that is between the
competitive and monopoly wage and a level of employment that is
above the monopoly and potentially above the competitive employ-
ment level. In such instances, collective bargaining might be associated
with higher rather than lower employment.
The negative employment effects contemplated by the standard
static model may also not be found if collective bargaining improves
productivity. In this case, the effects of the escalated wages are sub-
stantially and possibly fully offset by the productivity improvements
associated with collective bargaining. As organized firms’ unit labor
costs are no higher than that of non-union firms, employment will not
decline. If the productivity gains from organization are of sufficient
magnitude, organized firms may have lower unit labor costs and higher
employment than their non-union counterparts. This form of productiv-
ity gain is distinct from that which results when firms respond to esca-
lated union wages by substituting capital for labor. While increasing
the capital stock will boost labor productivity, it will, other things
equal, be associated with a decline in employment. If union labor is
itself more productive independent of the complementary capital stock,
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the increase in productivity occurs without any increase in capital stock
or decline in employment.
The interpretation of any negative employment findings is compli-
cated by a U.S. legal system that allows firms to escape collective bar-
gaining by investing away from the union. Under the U.S. system, a
firm may decide to eschew the difficult and expensive strategy of
directly eliminating collective bargaining in a plant that is already
organized. An alternative strategy is to accept collective bargaining
where it exists but strongly resist organization in new plants and focus
new investment in new, non-union plants. Employment declines in the
union sector as the capital stock that complements the unionized
employees becomes depreciated and obsolete. Thus, a negative rela-
tionship between unionization and employment growth might then be
the result of capital-stock-obsolescence-driven employment attrition in
unionized plants and union avoidance rather than direct adjustments to
escalated wages or other economic responses to collective bargaining.
A limitation of all of these models is that they make predictions
about the level of employment but say little about how collective bar-
gaining affects the rate of growth of employment. Some authors, such
as Leonard (1992), suggest that the reduced rates of profit predicted by
the standard neoclassical model will cause organized firms to have a
lower rate of employment growth, but these arguments are intuitive
and not derived from a formal model.
As noted by Kuhn (1998), research on the effect of unions on
employment in the United States is sparse.15 Leonard (1992) investi-
gates this issue with a sample of 1,798 California manufacturing plants
over the period between 1974 and 1980. In a model that included con-
trols for initial employment, corporate structure, percentage of noncler-
ical white-collar workers in the plant labor force, and industry and
regional indicators, employment in unionized plants grew 9 percent
more slowly than employment in non-union plants. When the sample
was separated by the union status of the plant, average annual employ-
ment growth rates were 4 percent lower in unionized plants. When
information on the vintage of plants was incorporated into a subsample
for which such information was available, there was no statistically
significant difference in the growth rates of union and non-union
plants. The latter result suggests that the slower growth of employment
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in organized plants may be due to unions’ inability to organize newer
facilities rather than any effect on employment growth rates per se.
As part of their study of Compustat firms, Bronars, Deere, and
Tracy (1994) found that the employment growth was significantly
slower among organized firms than among non-union firms. Employ-
ment in non-union manufacturing grew between 0.5 and 1.0 percentage
points faster than among organized firms, and between 0.6 and 1.1 per-
centage points faster among firms outside manufacturing.
Employment effects may also reflect union preferences. In a study
of bargaining behavior of locals of the International Typographical
Union in 13 small towns, MaCurdy and Pencavel (1986) found that
locals did not maximize rents at the expense of employment in negotia-
tions with newspapers. Rather, consistent with the efficient contracts
model, they accepted lower wages to minimize employment loss. In
contrast, in a study of employment in two-digit industry manufacturing
industries in 1972 and 83 construction projects in 1973–1974, Wessels
(1991) found a consistently negative relationship between unionization
and employment. Although significance varied by specification, the
results suggested that the relationship between collective bargaining
and employment was better described by a standard neoclassical
model. The difference in the results between the MaCurdy and Pen-
cavel and Wessels studies may reflect differences between the indus-
tries under study, as well as the varied goals and concerns of labor
organizations. The lower employment levels found on organized con-
struction projects is also consistent with the substantially greater pro-
ductivity of unionized workers found by Allen (1984, 1988a).
Dunne and MacPherson (1994) find that there was little correlation
between unionization rates by industry and plant closing between 1977
and 1982. However, industries with higher rates of organization had a
higher rate of employment loss due to contractions of plants and some-
what smaller job gains associated with plant expansions. Consistent
with the standard neoclassical theory, Linneman, Wachter, and Carter
(1990) find that the decline in employment in unionized industries is
greatest in those industries with the largest union/non-union wage dif-
ferentials.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Although standard economic theory generates straightforward pre-
dictions regarding the effect of unions and collective bargaining on
organizational performance, other more complex theoretical formula-
tions suggest that the effects of unions may be ambiguous and difficult
to predict a priori. The empirical research supports the latter position,
and suggests that unions and collective bargaining often have a posi-
tive rather than negative effect on productivity. As unions generally
increase costs of production, these results suggest that management is
generally able to adjust its production processes and employment lev-
els to unionization. Unions are also associated with lower profitability
than their non-union counterparts. Whether this negative effect on
profitability has a long-term negative impact on firm viability is deter-
mined by whether this union appropriation of profits is from dividends
or from internally financed investment and research and development.
Effects of unions and collective bargaining on other measures of orga-
nizational performance, such as product quality and training, tend to be
negligible (or positive) but small, suggesting that collective bargaining
does not alter these outcomes relative to what they would otherwise
have been in the absence of unions. There is evidence that cooperative
and nontraditional collective bargaining structures have a positive
impact on workplace outcomes, such as productivity and quality, but
have little effect on overall organizational performance. Finally, there
is some evidence of a negative employment effect associated with col-
lective bargaining and unionization, although it is difficult to determine
whether such effects are the result of union workplace practices or
employer opposition to unionism.
Overall, the effects of unions and collective bargaining are as var-
ied as might be expected in an economy with decentralized bargaining
structures and organizations with differing production functions, often
operating at less than maximum efficiency and participating in markets
with varying degrees of competitiveness. Straightforward predictions
about the effects of unions on firm performance are likely to be an
extreme oversimplifacation.
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Notes
1. Although it is possible for non-union employers to create voluntary employee
voice structures without union representation, in order to remain lawful, such
structures may not incorporate bilateral communications over terms and condi-
tions of employment. In addition, because these structures are controlled by the
employer, and because the employees lack protection, employees may be less
likely to share knowledge for fear it may be used to their disadvantage.
2. There has been no new literature on the effect of unions on productivity growth
since Belman’s review, and we omit this issue from our review.
3. This interpretation is reenforced by the Boal and Pencavel finding that unions
raised wages by a meager 5 percent in this period. It is unlikely that an organiza-
tion that had the ability to reduce operating days by one-quarter would settle for
such a small wage advantage that the members’ income was lower than their non-
union counterparts.
4. Discussion of issues involved in the use of firm data is put off to the section on the
effect of unions on firm profits.
5. Results range from negative and significant for 1975–1978 data with a Cobb-
Douglas with industry and additional controls, to positive and significant for
1979–1982 data with a Cobb-Douglas with industry and additional controls, to
negative and significant for the same year and specification when estimated with a
frontier approach.
6. Hirsch (1991b) reports that labor costs, an essential element in the calculation of
value added, are only available for one-quarter of the firms in the sample. For the
balance of the sample, labor costs are constructed by assigning industry average
labor costs to firms and assigning a 25 percent premium in labor costs to orga-
nized firms. This will create the observed negative correlation between unioniza-
tion and value added as well as a strong correlation between industry and value
added, and suggests that the estimates of firm level union productivity effects may
be the result of construction rather than an underlying relationship. These prob-
lems are unfortunate, as the conventional measure of productivity—output per
unit of labor—could have been constructed from Compustat data.
7. Delery et al.’s (2000) research is hampered by the low response rate to his survey
and the even lower response to questions on turnover and quit rates.
8. Hirsch (1991b) reports that the means for his sample are similar to the means for
the Compustat for the period under study. A more complete approach would have
been to test the means and variances to ensure that data came from similar distri-
butions and, because of the importance of industry to the study, to test means and
variances by industry.
9. The omission of controls for foreign operations is the consequence of applying
specifications developed for census industry/establishment data, which is limited
to domestic operations, to data on firms which includes foreign operations.
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10. Using a cross-section of New York firms, Hirsch and Link (1987) find that union-
ization is associated with firm managers perceiving their firms as being less inno-
vative than their competitors.
11. Hirsch’s approach to obtaining firm-level unionization data differs from that of
Becker and Olson (1992), who used pension data to determine firm unionization,
and of Bronars, Deere, and Tracy (1994), who used the collective bargaining files
at the Bureau of Labor Statistics to determine the extent of organization. The sur-
vey was sent to 1,904 firms, and useable replies were obtained from 475 firms.
This was supplemented with data from an additional 157 firms, which reported in
a 1972 survey by the Conference Board. The final sample size was 632 firms.
12. The effect of controls for industry is found in Hirsch (1990). Similar results
appear to characterize Table 4.4 of Hirsch (1991b) but, due to a misprint, this is
not certain.
13. The measure of π is the gross return on capital (income plus depreciation plus
interest income less inventory and imputed income adjustments) per unit of capi-
tal. Firm profitability is more typically constructed as net income per unit of capi-
tal, or as net operating income per unit of sales, and it is uncertain whether the
results for π as constructed by Hirsch would obtain with the more conventional
measures. 
14. Although current studies treat unionization as a strictly exogenous variable, it
may be simultaneous with profitability. One explanation of this is that unions seek
to organize more profitable firms, resulting in a positive causal link between prof-
itability and organization. A second possible explanation suggests that under U.S.
labor law, large firms resist unionization by replacing union facilities with non-
union facilities and resisting organization of non-union plants. Resisting unions is
costly and is likely pursued more effectively by profitable firms and industries.
This suggests a negative causal relationship from profitability to unionization.
Either causal link would result in bias in estimates of the unionization/profitability
relationship, which did not allow for simultaneity, but the direction of the bias is
uncertain.
15. As in the balance of this review, we do not include articles that center on other
countries or in which discussion and analysis of the United States is incidental.
This reflects the focus of this review, and with regard to empirical work, authors
view that cross-country measures of differences in employment relation systems
are difficult to construct and their results even more difficult to interpret. Two
articles that attempt to sort out the effects of international institutions on employ-
ment growth are Addison, Teixeira, and Grosso (2000) and Buchele and Chris-
tiansen (1999).
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Case Study Methodology
Richard N. Block
Michigan State University
This chapter will address the methodology used in the four case
studies presented in the following chapters. As this was a study of the
relationship among collective bargaining, employment protection/cre-
ation, and firm competitiveness, it was our initial view that the case
study methodology should take into account all three major compo-
nents to the extent possible. The review of the literature suggested,
however, that formal, negotiated job protection was fairly rare in the
collective bargaining system in the United States. Therefore, while we
examined the extent of formal job security guarantees, we did not
expect to find this a common occurrence.
In carrying out the case studies, we did not explicitly address the
concepts discussed in Chapter 1, i.e., individualism, property rights,
and transaction or value-based employment, as these concepts are
embedded in the very nature of employment. Rather, our interest was
in seeing how these concepts were manifested in the relationship as the
parties attempted to address the goals of competitiveness and job secu-
rity. Individualism is not seen in these case studies, because these are
employment relationships that are collectivized. But property rights
and transaction or value-based employment are the essence of these
case studies, as will be discussed. 
FRAMEWORK
The importance of property rights in the United States results in a
highly decentralized system of collective bargaining. Public policy per-
mits firms and unions, with firms generally being the more influential
party because of property rights and their control of resources (Block
1990), to determine the type of collective bargaining system they wish.
Bargaining outcomes, defined as wages, hours, working conditions,
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and the processes through which employers and unions interact, are
determined at the level of the bargaining relationship.1
Because of decentralization of bargaining in the United States, we
chose to focus the study at the plant or site level. Consistent with an
industrial relations system approach (Dunlop 1958), we examined the
parties’ collective bargaining response to job protection/creation and
competitiveness as the outcome to be examined. Because these were
plant-level case studies, we focused on the two contextual constraints
that would be most relevant at the plant level: the technological charac-
teristics of the workplace and the market constraints, both key determi-
nants of employment in a system of value-based jobs. Government,
both as an actor in the system and as creator of constraints, plays a sec-
ondary but not unimportant role. At the plant level, the impact of gov-
ernment is felt not as a component of the locus of power in society or
as an actor in the system, but as part of the competitive environment
through policies that affect how business is conducted.
Using the Kochan, Katz, and McKersie (1986) framework, the
focus of this study is at the workplace tier—the lowest-level tier—of
the three-tier system. It may be expected, however, that there will be
occasional interaction between the workplace tier and the two higher-
level tiers, the strategic policy tier at the top and the collective bargain-
ing/human resources policy tier in the middle. It is likely that bargain-
ing structure matters; therefore, interactions between the workplace
level and the two higher levels would be expected to be greater in a
relationship that is part of a multisite bargaining unit than a relation-
ship that is a single-site bargaining unit.
The most salient feature of the U.S. industrial relations system is
the structured, written, legally enforceable, fixed duration collective
bargaining contract. Crucial to this research was an examination of the
traditional view that the collective agreement was the key component
of the collective bargaining system in these facilities. A widely held
view is that the collective bargaining agreement contract, with its
inherent inflexibility, is a substantial impediment to firm competitive-
ness because it fails to adjust the employment bargain to market
changes in a timely manner. If parties believed that these agreements
served a useful purpose but at the same time were an impediment to
desired flexibility, then flexibility could be obtained in the presence of
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a formal agreement by informal, extracontractual, unwritten, and
legally unenforceable arrangements. 
If many of the important innovations occurred outside the collec-
tive bargaining agreement, it would suggest that the U.S. collective
bargaining system is far more flexible than might otherwise be recog-
nized. It would also suggest that the focus on the collective agreement
as the major characteristic of the collective bargaining system would
be too narrow an approach to understand the true nature of the collec-
tive bargaining system, at least at these sites.
Thus, a key component of this study was to determine whether the
parties established extracontractual structures for competitiveness and
job protection, and if so, to describe them. If these structures existed,
we also asked why they were created and whether competitive pres-
sures may have had an effect on the nature of these structures.
METHODOLOGY
As noted, the basic methodology was the case study. The three key
components of a case study are the selection of the sites to be studied,
the nature of the data collected at the site, and the data collection proce-
dure. Each of these will be examined.
The Sites
Site selection was based on the nature of the research needs, con-
strained by access. With respect to the nature of the research, we
attempted to obtain sites that represented a range of businesses/indus-
tries, product types/production processes, and competitive environ-
ments to permit us to make reasonably generalized inferences. While
we also hoped to attain some geographic variability within the sample,
given globalization of the markets for many products produced in the
unionized sector, this factor was given only secondary importance in
site selection.
Access, of course, was essential. Inquiries were initiated based on
the above criteria through contacts developed through the School of
Labor and Industrial Relations at Michigan State University. We initi-
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ated contact with six firms, four of which agreed to participate. The
participants were informed that the research was commissioned by the
International Labor Organization (ILO), and the parties would have the
right to review and comment on the report prior to submission to the
ILO. Although the parties were given the right to keep their identities
private, none opted for confidentiality.
Ultimately, we obtained access at four sites: Alcoa and United
Steelworkers of America Local 4895, Rockdale, Texas; General
Motors and United Automobile Workers (UAW) Local 652, Lansing,
Michigan; Lear Corporation and UAW Local 1660, Elsie, Michigan;
and Sparrow Health Systems and the Michigan Nurses Association,
Lansing, Michigan. The sites, with their associated business character-
istics, are listed in Table 4.1. 
The sites represent a range of products, production processes, and
market constraints. While each of these will be described in detail in
the respective case studies, even this brief overview indicates that we
were successful in obtaining sites that represented a range of produc-
tion processes, product types, and market conditions. None of the sites
are similar on these three dimensions.
On the other hand, we were less successful in obtaining geographic
diversity. Three of the sites are in central southern Michigan. Two
sites, General Motors–UAW Local 652 and Sparrow–Michigan Nurses
Association, are in the same city, Lansing, Michigan. A third site, Lear
Corporation–UAW Local 1660, is only 35 miles north of Lansing. We
do not believe, however, that this geographic uniformity unduly com-
promises the generalization of the study. As will be seen, the GM–Lan-
sing facility produces autos for an international market. Its unique
characteristics are not due to its geographic location, but rather to its
industrial history. Lear, as an auto supplier, is representative of auto
suppliers, which tend to be concentrated in geographic areas proximate
to automotive assembly plants, such as Michigan. Sparrow is subject to
the same pressures as other health care organizations. Put differently,
only Sparrow serves a primarily local or regional market, and servicing
such a market is characteristic of health care organizations.
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Table 4.1 General Characteristics of Sites in Study
Nature of the Data to be Collected
The data collected were a mix of qualitative and quantitative data
on collective bargaining at the site. The qualitative data were primarily
a description by the parties of vehicles created by their collective bar-
gaining systems to address issues of job protection/creation and com-
petitiveness, the outcomes of the system. There was a focus on
contractual structures, noncontractual formal structures, and informal
programs. This was supported by obtaining descriptive contextual data
on the nature of the production process (technological constraints) and
the market constraints facing the site.
Site
Product and 
process 
description Product type Market constraints Location
Alcoa and 
United 
Steelworkers 
of America, 
Local 4895
Basic 
manufacturing
(aluminum)
Commodity Competitive global 
market, discrete number 
of potential customers; 
competitive oligopoly 
in product market
Rockdale, 
Texas
General 
Motors and 
UAW Local 
652
Heavy assembly
(automobiles)
Differentiated 
product
Internal choice within 
corporation for 
production; millions of 
potential national (and 
international) 
customers for product; 
competitive oligopoly 
in product market 
Lansing, 
Michigan
Lear 
Corporation 
and UAW 
Local 1660
Light to medium 
assembly
(motor vehicle 
parts, seating 
systems)
Moderately 
differentiated 
product made to 
customer 
specification
Discrete number of 
potential customers for 
product (oligopoly); 
competitive oligopoly 
in product market
Elsie, 
Michigan
Sparrow 
Health 
Systems
Health care
(inpatient and 
outpatient 
services)
Service Local/regional product 
market; limited number 
of competitive 
providers; choice 
generally made by third 
party (physician)
Lansing, 
Michigan
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We also collected such basic quantitative data on employment
trends since 1980, investment history, age of the facility, and numbers
of strikes. While employment trends might be considered to be a key
indicator of the extent to which the collective bargaining relationship
has addressed employment protection and creation, one must be careful
not to overinterpret the quantitative data based on a case study. We are
unable to control for the other factors that may also affect employment.
For example, employment may fall at a site because of declining indus-
try demand, declining firm demand, or technological change, all fac-
tors that are largely independent of collective bargaining. It may be,
however, that the collective bargaining system caused employment
losses to be less than they would otherwise be. In such a case, collec-
tive bargaining protected jobs in an environment of declining employ-
ment. Strike incidence could be the result of a conflicting relationship
between the parties at the plant, or of decisions made at higher levels of
the company and union.
Given the variation in the case studies, the researchers did attempt
to develop a definition of competitiveness to be imposed on the case
studies. It was our expectation that each site would define competitive-
ness in its economic and market context. Competitiveness might be
defined as a continually increasing market share in a growth industry;
in a contracting industry, competitiveness might be defined as continu-
ing existence.
Data Collection
Data collection was based on a structured interview from a gener-
alized protocol, which attempted to learn about the interaction of col-
lective bargaining, job security/creation, and competitiveness at the
site. That general protocol is attached as an appendix to this chapter.
Questions were also asked about the collective bargaining agreement.
In addition, however, the researchers were given the flexibility to
probe through the questions when the interview responses made it clear
that the protocol may not capture the important components of the col-
lective bargaining relationship. As the study attempted to gather data
on the overall relationship, the researchers interviewed the key com-
pany and union officials who were responsible for the collective bar-
gaining relationship. The number and identity of company and union
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officials were determined by each of the parties. The interviews were
done in individual and group settings within parties, depending on the
preferences of the parties. Any inconsistencies between the company
and union officials were reported.
Most of the interviews occurred in 1999, during an upswing in the
business cycle. Thus, the study takes the reader through the difficult
economic period of the 1980s through the improved economic times of
the 1990s. We do not consider the effect of the recent economic down-
turn.
Note
1. This differs from the situation in many European countries, for example, where
employer associations and high-level union organizations, occasionally with gov-
ernment involvement, agree on minimum terms and conditions for all firms and
employees covered by the association and the union.
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Appendix
Date_________
Site______________________________________
Interviewees: Name_______________________________________
Organization_________________________________________
Tentative Structure of Site Visit Protocol 
for ILO Study
Michigan State University/ILO Study on Collective Bargaining, 
Employment Protection/Creation and Competitiveness
January–March, 1999
Cluster I: Background of Plant and Local Union
A. Current situation
Product
Major customers
Current employment level
Supervisory
Hourly
P&M
Clerical
Others
B. Plant history (since 1980)
Product history and current product
Ownership history
Age of the plant/Greenfield or Brownfield
Collective bargaining/relationship history
Employment trends
Investment history
Expansions
Turnover in plant management 
Local union history
Age of local
Mergers of locals?
Change in international?
Relationship history
No. of strikes
Characterization by parties
Conflictual, adversarial, cooperative, collaborative
Third party involvement?
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Cluster II: Competitive Pressures
When did you feel that your competitive environment had changed or that
union members were faced with a new and different kind of threat to job
security? These are distinct from the normal variations in employment
and product demand associated with the business cycle.
What happened in your environment that sent you this message?
Cluster III: What Did You Do in Response to These Pressures?
A. We are looking for three basic types of responses/actions, etc.
Changes in contract language
Creation of formal structures that were not included in the contract
Structures that operate regularly or on a recurring basis with 
specified systems
Informal actions and programs
Ad hoc, nonrecurring actions the parties took
B. What did you do and why did you do it? 
Prototype Classification System
Action Type Competitiveness Job Prot./Creation Both
(Example)
Wage freeze
Contract x
(Example)
Layoff restrictions
Contract x
(Example)
Productivity 
committee
Noncon.
structure
x
(Example)
Joint approach on tax 
abatement
Ad Hoc x
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Ask about the following if not mentioned:
Wage freeze
Reduced classifications
Early retirement/attrition
Different layoff system
Outsourcing: restraints or removal of restraint
Reduction in hours
Wage reductions
Two-tier wage system
Length of time to convergence? 
Lump-sum payments (in lieu of wage increase)
Neutrality pledge (for other plants)
Retirement/new hire ratios
Performance-based pay
Profit-sharing
Gain-sharing
New incentive systems
Investment in plant
ESOP
Creation of new structures
Parallel union management structures for special purposes
Task forces
Committees
New methods of negotiating
Changes in processing grievances
Jointly approaching government officials for aid (e.g., tax abatements)
Anything else?
C. Think about the things you did. Did you explicitly consider some types
of actions and decide not to undertake those? Why did you choose ac-
tions you chose and reject the actions you did not choose?
D. What was the source of the change mechanism, e.g., how did you come
to be aware of the possibility that these actions existed?
Self-generated from people at the plant based on the relationship and 
experience (type of continuous improvement model)
Formal experiments with evaluation
Informal experiments (trial and error)
Learning from others, but on your own (benchmarking)
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Learning from experts
Private consultants
Books
Videos
Universities
Seminars and conferences
International union
Corporate staff
Cluster IV: Results
Did the changes achieve their desired objectives?
How do you know, what measures do you use?
Were there any unforeseen consequences?
Is there anything else you want to tell us that will aid in understanding 
your case?
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Basic Aluminum
Alcoa–Rockdale, Texas, and United Steelworkers 
of America Local 4895
Richard N. Block
Michigan State University
DESCRIPTION OF THE BUSINESS
Alcoa Inc. is the world’s largest producer of aluminum and alu-
mina and fabricated products. It is involved in all segments of the
industry: mining, refining, smelting, fabricating, and recycling. In
2000, following a 1999 merger with Reynolds, Alcoa had approxi-
mately 140,000 employees with 300 operating locations in 36 coun-
tries. In 2001, Alcoa had approximately 142,000 employees in 37
countries. Alcoa’s 2001 revenues were U.S.$22.9 billion (Alcoa 2001).
 Aluminum, an extremely abundant element, must be extracted
from other substances. Bauxite is the basic physical raw material from
which aluminum is obtained. Bauxite contains approximately 45 per-
cent alumina, which is a powdery aluminum oxide that looks like white
granulated sugar. After the alumina is removed from the bauxite, the
aluminum and the oxygen are separated in an electrolytic reduction cell
commonly called a “pot,” in which the alumina is dissolved in molten
cryolite and is reduced to metallic aluminum. The aluminum is then
cast into large ingots or smaller molds called “hogs” or “pigs,” which
are suitable for remelting or fabricating (Alcoa 2001). This is called the
aluminum smelting process. Plants that produce primary aluminum are
commonly called smelters.
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HISTORY OF THE FACILITY
Alcoa’s Rockdale facility is located in Rockdale, Texas, a town of
approximately 5,200. Rockdale is approximately 60 miles (100 kilo-
meters) northeast of Austin and 144 miles (230 kilometers) northwest
of Houston. The plant is a smelter, extracting aluminum from alumina,
and also produces aluminum powder. 
 The plant’s major customer is internal to Alcoa, an Alcoa flat-
rolled aluminum plant in Davenport, Iowa. Among the major final cus-
tomers for the aluminum produced at Rockdale are the aerospace
industry and lithographic industry, which uses aluminum in litho-
graphic plates. Aluminum powder is used in such products as deodor-
ant, paint, metal pots, ordnance, and rocket fuels.
The Rockdale smelter was completed in 1952 as part of the United
States’ defense effort to maintain a large supply of aluminum for
defense purposes. Electricity, the largest cost input to the aluminum
manufacturing process, is used to provide power to run the facility and
to extract the aluminum from the alumina. The smelter was located in
Rockdale because of the presence of a large supply of lignite coal to
provide electricity for the facility. There is a coal mine, called the San-
dow Mine, that is adjacent to the Rockdale facility, and that provides
coal to power the facility’s electrical generators. Although Alcoa has
always owned the mine and the power plant, until 1988–1989, Alcoa
contracted the operation of the mine and power plant to the utility that
served the Rockdale area. Alcoa has operated the mine since 1988, and
the power plant since 1989. 
It was believed that the Sandow Mine would provide a long-term
supply of electricity. This was to be especially advantageous because it
was believed in the early 1950s that the supply of electricity from
water would soon peak, and other sources would be necessary.
Although it is more costly to produce electricity from coal than from
water, Alcoa believed that this cost disadvantage would be more than
offset by adequate supplies of coal from the Sandow Mine.
Current employment (both salaried and hourly) at the site, includ-
ing the mine, power plant, and smelter, is approximately 1,300. The
peak employment at the site was approximately 2,000, reached in the
early 1970s. As can be seen in Figure 5.1, this decline in employment
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reflected the overall decline in employment in the primary aluminum
industry in the United States over the past quarter of a century. 
HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING AT ROCKDALE
Of the 1,300 employees at Rockdale, 800 are hourly employees
represented by United Steelworkers of America (USWA) Local 4895,
260 are power plant or mine employees represented by a local of
another international union, and 240 are salaried and unrepresented.
The focus of this case study is on the relationship between Local 4895
and Alcoa, although the relationship between Alcoa and the other local
will be addressed as necessary.
Local 4895 was certified as the collective bargaining representa-
tive of the production and maintenance employees at Rockdale in
1953. In 2000, the employees represented by Local 4895 were covered
Figure 5.1 Employment in Primary Aluminum Industry, All Employees 
and Production Employees, 1973–2000
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by a master agreement between Alcoa and the international union,
United Steelworkers of America covering plants in Badin, North Caro-
lina; Alcoa (Knoxville), Tennessee; Bauxite, Arkansas; and Pt. Com-
fort, Texas, in addition to the Rockdale employees. The parties have
generally had a harmonious relationship. The only exception was a 35-
day strike in 1986, from June 1 to July 4, that was called among all
employees represented under the Alcoa–USWA master agreement.
As a result of that strike, Alcoa obtained additional flexibility in
combining classifications and, therefore, restructuring the way work
was performed. Prior to 1986, more classification lines were in exist-
ence, and Alcoa could only assign employees outside their respective
classifications on a voluntary basis. Following the work stoppage,
employees were required to perform any assignment they were quali-
fied to safely perform.
Overall, the relationship between Alcoa and Local 4895 is mature
and cooperative. The parties arbitrate only one or two grievances per
year, and these are primarily discharge cases. The parties have an expe-
dited procedure for overtime grievances, minor discipline cases, and a
few other issues, such as contracting out. The company has the right to
subcontract; however, the parties are obligated to meet and discuss
such needs before any decision is reached. Although the 1986 strike is
still discussed, it does not appear to have affected the long-term rela-
tionship of the parties. 
For many years, the USWA also benefited from the fact that labor
accounts for only about 17 percent of the cost of aluminum. The most
important cost in the production of aluminum is energy. In this sense,
then, the unions reaped the benefits of the Marshallian condition of
“the importance of being unimportant” (Kochan and Block 1977).
Within broad limits, Alcoa could be generous with the unions repre-
senting its employees, because the major cost components were associ-
ated with inputs other than labor.
Indicative of Alcoa’s labor relations strategy/philosophy is its rela-
tionship with the other local union at the Rockdale site. When Alcoa
assumed operations of the power plant and mine in the late 1980s, it
voluntarily recognized the other local union as the representative of the
mine and power plant employees. Although Alcoa unsuccessfully
requested that the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) designate
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the mine and power plant as one unit, the decision did not affect the
company’s relationship with the other local. 
COMPETITIVE PRESSURES
During the first three quarters of the twentieth century, Alcoa was
the dominant player in the world aluminum market. Thus, during the
period from the 1940s through the 1970s, Alcoa and its employees, like
many other unionized firms in the United States, benefited from market
dominance. Alcoa was able to pass on any cost increases that might be
associated with collective bargaining.
This favorable situation began to turn in the early 1980s. Since
then, the Rockdale plant has faced four major competitive issues. Each
of these will be discussed. 
Market Pressure
One major source of competitive pressure on Rockdale is the glo-
balization of the market for aluminum. This has manifested itself in
two ways: an increased supply of aluminum on the world market, and
the development of a centralized, market-based pricing mechanism.
Each of these will be examined.
Increased supply of aluminum
Since the early 1980s, there has been a globalization of the market
for aluminum. Developed or emerging countries (such as China, fol-
lowing an import substitution policy) have established domestic alumi-
num-smelting operations which are throwing aluminum onto the world
market. Russia for many years had an aluminum industry that serviced
the defense needs of the Soviet Union during the cold war. Now that
the cold war has ended and those defense needs no longer exist, the
aluminum produced by the Russian capacity is being sent to the world
market. In essence, the market for aluminum has become commod-
itized. Aluminum has become a commodity available from multiple
sources at a world price determined primarily by supply and demand.
Commoditization has resulted in enormous variation in the price of
aluminum. Some sense of this variation can be obtained by examining
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Figure 5.2, which depicts the cash seller and settlement price of aluminum
between July 1993 and March 1999. The price was at roughly U.S.$0.50
per pound (U.S.$1,000/ton) in late 1993. The price rose to well over
U.S.$1.00 per pound (U.S.$2,200/ton) during the first quarter of 1995.
Since then, there has been a general, albeit uneven trend downward to a
March 1999 level of U.S.$0.58 per pound (U.S.$1,150/ton). This lack of
price certainty has placed increasing cost pressure on the company,
because Alcoa’s revenue stream is less certain than it once was.
Information flows
A second major contributor toward commoditization was the emer-
gence of the London Metal Exchange (LME) in the early 1980s as a
facilitator of the market for nonferrous metals, including aluminum.
Prior to the emergence of the exchange, Alcoa, as the largest aluminum
producer in the world, could determine prices based on its cost struc-
Figure 5.2 Cash Seller and Settlement Price of Aluminum, July 1993–
March 1999
SOURCE: London Metal Exchange (www.lme.co.uk).
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ture. The LME created a market mechanism for pricing. Thus, Alcoa
now had to accept the world price of aluminum, a price that was inde-
pendent of its costs.
Cost Pressure from Environmental Regulations
The third source of competitive pressure on the Rockdale facility is
from increased environmental regulations in the 1980s, primarily the
Clean Air Act. The power plant generates and the smelter uses electric-
ity from coal, and coal creates emissions that must be cleaned. In addi-
tion, the Sandow Mine is a strip mine, and the land must be reclaimed
and restored to an appearance as close as possible to its pre-mining
state. Although some of these regulations have encouraged waste
reduction—and therefore cost reduction—in general, environmental
regulations require expenditures without a rate of return. The smelter
sees them as purely a cost. To the extent that the environmental regula-
tions impose additional costs on the production process over and above
what the company would otherwise directly incur to produce the alu-
minum, there is pressure on the collective bargaining system to be the
source of the offset of those costs. 
Cost Pressure from Use of Coal
When the decision was made in 1952 to locate the Rockdale
smelter near the coal seam, it was believed that smelter sites near rela-
tively inexpensive hydro-generated electricity would soon be
exhausted. This has not been the case. The parties estimate that coal-
generated electricity costs three times as much as water-generated elec-
tricity. As with environmental regulations, there is constant pressure on
the collective bargaining system to offset this cost disadvantage.
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, COMPETITIVENESS, AND 
EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION/CREATION
Since the mid 1980s, management and the employees at Rockdale
have become increasingly aware of the importance of plant competi-
tiveness and job protection. Plant management began to emphasize
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competitiveness in the mid 1980s, as indicated by its insistence during
the 1986 strike on increased flexibility to assign workers to tasks. The
parties have generally had a cooperative, high-trust relationship.
Therefore, when the company began to raise issues of competitiveness
with the union, and ultimately job security, the union took them seri-
ously and was willing to cooperate. The union leadership also saw con-
sistency between the company’s competitiveness/job security message
and reports in the general news media regarding globalization and
competitiveness.
Contract Changes
As one of five plants under the master Alcoa–USWA agreement,
the parties at Rockdale are somewhat constrained in their actions.
Given this, it is not surprising the parties’ main tool for addressing
competitiveness and job security has been a traditional one, wage
restraint in the collective agreement. Wage data provided by the com-
pany for a representative group of pay grades indicate that between
1977 and 1986, the average base wage increased by 62 percent, from
approximately $8.08 per hour to $13.12 per hour. From 1986 to 1996,
however, the average base wage of those classifications increased only
9 percent, from $13.12 to $14.32.
It should be noted, however, that this 9 percent increase masks
increases associated with combining of job classifications. When the
job classifications in the new grouping were upgraded, the wage rates
in the previously lower-paid classifications were increased to the level
of the higher-paid classifications in the grouping. Many employees
received wage increases associated with this upgrading. In addition,
employees have benefited from an increase in variable compensation,
such as profit sharing. A reduction in job classification and enhanced
management flexibility to assign work, provided employees are quali-
fied, was important to plant management as it gave them increased
flexibility to assign employees.
The parties also increased the length of the master contract from
the usual three years, to six years. Although there was a reopener in
2001, unresolved issues were submitted to binding arbitration. This
provided the company with increased stability in its production plan-
ning and cost structure.
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Noncontractual Formal Structures
The major structural noncontractual innovation has been the cre-
ation of partnership teams. The impetus for the teams came from cor-
porate level and the international union, who directed that all plants
covered by the Alcoa–Steelworkers master agreement undertake some
sort of initiative, primarily to upgrade the skills of the workforce. The
parties at Rockdale used this directive to create partnership teams at the
plant and department levels. The plant-level partnership team consists
of the plant manager, the labor relations staff, all department heads,
and the union bargaining committee. Each department in the smelter
also has a partnership team that sends representatives to the plant-level
team.
The union sees the purpose of the partnership team as improving
the position of the Rockdale plant in the market. At the same time, it is
advantageous to employees to have a say in how the plant is run. From
the company’s point of view, the benefit of the partnership team is the
improvement of employee productivity, leading to improving relative
market position.
The partnership team has been the vehicle through which the Alcoa
Production System, Alcoa’s version of the modern demand-driven pro-
duction system, is being implemented at Rockdale. In the ingot plant,
union and management came together to reorganize scrap handling,
saving hundreds of thousands of dollars per year by recycling scrap
that had previously not been recycled. Similar successful efforts have
been made in the pot room and the carbon plant. These efforts have
reduced costs, thereby increasing the competitiveness of the plant.
Hourly and supervisory employees have been sent to seminars and
conferences both inside and outside Alcoa to aid them in instituting the
system. They have also been sent to other Alcoa facilities for bench-
marking purposes.
The parties cited several changes that would not have occurred but
for the existence of the partnership team. These have involved the
return of work that had once been contracted out, or retention of work
that was scheduled to be contracted out. For example, the plant has a
yard service that acts like a construction crew. The yard service had
been short-staffed and unable to perform needed work. Through the
efforts of the partnership team, seven people were added to the yard
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service, and it began doing construction that had been previously con-
tracted out. This solution upgraded the skills of the workforce and per-
mitted the represented employees to do work for which Alcoa was
paying a great deal. Because of the upgrading of the workforce, the
cost differential between the contractors’ employees and the unionized
employees declined. Thus, jobs were protected through the partnership
team, encouraging the reassignment of people. 
In 1997, the plant management was considering contracting out its
janitorial function of six to eight employees. The matter came to the
attention of the partnership team. Under the auspices of the team, the
parties developed a proposal to reschedule and redistribute the janito-
rial work, including adding weekend work that could be done without
disrupting the normal production. The result was that the original jani-
torial jobs were retained and four additional janitorial jobs were cre-
ated. The retention of the janitorial jobs in the plant also had the
unintended benefit of creating some less physically demanding posi-
tions that could be filled by employees with physical restrictions.
Through the partnership team, the local union president was also
assigned 40 hours per week to union-management issues, and granted
office space in a centrally located area. This has permitted the union to
increase its awareness of all issues in the plant, as compared to the situ-
ation that would exist if the local president had assigned duties and
could respond only as contacted by employees. 
Ad Hoc Informal Structures
There are also important informal systems that are created at the
plant. For example, there is a toolbox meeting at the beginning of each
shift at which hourly employees and the supervisor discuss any issues
that have arisen, particularly safety, Alcoa’s top internal priority. As
needed, employees have been released from their jobs for specified
periods of time to develop training programs. This was done when job
classifications were combined following the 1986 negotiations, and
employees were required to be cross-trained in different crafts. In addi-
tion, as another example of informal, ad hoc action, the plant manage-
ment and local union joined together to successfully lobby their U.S.
Congressman in opposition to a tax on carbon-based fuel that could
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have threatened the existence of the plant, which depends on coal for
so much of its power.
CONCLUSIONS
Alcoa–Rockdale and Steelworkers Local 4895 have what may be
defined as a mature, traditional collective bargaining relationship. This
is based to a large extent on Alcoa’s corporate philosophy of respect
for the institution of collective bargaining and a willingness to recog-
nize the legitimacy of the unions, including the USWA, in the facilities
where the employees have chosen union representation.
There is a high level of trust between the parties, and this has facil-
itated the use of the collective bargaining relationship to enhance both
employment protection/creation and firm competitiveness. The long-
time willingness of the company to provide the union with information
on the state of the business and the facility, and the willingness of the
union to accept that information at face value, was an important first
step in adapting the relationship to the twin needs of employment pro-
tection/creation and competitiveness.
Initial responses to these two issues came not through specialized
structures designed to address employment protection/creation and
competitiveness, but rather through the traditional vehicle of the col-
lective agreement and day-to-day informal interactions. Through the
agreement the parties agreed on wage restraint, the introduction of
variable compensation, a six-year contract with an arbitrated wage
reopener, reduced job classifications, and flexibility in assignments.
Ad hoc arrangements through interactions included toolbox discus-
sions and safety committees. 
As can be seen, the parties’ mutual trust placed them in a position
where they could move away from rights-based formalism based on
management rights and union use of the grievance procedure to an
interest-based relationship. It was not necessary to create structures or
use external consultants to do this. The interest-based relationship sim-
ply flowed from the nature of the collective bargaining relationship.
When the formal competitiveness structure, the partnership team,
was mandated in 1996, the parties had no difficulty incorporating it
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into their relationship. The partnership team mandate provided a for-
mal vehicle for doing what the parties had been doing in any event. It
was easy for them to adapt to this new system.
Anecdotes suggest that there have been specific instances in which
the collective bargaining relationship contributed to job creation (such
as yard service and janitorial function). The plant continues to operate
profitably. The parties are aware of their common situation in Rock-
dale, and they will continue to do what is necessary to keep the plant
competitive in an increasingly uncertain and competitive aluminum
market.
The Alcoa Rockdale–Steelworkers Local 4895 case represents an
excellent example of how value-based employment drives collective
bargaining. With aluminum prices declining, or at least uncertain, the
revenue stream associated with the product produced by the employees
was declining, or at least less certain than it was in the past. That
declining and/or uncertain revenue stream was the chief threat to the
employees’ jobs. In the absence of legal job security guarantees in the
United States, the union must depend on itself to address job security.
At Rockdale, this took the form of cooperation with the company to
increase the cost-competitiveness of the plant by reducing the cost of
producing aluminum. Job security and firm competitiveness then were
seen as one and the same.
Notes
In addition to the interviewees cited in this chapter, the authors would like to thank Ms.
Janine Fogg, formerly with Alcoa; Mr. Greg Freehling, Alcoa; Ms. Colleen Haley,
Alcoa–Fujikura; and Mr. Jim Michaud, Alcoa–Fujikura, for their cooperation in this
research. Mr. Joe Quaglia, manager of human resources–industrial relations, and Ms.
Joyce Saltzman and Ms. Bonita Cersomino of Alcoa Corporate Communications pro-
vided important comments that enhanced the accuracy of the chapter. 
Unless otherwise noted parenthetically in the text, the material in this chapter is based
on interviews with Anders et al. (1999), Carney (1999), and Cleveland et al. (1999).
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DESCRIPTION OF THE BUSINESS
General Motors (GM) in Lansing, Michigan, consists of four divi-
sions, the employees of which are represented by UAW Local 652:
Worldwide Facilities, which consists of skilled trades, primarily con-
struction; Powertrain, which is responsible for designing and building
engines and transmissions for GM vehicles; metal fabrication, which is
responsible for sheet metal; and small car assembly, which is responsi-
ble for the actual assembly of the vehicles. As of October 2001, the
Lansing facilities assembled the Pontiac Grand Am, the Oldsmobile
Alero, and the Chevrolet Malibu. The Grand Am is an established
nameplate that has been restyled several times over the last decade. It
has long been one of GM’s most successful vehicles. The Alero is a
new nameplate, and the Malibu is a revived nameplate. Lansing and
Lordstown, Ohio, which is also part of GM small car assembly, are the
main assembly locations for GM small cars. Saturn, in Spring Hill,
Tennessee, also assembles small cars, but under a different agreement. 
Also located in Lansing are a body plant, a parts facility, and the
Craft Centre, which manufactures GM’s electric car and the Chevrolet
Cavalier and Pontiac Sunfire convertibles. The production employees
in these facilities are represented by UAW locals other than Local 652.
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 HISTORY OF THE SITE
Lansing is a medium-sized city with a 2000 population of 119,128
(U.S. Bureau of the Census 2001a) in the midst of a metropolitan area
with a 2000 population of 447,728 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2001b).
The city is located in southern lower Michigan, approximately 90 miles
northwest of Detroit. Other major employers in the area are the State of
Michigan (Lansing is the state capital) and Michigan State University.
Oldsmobile was founded as an automobile producer in Lansing in
1897 by Ransom Olds. After GM acquired Oldsmobile in 1908, Lan-
sing became the headquarters of the Oldsmobile division of GM. Until
the early 1980s, Lansing was a complete automotive manufacturing
complex—a hometown manufacturer. Oldsmobile maintained power-
train, sheet metal, parts, and assembly facilities in Lansing. GM’s body
division, Fisher Body, also maintained a plant that supplied Oldsmo-
bile with car bodies. Through the 1970s and early 1980s, Oldsmobile
manufactured mid-size and full-size rear-wheel-drive automobiles in
Lansing: the Oldsmobile Cutlass Supreme, a mid-size two-door auto-
mobile; the Oldsmobile 88, a full-size automobile; and the Oldsmobile
98, a luxury automobile. 
With a corporate reorganization in 1983–1984, which is discussed
in the following section, GM chose to establish Lansing as a manufac-
turing site for small front-wheel-drive vehicles. Because Lansing had
been tooled to assemble large, rear-wheel-drive vehicles, GM invested
approximately U.S.$40–$60 million in Lansing by building a new
paint plant, a new assembly plant, and remodeling the fabrication facil-
ities. From the mid 1980s through the late 1990s, GM Lansing and
Local 652 assembled the Pontiac Grand Am (three major styling
changes), the Buick Skylark (two major styling changes), the Oldsmo-
bile Calais, the Chevrolet Cavalier, and the Oldsmobile Achieva. 
EMPLOYMENT AT GM–LANSING
GM employment in Lansing facilities represented by Local 652
peaked at approximately 15,000 hourly and salaried employees in
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1980. Overall, Lansing facilities employment has been reduced prima-
rily due to corporate reorganizations that will be discussed below, as
well as by a 1995 decision to move to Detroit engineering and market-
ing personnel who had been in Lansing. At the end of 2000, the
employment level in the four Lansing divisions in which Local 652
represents was approximately 8,600 skilled and nonskilled workers and
2,500 salaried workers. In 2000, the average age of the workforce was
46, indicating little turnover, which is to be expected in a high-wage
industry.
Each year the Lansing divisions hire between 200 and 300 workers
(many of which are interplant transfers from other GM facilities).
External candidates are hired based on the recommendations of current
GM employees. It was estimated that about half of the employees in
the Lansing divisions were hired through family referrals or have fam-
ily working for GM. 
The decline in production worker employment in Lansing has
tracked the general drop in unionized auto employment in the United
States since the early 1980s and GM’s declining market share. Figures
6.1 and 6.2 demonstrate this trend. Figure 6.1 graphs overall produc-
tion employment and unionized employment in the motor vehicle and
equipment industry from 1983–2000. The production employment and
unionized data are from different sources. The production employment
data are from establishment data collected by the Current Employment
Statistics, and union membership data are from individual data col-
lected by the Current Population Survey.
Despite the unmatched data, the results are interesting. In 1983, the
number of production workers and the number of union members was
almost identical—568,000. Between 1984 and 1986, the number of
union members exceeded the number of production workers. This is
most likely because many unionized workers on layoff as a result of
the economic slowdown in the industry reported themselves as union
members, although part of this could be due to data differences. By
1987, however, the trend that would persist throughout 1990s had
begun: a long-term increase in the number of production workers in the
industry, and a long-term decrease in the number of union members.
This was the result of foreign-owned firms (Toyota, Nissan, BMW,
Daimler Benz) opening non-union facilities in the United States, as
well as the increase in non-union auto parts suppliers (Cutcher-Gersh-
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enfeld and McHugh 1994). These results are supported by unionization
estimates displayed in Figure 6.2, which shows unionization in motor
vehicles and equipment declining as a percentage of all employees and
as a percentage of production employees.
In addition to these overall industry trends, GM–Lansing and
Local 652 were affected by trends in GM’s market share. General
Motors saw its share of the U.S. motor vehicle market decline from 46
percent in 1978 to approximately 29 percent in 2000 (Fox 1996; Flint
1998; Automotive News 2001a,b; Henry 2001).
Figure 6.1 Production Employees and Union Members, Motor Vehicles 
and Equipment, 1983–2000
NOTE: CES = data came from Current Employment Statistics; CPS = data came from
Current Population Survey.
SOURCE: Hirsch and McPherson (1994); U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current
Employment Statistics, National Employment and Hours Earnings, Motor Vehicles
and Equipment.
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HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING AT GM–LANSING
Local 652 was originally chartered circa 1937, when GM recog-
nized the UAW as the collective bargaining representative of the pro-
duction employees in its plants. Two groups of workers have severed
from the local, one when the parts division was established and one
when the Craft Centre was established.
 Since the late 1930s, GM and the UAW have negotiated a master
agreement for all GM plants. That agreement and supporting docu-
ments provide the basic terms and conditions of employment for all
GM hourly employees. The national agreement establishes such corpo-
Figure 6.2 Union Membership and Collective Bargaining Coverage as a 
Percentage of Production Employees and Total Employees, 
Motor Vehicles and Equipment, 1983–2000
NOTE: CES = data came from Current Employment Statistics; CPS = data came from-
Current Population Survey.
SOURCE: Hirsch and McPherson (1994); U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current
Employment Statistics, National Employment and Hours Earnings, Motor Vehicles
and Equipment.
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rate-wide provisions as guidelines for wage levels and wage increases,
by wage range, benefits, interplant transfer rights, and specified
employment rights of covered employees. GM–Lansing and Local
652, as with all GM facilities, negotiates a local agreement to deter-
mine which classifications are in specified wage ranges and to address
such plant-level issues as seniority, job transfer, shift preference, and
work practices.
The relationship between then–Oldsmobile Division of GM and
currently GM–Lansing and UAW Local 652 has long been traditional
but peaceful. The accordant nature of the relationship between GM–
Lansing and Local 652 is indicated by the fact that there has never been
a local strike in Lansing. By contrast, for example, since 1996 GM has
experienced local strikes in Flint, Michigan; Janesville, Wisconsin; and
Dayton, Ohio (Bradsher 1996, 1998; Livingston 1996). Although there
is an arbitration provision in the national agreement, there have been
no arbitrations in Lansing since the 1970s. 
COMPETITIVE PRESSURES
General Motors–Lansing and UAW Local 652 have been affected
by two key environmental factors since the mid 1980s: the changing
nature of the automobile market, and GM corporate reorganization. In
addition, there are two factors that are specific to Lansing: the nature of
the product, and the production process that affected the competitive
situation. Each of these will be examined.
Changing Nature of the Automobile Market
The change in the U.S. automobile market has been so heavily doc-
umented in the business press that it is unnecessary to address it here in
any detail. These changes had a severe effect on GM, especially the
long-term decline in GM’s share of the U.S. motor vehicle market. The
parties were also affected by the closing of GM plants in California.
The message was clear: the days in which GM dominated the U.S.
automobile market had ended.
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General Motors Corporate Reorganization 
During the period 1983–1984, GM undertook one of the most
extensive reorganizations in its corporate history. Since the 1920s, GM
had been organized based on distinct divisions and nameplates, each of
which designed, manufactured, and marketed its own vehicles.
Although each of these vehicles was designed to capture a different
price segment of the market (in order from lowest priced to highest
priced: Chevrolet, Pontiac, Oldsmobile, Buick, Cadillac), there were
overlapping models within brand names. Thus, there was some compe-
tition among brands. During this time, Oldsmobile was a full-line man-
ufacturing division. As the “hometown” for Oldsmobile, Lansing
would always produce Oldsmobiles.
The reorganization changed this. With the reorganization, the
former design and manufacturing divisions would now become simply
marketing divisions, promoting the vehicles GM produced. Although
the vehicles would still be called Oldsmobiles, they could be manufac-
tured anywhere within the GM system, including Lansing. Addition-
ally, any other nameplate could also be manufactured anywhere in the
GM system, including Lansing. 
In other words, the manufacturing facilities in Lansing were
decoupled from Oldsmobile and assigned to GM. Prior to the decou-
pling, as long as Oldsmobile was a full-line manufacturing division,
Lansing would always have product to build because these were Olds-
mobile manufacturing facilities. Once Oldsmobile became simply a
marketing division, with manufacturing decisions made separately,
Lansing would only obtain work that GM allocated to it. Lansing could
lose Oldsmobile work, and it could gain non-Oldsmobile work. The
Lansing facilities and other GM plants would hereafter depend on GM
for product allocation. 
This reorganization caused uncertainty for the GM–Lansing
employees and UAW Local 652. General Motors products/models gen-
erally have a life cycle of five to six years. There would never be a
guarantee of product after a vehicle line produced in Lansing was
dropped. Because GM does not guarantee product allocations to plants,
Lansing, like other GM manufacturing facilities, would be required to
constantly compete for vehicles to assemble. Lansing was now
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required to compete for GM production work, rather than simply oper-
ate as the manufacturing arm of Oldsmobile.
The Nature of the Product
With the reorganization, GM chose to establish Lansing as a manu-
facturing site for small cars. In the mid 1980s, GM was unable to turn a
profit on its small vehicles. General Motors continued to market and
produce small vehicles, however, because of the requirement that the
company maintain a high average corporate fuel economy (CAFE)
standard. The small cars generated high mileage, raising GM’s overall
average and permitting the company to continue to market and produce
larger, less fuel-efficient—but profitable—vehicles. 
This product, then, placed pressure on GM–Lansing and Local 652
to reduce costs so that the vehicles produced in Lansing could be prof-
itable. General Motors would likely continue to increase the efficiency
of its larger vehicles and to pressure the government for relief from
CAFE. To the extent it was successful in either or both of these
endeavors, the need to produce unprofitable small cars in Lansing
would be reduced; thus, the incentive for GM–Lansing and UAW
Local 652 was to make small cars profitable for GM.
The Production Process
Although GM’s investment modernized the assembly process in
Lansing, the body plant is three miles from the main assembly facili-
ties. As a result, GM must truck bodies from the body plant to the
assembly plant. This placed (and continues to place) the Lansing
assembly process at an inherent cost disadvantage vis-à-vis other
plants inside and outside GM at which the body facility and the assem-
bly plant are adjacent to one another.
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COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, COMPETITIVENESS, AND 
EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION/CREATION
Contractual Structures
As noted, GM and the international union, UAW, have negotiated
a national agreement for all GM hourly workers, including employees
represented by Local 652. The 1996 and 1999 national agreements
included a Job Security (JOBS) Program. The JOBS program provides
for Secured Employment Levels (SELs) for each bargaining unit equal
to the number of active employees with at least one year of seniority
and prohibits layoffs for any reason other than sales declines, acts of
God or other reasons beyond the control of the corporation, sale of part
of the business, if another employee is recalled or assigned to a tempo-
rary position, or if there is model change or plant rearrangement. As
stated in an agreement between General Motors Corp. and UAW,
November 2, 1996, the SEL is reduced by attrition, and employees
whose jobs are eliminated may avail themselves of interplant transfer
rights. The JOBS program provides for substantial job security for
UAW Local 652–represented employees, and creates an incentive for
the parties to make the most efficient use of employees as a generally
fixed asset.
Noncontractual Structures
In order to fully understand the collective bargaining system in
Lansing and the relationship between this system and competitiveness
and employment protection/creation, one must understand the noncon-
tractual structures the parties have created. In addition, one must
understand the physical nature of GM production in Lansing.
Jointness
Noncontractual jointness permeates the relationship. Every possi-
ble function, such as health and safety, communications, and ergonom-
ics has a plant management and union representative assigned to it.
Each of the plant functional representatives reports to a local union
official with local-wide responsibility for that function. These func-
tional representatives, in turn, report to a joint activities chair through a
110 Block and Berg
monthly meeting. The joint activities chair reports to the chair of the
bargaining committee. Through this structure, everything that affects
Local 652–represented employees is jointly administered. There are
very few employee-related decisions that management makes without
union involvement.
This labor–management system creates consistency across the four
divisions. Prior to the reorganization, all functions in Lansing reported
to Oldsmobile. This local autonomy of Oldsmobile in Lansing helped
to create consistency; everybody was building Oldsmobiles. When the
corporation reorganized, each plant manager had different divisional
reporting lines, e.g., Powertrain reported to corporate Powertrain,
assembly reported to corporate small car assembly, and metal fabrica-
tion reported to corporate metal fabrication. But Local 652 and the
GM–Lansing (formerly Oldsmobile) labor relations system remained
unitary across all divisions.
This system is called the “star system” by the chair of the local bar-
gaining committee. At the hub of the star sits Local 652 and GM–Lan-
sing labor relations. Each point of the star represents a different
function that union and management undertake jointly on a site-wide
basis, such as outsourcing, health and safety, communications, and
ergonomics. Although organizationally each of the four divisions in
Lansing reports to different corporate heads, as noted, the labor rela-
tions function is unitary across all four divisions, reporting to GM–
Lansing Labor Relations. All the hourly employees in each division are
represented by Local 652, and there is one labor relations function
across all four divisions. As the supervisor of labor relations for the site
stated in the interview, “Nothing goes on in the plants that I don’t know
about.”
Scale
A second key characteristic of the labor relations system in Lan-
sing is size and scale. This scale provides the opportunity for employee
movement across all four divisions depending on the needs of the divi-
sion, and the unified labor relations systems across the four divisions
provide the means for employee movement. If there are excess
employees in one division because of short-term production variations,
these employees can be easily shifted to another division because all
divisions are represented by the same local, and the labor relations
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function for all divisions is unitary. In a sense, Lansing has created a
small-scale Japanese-type system of affiliated corporations in which
the affiliates help the main corporation by absorbing excess workers
when needed, thereby maintaining employment.
Examples
This labor relations system serves to maintain the connection
between the otherwise separate divisions and ensures consistency of
labor relations across all the divisions. It also ensures that the indepen-
dent plant managers who report to corporate stay firmly anchored in
the Lansing collective bargaining system. Three examples illustrate
how the system works toward competitiveness and employment pro-
tection/creation. First, because the parties worked together so well,
since the mid 1990s, GM has turned a profit on each Lansing-built
automobile it sells. This was accomplished by the parties working
together to consistently take costs out of the vehicle. This was a major
change for Lansing because, as noted, their position was precarious so
long as GM was losing money on its small cars. There was no structure
explicitly dedicated to making the vehicle profitable. All the parties
realized the need and did what was necessary.
An example of employment protection is illustrated by an anecdote
regarding sign fabrication. Several years ago, a fabrication divisional
manufacturing manager decided to outsource the fabrication of signs to
be used within the plant, as he wanted the signs in all corporate fabri-
cating plants to be the same. The manager was informed by GM–Lan-
sing labor relations and Local 652 that sign manufacture was not
outsourced in Lansing, that skilled tradespeople built signs, and that
Local 652–represented employees would be willing to make the signs
to the divisional manager’s specifications. In this case, the plant man-
ager simply failed to consider the fact that a broader labor relations
system existed in Lansing, and that his plant was part of the “home-
town” system. 
A third example involves the production of camshafts. GM–Pow-
ertrain wanted to put a camshaft line in Lansing. General Motors
attempted to dictate how the line would be built and installed, but the
Lansing plant said that it would be built by toolmakers, electricians,
and machine repairpersons, because “this is the way it is done in Lan-
sing.” The camshafts were built to specification and at the target cost,
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but they were built and installed with the configuration of workers that
was customary in Lansing, protecting the jobs of Lansing employees.
In January 2000, GM announced that it would build a $558 million
auto assembly plant in Lansing, at the site where the main assembly
plant has been located. Called Lansing Grand River Assembly, the
plant is GM’s first new assembly plant in 15 years. Starting in late
2001, this plant, staffed by members of Local 652, will build the next
generation of the Cadillac Catera, the Cadillac CTS, a GM vehicle for
the entry-level luxury market. More important, however, this invest-
ment means it is likely that Local 652 will have work and jobs for years
into the future. This means long-term job security for the Lansing
workforce (Evanoff 2000; Vlasic 2000).1
CONCLUSIONS
The Lansing collective bargaining system is based on a unitary labor
relations function across otherwise independent GM divisions, Local
652–representation of hourly employees in all four divisions, formal and
deep jointness, and scale. By the only criterion that really matters for
plant management and a local union, product allocation by GM, the Lan-
sing system has been successful in both creating a competitive produc-
tion system and protecting jobs in Lansing, and doing it within the limits
of GM’s long-term market share decline and the overall production
employment decline in the U.S. unionized sector. Since the mid 1980s,
GM has continued to allocate small car production to the Lansing site.
More important for the future employment, however, GM has made sub-
stantial capital investment in Lansing, including its newest assembly
plant, Lansing Grand River Assembly. Working with state-of-the-art
capital and production systems is likely to make GM–Lansing
extremely competitive in the future. GM–Lansing and Local 652 are
likely to continue to be allocated product, thereby maximizing employ-
ment opportunities for Local 652 members. Given declining market
share and declining employment, a local is successful in this system if it
is able to minimize large employment losses by obtaining GM invest-
ment and product allocation. By this measure, the relationship has been
successful with respect to both employment and competitiveness.
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Equally important for GM–Lansing and Local 652 is the diversifi-
cation of its product line. With the allocation of the Cadillac CTS to
Lansing, GM–Lansing and Local 652 now assemble a product that is
likely to generate higher margins than the small cars produced in Lan-
sing in the 1980s and 1990s. Thus, the margins of the overall Lansing
product mix should improve, further enhancing Lansing’s standing in
the GM hierarchy.
It appears that the long-term relationship between GM and UAW
Local 652 was an essential element in a substantial GM investment in
production capacity in Lansing. This indicates that GM believes it can
competitively produce vehicles in Lansing. Equally important, it would
confirm the success of GM–Lansing labor relations and UAW Local
652 in creating a system that is competitive for the corporation and
maximizes employment opportunities for GM employees represented
by UAW Local 652.
The collective bargaining system created by GM–Lansing and
UAW Local 652 has been extremely successful in bargaining under the
constraints of the U.S. collective bargaining and employment relations
systems. The location of Lansing Grand River Assembly gives UAW
Local 652 the opportunity to work with the newest manufacturing tech-
nology and the most productive capital stock in the GM system, thus
maximizing the value created by Local 652 employees.
Notes
In addition to the interviewees cited in the report, the authors would like to thank Mr.
Fred Charles, joint activities representative, UAW Local 652, and Mr. Michael Rein-
erth, human resources director, GM–Lansing Craft Centre, for their support in provid-
ing access to officials from UAW Local 652 and GM–Lansing; Mr. John Couthen Jr.,
supervisor, labor relations, Small Car Group, North American Operations, GM, Mr.
Matthew W. Boyle, manager, industrial relations, Lansing Site, GM, and Mr. Ralph
Sheppard, president, UAW Local 652, for their cooperation in this research; and Ms.
Betty Barrett, Ph.D. candidate, School of Labor and Industrial Relations, Michigan
State University, for her research assistance.
Unless otherwise noted parenthetically in the text, the material in this chapter is based
on Baker and Scheffler (1999).
1. The Cadillac CTS exceeded GM’s expectations in sales (Hayes 2002). In 2004,
GM will add a second high-margin vehicle to the Lansing Grand River Assembly
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product line—the Cadillac SRX, a “cross-over” sedan/sport utility vehicle. This
addition will result in 700 new jobs in Lansing (Hayes 2003).
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The Lear Corporation’s plant in Elsie, Michigan, and its union
partner, Local 1660 of the United Automobile Workers (UAW) Inter-
national Union, graphically illustrate global and national forces at play
in reaching the goals of remaining competitive while providing for
employment protection and job creation. Although the Lear Corpora-
tion in the aggregate is a conglomerate business with sales of over
U.S.$5.9 billion, each of its auto component plants faces strong pres-
sures from the corporation to demonstrate economic viability and
advantage. It also faces pressures from its community to maintain or
increase its employment base. The story of this rural plant and its
employees’ 35-year journey to remain open and to continue to be
awarded new product placements is a typical yet fascinating story for a
U.S. firm.
The Lear–Elsie and UAW Local 1660 case demonstrates the abil-
ity of collective bargaining practices and noncontractual workplace
processes to cope with changing manufacturing paradigms. Between
its opening in 1966 and the present, this plant has exemplified three
manufacturing models. From 1966 to 1996, the Lear plant was a typi-
cal mass production facility. From 1996 to 2000, the plant shifted to a
team-based work system closely aligned with the sociotechnical sys-
tems model. With the adoption of the 2000 contract with UAW Local
1660, the plant transformed itself into a lean production plant based on
the principles of the Toyota Production System (Ohno 1988). The pre-
sentation of these contextual factors will be elaborated in the final sec-
tions of this chapter, as case findings are augmented with current
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(2001) interview data. Attention now turns to the fundamentals of the
business, the facility, the collective bargaining relationship, and the
pressures toward competition and employment protection/creation at
Lear–Elsie.
DESCRIPTION OF THE BUSINESS
The Lear–Elsie plant is part of Lear Corporation, an automotive
components supplier. Lear’s goal is to supply every component of an
automobile interior in kitted modules suitable for assembly by major
automotive producers. The corporation’s worldwide sales were
U.S.$9.1 billion in 1999, and it is clearly an expert in the design of
seating systems. Lear’s major competitors in the power seating busi-
ness are Bertrand Pfaume (France), Mariner Corporation (originally
Rockwell International), and the Johnson Controls Corporation. Since
1990, four major competitors have left the power seating business.
These former competitors are Magna Corporation, Excel Corporation,
Thompson Tennessee, and the Dura Corporation. The seat and seat
component business is highly competitive worldwide.
HISTORY OF THE FACILITY
Elsie, Michigan, is a town of 700 people, located about 28 miles
northeast of Lansing and about 110 miles northwest of Detroit, the
major industrial area in the state. It is a farming community with a
focus on dairy production and beef cattle. The Lear plant is the only
major manufacturing employer in this town.
The plant opened in 1966 and was privately owned. During the
1966–1972 period, it made door latches, hood latches, and manual seat
adjusters. The plant was sold to International Telephone and Telegraph
(ITT) Automotive in 1973. ITT, which eventually became a division of
United Technologies, aggressively pursued power seat assembly and
power window regulator business. In the mid 1990s, ITT reconceptual-
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ized its business strategies to focus on rate of return and broke up its
automotive group. Lear purchased the plant in 1997.
Lear’s business strategy was and is to earn an acceptable rate of
return while maximizing its share in the market for vehicle interiors.
Local 1660 of the UAW represented the employees through all of these
ownership changes and had to work through the necessary transitions.
Financial results from the first quarter of 1999 indicate that this strat-
egy has been successful for Lear, as the company increased earnings by
6.3 percent compared with the first quarter of 1999.
This Lear–Elsie plant currently manufactures power seat track
assemblies, seat frames, torsion bars, and seat recliner mechanisms.
Customers include Ford, General Motors, Daimler Chrysler, Saturn,
and Toyota. The power seat track assemblies must be assembled to
meet high customer standards. Because the driver’s and passenger’s
seats are fitted onto these power seat tracks, any squeaks, noise, or
wobble in their operation is likely to be immediately noticed by cus-
tomers as a defect. The plant also has a repair shop capable of repairing
seat track assemblies damaged in accidents or returned for other rea-
sons. 
The Lear–Elsie plant currently employs about 500 unionized pro-
duction employees called process specialists, 15 skilled trades employ-
ees, 15 unit advisors (formerly supervisors), 8–10 clerical people, and
about 8 material analysts and quality analysts in addition to the upper
tier of managers. Employment levels have varied widely, though. In
1991, the plant employed 305 assembly employees. By 1995, the prod-
uct market for sport utility vehicles had boosted the plant labor force to
over 800 employees. In 1996, the bubble burst and jobs at Elsie fell
from 800 to 258, as ITT management pulled all its Chrysler work from
this plant and sent it to a sister ITT plant in Walker, Michigan, near
Grand Rapids. Another sister plant in St. Thomas, Ontario (Canada),
that did the same work as Lear–Elsie closed in 1996 due to high labor
costs. Elsie realized that it had an opportunity to become more compet-
itive by the mid 1990s, but it needed to find a way to survive. 
An additional factor in understanding this plant is the turnover in
the plant manager position. David Chambers, the current plant man-
ager since 1996, was also plant manager from 1979 to 1987. Other
plant managers served from 1987 to 1991 and from 1991 until 1996,
while Chambers’ career took him to roles as operations manager for
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five ITT plants and then as advanced engineering manager for ITT. He
chose to return to the Elsie plant in 1996 and was retained by Lear
when that company completed its purchase in 1997.
HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING AT LEAR–ELSIE
Today, approximately 500 workers are represented by UAW Local
1660. The union was formed as Local 1660 in 1969 and has never
merged or been amalgamated since then. There was one strike in 1979
that lasted for about 10 days over pension benefits. Use of third parties
for arbitration is rare—possibly three or four cases in the last 30 years.
The union–management relationship with ITT was seen as “arm’s
length” at best and adversarial most of the time. The company saw all
issues in terms of their business objectives. The union described this
relationship as “take, take, take” in terms of ITT behavior, and it
focused on filing grievances with little sense of any “give and take” in
the process.
The 1997 negotiations began with ITT amid a flurry of rumors that
the plant would be sold or closed. With three other ITT plants vying for
seat track work, the union felt that the company held the upper hand in
bargaining. The union had observed ITT changing its focus on automo-
tive work from aggressive pursuit of business to letting workers and
engineers be laid off. The workforce hoped for a new owner who
would keep the Elsie plant open. Lear Corporation bought the plant and
completed the negotiation process in 1997.
Lear Corporation differed from ITT in its stance toward unions. It
pledged neutrality and recognized a union that possesses 51 percent of
potential member cards stating a willingness to join that union. Fur-
thermore, Lear has stated publicly that it “liked the UAW,” and it
enjoyed a good relationship with the international union. The parties
have characterized their relationship since 1997 as “cooperative and
collaborative.”
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COMPETITIVE PRESSURES
Employment in motor vehicle parts and accessories experienced
growth in the last two decades of the 1980s. The trend of employment
in the industry is presented in Figure 7.1. After a drop in the early
1980s, associated with the recession, employment in the industry
began to grow in 1983 and continued to grow through 2000. Over the
20-year period, total employment increased by 57.5 percent, from
approximately 349,500 to approximately 553,000. The growth rate in
production employment was slightly greater; production employment
grew by 60.5 percent, from 268,800 to 431,300. 
But this overall growth in employment presented only an opportu-
nity for the Elsie plant. There was no guarantee that all plants in the
industry would share equally in this growth, or share at all. More spe-
cifically, given the small number of purchasers of motor vehicle parts
and accessories, and the large contracts associated with those pur-
chases, a small, stand-alone plant like Lear–Elsie found itself in a con-
tinual cycle of high risk, high reward; acquisition of a large contract
meant increased employment; loss of a large contract meant a decline
in employment.
Figure 7.1 Motor Vehicle Parts and Accessories, Total Employment and 
Production Employment in the United States, 1980–2000
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At the same time, global competition hit the Elsie plant in 1990–
1991. Orders appeared from Toyota and Nissan, and suddenly employ-
ees realized that they were no longer linked only to domestic automo-
tive production. At about the same time, Ford pulled its valuable
Taurus contract from Elsie and gave it to Johnson Controls. Employees
were shocked to see several lines closed. Since the plant is set up with
decoupled assembly lines for each contract, employees can easily dis-
cern exactly which contracts the plant is gaining or losing. Employees
no longer assumed that management or “someone” would always keep
the Elsie plant supplied with work. Seeing employment drop from the
800s to the 200s in 1995 and 1996 (“high risk, high reward”) demon-
strated the vulnerability of this plant, as did the closing of the St. Tho-
mas plant in Canada, and ITT’s decision to move Chrysler work to the
Walker plant.
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, COMPETITIVENESS, AND 
EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION/CREATION: CONTRACT 
CHANGES
As noted, by the early 1990s the union at Elsie had become aware
of the importance of competition and employment protection/creation
at Elsie. These were also concerns of Lear when it assumed ownership
of the plant. Of this joint concern, almost nothing was reflected in the
formal collective bargaining agreement. Plant management stated that
it could never guarantee levels of employment or offer job security. Job
security was “based on seniority as long as the plant stays open.” Job
security was also seen as derived from “competitiveness and continu-
ous improvement” in the 1997 collective bargaining agreement. This
provision emphasizes a mutual commitment to team-based work sys-
tems, customer satisfaction, training and education for all employees,
creation of a climate of mutual dignity and respect, and use of partici-
pation to improve productivity, efficiency, quality, and cost perfor-
mance. The provision also states that employees will assume personal
responsibility and accountability for the Elsie plant’s success.
A major gain for Lear in the 1997 contract was the ability to col-
lapse six job classifications into one to gain flexibility. The union feels
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that merging assembly, maintenance, material handling, inspection,
forklift, and salvage employees into one classification overdoes the
flexibility concept and should be rethought on the next negotiation.
Lear management’s vision was comprehensive. It downloaded
quality, scrap, and cost objectives for each line to employee teams. It
changed the designation of supervisor to unit advisor and demanded
that they assume a teaching, coaching, and facilitating role with
employee teams rather than a directive role. A 1999 assessment is that
some supervisors still complain about their loss of power to direct
employees, but that this role transition has been mostly successful
except for periodic incidents of old ways of thinking. The philosophy is
that “we are all in this together,” and that everyone needs to work
together to improve multiskilled and multifunctioning employees. 
 Combined with the collapsing of six classifications into one, the
plant has gained huge cost efficiencies. The Elsie collective bargaining
agreement differs from most other Lear plants in that it does not spec-
ify production standards. Elsie management believes people in teams
working in units can do a better job of setting and achieving competi-
tive standards than by using a top-down industrial engineering
approach.
The parties did not limit themselves to competitiveness in the 1997
negotiations. A lump sum payment of $750 was provided to each
employee. In addition, the parties incorporated a “neutrality pledge” to
accept the union as a partner at Lear workplaces.
FORMAL NONCONTRACTUAL MECHANISMS
The current philosophy is anchored in a formal noncontractual par-
ticipation system. The company and union created a joint steering team
(JST) that reports to a planning team consisting of the plant manager,
plant superintendent, union president, and bargaining chair of Local
1660. The JST is a parallel organization that bridges upper leadership
to the workforce. The JST includes the plant manager, plant superin-
tendent, human resources manager, quality manager, materials man-
ager, and quality analyst. Their union counterparts on the JST are the
president, bargaining chair, and volunteers such as the statistical pro-
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cess control coordinator (SPC) and a process specialist employee from
the shop floor. The JST charters four design and development commit-
tees to serve all 14 business unit teams on the line. Design and develop-
ment function teams are staffed by at least one JST member plus
technical volunteers. Four teams are used: finance, people and groups,
equipment and facilities, and information. These teams act as in-house
consultants to help each business unit (assembly teams) with budgets,
layout, process improvements, and team issues necessary to remain
competitive and attract new business. All design and development
team projects lead to recommendations to the JST. The JST may also
create ad hoc teams to host recognition dinners, examine rewards, or to
be a community service team to help the plant support its community.
These JST mechanisms have created formal opportunities for employ-
ees to become engaged in making their business units more productive
and customer responsive.
The plant now runs as an open book and “glass wall” plant with all
cost, quality, scrap, and productivity data made available to employees
in business units. Management still reserves the right to allocate
employees across business units.
Both union and management stressed the need for training. Plant
employees indicated that they had attended courses in SPC, pull train-
ing, traceability, process analysis, QS 9000, team interaction training,
compass, and problem solving. Training may be initiated by either
management or the union; the business unit makes the decision. Both
management and the union see the current system as effective in pro-
moting competitiveness and in creating and protecting jobs. Other for-
mal but noncontractual elements of the current situation include the 40
hours guarantee, which allows employees to volunteer to work extra
hours elsewhere in the plant or just take time off if a line runs short of
materials or work during any week, and the “six pack” system, where
each business unit works on the top six line problems and issues
reported each week. The JST system is clearly evolving to meet jointly
perceived needs for competitiveness and job protection/creation.
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CREATING A FORMAL, NONCONTRACTUAL 
PARTICIPATION SYSTEM
ITT had experimented with teams since the mid 1980s and had
focused on individual skill training. Team roll-outs failed twice. But
plant management and the union learned together how to build a suc-
cessful participation system. They read books on teams, worked with
private consultants, and jointly benchmarked firms such as Johnson-
ville Sausage, Sealed Power, Saturn, and Delphi-Saginaw, firms
known for having successfully installed team-based work systems.
Company and union leadership attended seminars on team develop-
ment offered at North Texas State University. New union leadership
and the return of David Chambers as plant manager were seen as plus-
ses in terms of consistent leadership of this competitive effort. The
plant experimented with new work system concepts until it reached a
workable solution for the Elsie work context.
COMPETITION AND EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION/
CREATION WITHIN DIFFERING MANUFACTURING 
PARADIGMS
The Elsie plant of the Lear Corporation and Local 1660 of the
UAW have had to bargain competitiveness, employment security, and
growth issues in the context of major changes in the manufacturing
systems of the plant. These three manufacturing systems or paradigms
are those of: 1) mass production (Womack, Jones, and Roos 1990); 2)
sociotechnical systems production (Trist and Bamforth 1951; Niepce
and Molleman 1998); and 3) lean manufacturing (Ohno 1988; Kenney
and Florida 1993; Womack and Jones 1996). Each system differs in
fundamental dimensions from the others. These manufacturing systems
will be discussed in turn and related to the business context and the col-
lective bargaining relationship at the Elsie plant.
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MASS PRODUCTION AT LEAR–ELSIE
Mass production is based upon the ability of a system to standard-
ize outputs from a manufacturing or service process. It is an American
system that spread around the world from 1915 to the present, and until
the late 1980s, received few challenges from competing systems. Mass
production is based on the principle of economies of scale. Its compo-
nents include functional specialization, infrequent job rotation, tightly
supervised machine-paced work, many job classifications, and prob-
lem solving by manufacturing and staff (engineering, accounting, pro-
duction control, labor relations, quality, and human resources, to name
a few). It also utilizes a deskilled workforce, work standards imposed
on workers, seniority as the basis for wages and promotion, arm’s-
length relationships with suppliers, and adversarial labor relations. The
general objective of mass production was creation of products of “good
enough” quality and to maintain large inventories as buffers against
machine or worker problems. While mass production can be employed
with management styles ranging from coercive to enlightened, it still
represents a problematic manufacturing model in the twenty-first cen-
tury.
The Lear–Elsie plant was run by several owners as a mass produc-
tion facility until the mid 1990s. Management was in control of the
plant, and workers received little training, did not work in teams,
received little information about quality, and were tightly supervised.
Employment at the Elsie plant fluctuated wildly as it competed with
other plants to be awarded lines of business. While unionized since
1969, the relationship was characterized by company “take-away’s”
according to the union. The basic hope of the union was that a more
enlightened owner would purchase the plant. When the Lear Corpora-
tion purchased the plant in 1997, it brought a new manufacturing para-
digm plus a plant manager who knew and respected the plant and its
people. The new manufacturing paradigm of team-based work systems
closely followed the sociotechnical systems model.
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SOCIOTECHNICAL TEAM-BASED SYSTEMS AT 
LEAR–ELSIE
The team-based “sociotechnical” systems (STS) bargained in the
1997 contract by plant manager David Chambers were American but
were built heavily on ideas first tested in England (Trist and Bamforth
1951) and northern Europe (Berggren 1992). These systems were
designed to create high levels of worker satisfaction, which was
believed to lead to high levels of quality production and retention of
workers. These STS approaches grouped employees into large teams,
changed the role of supervisor into more of a group facilitator, incorpo-
rated team process skills and quality skills into the training of all group
members, and led to frequent team meetings to discuss plant perfor-
mance—the “glass wall” concept. The union was accepted by manage-
ment as a partner rather than an adversary, and its opinion was sought
on all workplace changes. Ergonomics received new attention, and
workers were given more freedom to design and schedule tasks as long
as quality standards and productivity standards were met. Employees
were urged to deeply identify with their team and the product it pro-
duced for each of the contracts in the plant.
This STS story is largely the story told in this case, which portrays
the successful shift to a team-based work system; improved worker,
management, and union attitudes; a successful contract negotiation in
1997; and the general prosperity of the plant. The team-based system
was seen by all as incorporating the elements necessary to maintain a
competitive posture and to secure jobs for the Elsie plant for the fore-
seeable future. The case ended with appreciation for the versatility of
the collective bargaining process and noncontractual arrangements in
securing a positive future for the Elsie plant, its union, and its work-
force. However, in a surprising turn of events, an interview conducted
in 2001 indicated that the plant had largely discarded this paradigm and
had shifted to lean manufacturing in 2000, thus removing many team-
based elements from the contract bargained by Lear and UAW Local
1660.
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LEAN MANUFACTURING AT LEAR–ELSIE
The lean manufacturing system originated in Asia as the Toyota
Production System created by Taiichi Ohno (1988). Lean manufactur-
ing became known to the West when popularized by the International
Motor Vehicle Program at MIT. The book The Machine That Changed
the World (Womack, Jones, and Roos 1990) startled U.S. and Euro-
pean mass producers by showing that lean principles allow factories to
operate with half the space of comparable mass production facilities.
Further, lean plants showed only half the defects found in mass prod-
ucts, used half the hours of human effort, needed only one-tenth the
amount of in-process inventory, and reduced product development
times by one-third. The best European STS plants were shown to be
nearly one-third less efficient than lean plants in Japan and those of
Japanese transplants in the United States. Controversy arose immedi-
ately as intellectuals of the STS orientation (Berggren 1992; Van
Eijnatten, Hoevenaars, and Rutte 1992; Fucini and Fucini 1990; Parker
and Slaughter 1995) launched attacks on lean manufacturing as simply
being an advanced form of “Fordism.” Lean advocates (Adler and Cole
1993) responded that lean plants could not only out-produce other par-
adigms, but that the secret of the lean approach was in its superior way
of promoting organizational learning through its standardized work
systems and team-based suggestion systems. This is the direction taken
by the Elsie plant in 2000.
The lean system at Lear–Elsie is a close fit with lean principles
(Ohno 1988). Chambers felt that the STS-type large teams had become
too independent and rigid. They set up boundaries and isolated them-
selves from other plant teams. Their working autonomy was not trans-
lated into sharing ideas to help the plant but instead to become more
impervious to ideas from others in the plant. These comments echo the
Adler and Cole (1993) comments about the downsides of the STS team
systems. In contrast, lean teams are small and are led by team leaders;
they are not “semi-autonomous” but are tightly linked to other teams
on their line. Lean is characterized by “andon” systems (which allow
workers to stop the line in the event of materials shortage or quality
problem), standardized work, just-in-time inventory and material han-
dling systems, quick team meetings, and a focus on eliminating waste.
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“Kaizen” (continuous improvement) events are used for extensive pro-
cess and quality assessment of specific target areas in the plant. All of
these systems and processes have been installed at the Lear–Elsie plant
since 2000. The union allowed the company to remove many of the
team concepts and install lean principles in order to support manage-
ment’s goal of keeping the facility competitive. According to Cham-
bers, the UAW Local 1660 leaders were somewhat cynical that lean
production was simply a new “flavor of the month,” but they had built
up enough trust in management after the 1997 contract to be willing to
negotiate a shift to lean manufacturing. The union felt that both
approaches are team-based and that team concepts were supported by
the membership.
The lean system is already producing successes for the Elsie plant.
Plant in-process inventory has dropped 22 percent. Four kaizen events
have been held. Employees are contributing a steady flow of sugges-
tions. “Glass-wall” knowledge of plant functioning is still shared with
all employees. Employees have been trained in the seven types of
waste and how to use the “5’s” model of workplace organization.
Cross-functional teams are extensively used to solve problems and
ensure the sharing of best practices and ideas. The Elsie plant has suc-
cessfully launched new product lines and has reached productivity and
quality performance levels faster than ever before. Plant employment
levels have been maintained. The plant’s layout and footprint are the
current constraints to future growth, but upcoming kaizen events are
seen as likely to create improved space utilization so new product lines
can be attracted to the plant. By having the courage to use the collec-
tive bargaining process to make a successful team-based plant even
better, the union and the company have exemplified the creativity and
flexibility necessary to keep a small auto supplier plant economically
competitive and able to sustain employment levels in a small rural
community.
CONCLUSION
In an industry with growing employment overall, but with the pos-
sibility of unstable employment at any single facility, competitiveness
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means appropriating for that plant a share of the overall industry
employment gains. In 1999 and in 2001, this plant was working at
capacity with new jobs scheduled to replace jobs that will be closed out
due to decisions made about the product’s life cycle by automotive
manufacturers. Both management and union report that most employ-
ees are happy with the plant today and are pleased with its competitive
position and its future likelihood of job protection and creation. Man-
agement spokespersons see a complete turnaround by both sides. Ten
years ago, employee complaints were met with the statement “go write
a grievance.” Five years ago, management would take the time to argue
but would still resolve matters by telling the union to “go write a griev-
ance.” Today the situation is characterized as both sides being willing
to admit it if they are wrong. Plus, both sides are likely to give each
other some leeway because trust has been established. Management
recognizes it is always fighting inertia and resistance to change from
both supervisors/unit advisors and employees. Union reservations to
agree to total success of this system stem from the company’s use of
bargaining power in the 1997 negotiation and the resulting classifica-
tion collapse. The union believes the process of getting competitive
could have been handled better.
Management and union seem to agree that sharing information
makes everyone hungry to learn even more about the business and to
become multiskilled and even more knowledgeable about the competi-
tive global environment. Both are also likely to believe that Elsie was
fortunate to have Chambers return as plant manager and point to his
engineering background, product knowledge, benchmarking experi-
ence in Europe, Japan, and the United States, plus his vision and people
skills. He earns approval by his willingness to aggressively pursue
business for Lear–Elsie.
Finally, both union and management express appreciation for the
institution of collective bargaining as a way to forge new relationships
and to create new participation mechanisms necessary to foster compe-
tition and to protect and create jobs in response to global competitive
pressures. The Elsie plant’s ability to illustrate the worldwide search
for an optimum manufacturing paradigm while fully utilizing collec-
tive bargaining and noncontractual mechanisms makes this an impor-
tant case study. This small North American plant exemplifies the
global search for methods of achieving competitiveness while main-
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taining employment levels. In that sense, the Lear plant in Elsie repre-
sents a prototypical example of a unionized facility attempting to
maintain employment in the United States.
Note
The authors would like to thank the interviewees cited in the chapter.
Unless otherwise noted parenthetically in the text, the material in this chapter is based
on Chambers and Laxton (1999), Rathbun and Tyler (1999), Jordan and Klatt (1999),
Jablowski (1999), and Chambers (2001).
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Health Care
Sparrow Health System, Lansing, Michigan, 
and Professional Employees Council of Sparrow 
Hospital/Michigan Nurses Association
Michael J. Polzin
Peter Berg
Michigan State University
Employment in the hospital industry continues to increase despite
major financial challenges confronting the industry. Expenses in U.S.
hospitals doubled over the decade 1986–1996, and these costs are
expected to grow at a rate of about 6.5 percent annually (Strunk, Gins-
burg, and Gabel 2001). The rapidly rising costs are driving hospitals to
exact tough measures to control expenses, including mergers, acquisi-
tions, and closures. Consolidation has reduced the number of hospitals
by more than 10 percent, from 6,841 in 1986 to 6,201 in 1996 (Plunkett
2000). However, employment levels in hospitals have not changed cor-
respondingly, with employment in hospitals increasing by more than
500,000 over the level (4.28 million) of the prior decade (Plunkett
2000). Thus, collective bargaining in hospitals occurs within an envi-
ronment quite different from that experienced by unionized manufac-
turers, who often are confronted with excess capacity within their
industries and shrinking workforce needs.
This case focuses on Sparrow Hospital in Lansing, Michigan. The
chapter identifies many of the changes that confronted the hospital
over the past few years and examines how the collective bargaining
relationship affected the way union and management responded to
those changes.
134 Polzin and Berg
DESCRIPTION OF THE BUSINESS
Sparrow Health System is a nonprofit, community-governed, com-
prehensive, integrated health delivery and financing system headquar-
tered in Lansing, Michigan. At the heart of the Sparrow Health System
is Sparrow Hospital, a 502-bed regional, acute-care facility, and
another hospital, the St. Lawrence campus, a formerly independent
hospital. Nurses and other professional employees of the health system
are represented by the Professional Employees Council of Sparrow
Hospital (PECSH), which is affiliated with the Michigan Nurses Asso-
ciation (MNA), an affiliate of the American Nurses Association. Spar-
row owns and operates a nursing home in the Lansing area as well as
over 30 health-related facilities such as clinics, physician practices, and
laboratory draw stations.
The delivery of health care services is in major transition, as third-
party payers (insurance companies, state government, and federal
Medicare programs) are demanding reduced—or at least contained—
costs, while patients are demanding improved quality, greater accessi-
bility of services or resources, and higher degrees of satisfaction. The
industry as a whole is being affected profoundly, and the impact on
Sparrow is no exception.
Employment in the health care industry is in the midst of a long-
term secular increase. Figure 8.1 shows the trend in health services
employment in the Lansing metropolitan area from 1988 to 2000, and
Figure 8.2 shows the trend for health services employment nationally.
As seen in these figures, both are increasing. Lansing area health care
employment increased from about 12,000 to 16,600 between 1988 and
2000, a jump of roughly 38.3 percent. National health care employ-
ment during this same period increased from approximately 7.1 million
to 10.1 million, an increase of 42.1 percent. 
HISTORY OF SPARROW HEALTH SYSTEM
Lansing, the capital of Michigan, is a medium-sized city with a
1996 population of approximately 129,000 (U.S. Bureau of the Census
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Figure 8.1 Health Services Employment in Lansing–East Lansing, 
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1996a) in the midst of a metropolitan area with a 1996 population of
approximately 450,000 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1996b). The city is
located in southern lower Michigan, approximately 90 miles northwest
of Detroit, the state’s largest city, and approximately 90 miles east of
Lake Michigan. Other major employers in the area include the State of
Michigan, Michigan State University, and General Motors Corpora-
tion. 
Sparrow was founded in 1896 by a group of civic-minded women
who came together to form a community hospital. The 114 charter
members of the Women’s Hospital Association (WHA) raised $400,
and with that rented a house, hired a doctor and nurse, and devoted
their time and resources to keeping their tiny hospital afloat. In the
early 1900s, Edward W. Sparrow, a prominent Lansing businessman,
donated the money and property that formed the base of today’s Spar-
row Hospital. Today, the hospital founded by the WHA has become
Sparrow Hospital and Health System and serves the health care needs
of more than 120,000 people annually. 
HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING AT SPARROW HEALTH SYSTEM
Sparrow Health System employs approximately 5,600 people, of
which 1,630 are members of PECSH. The bargaining unit is comprised
of all registered nurses and other health care professionals (pharma-
cists, medical technicians, physical therapists, occupational therapists,
dietitians, social workers, and mental health therapists) who are
employed by Sparrow Hospital. Members of the bargaining unit may
be found working in both of the hospital campuses, as well as in other
health system affiliates.
The bargaining unit was first organized in 1988 in response to an
increasing number of unilateral decisions by management, particularly
with respect to changing work schedules and shifting assignments.
Employment trends at Sparrow over the last decade were difficult to
determine, as during that time, Sparrow, like many other health care
organizations, merged with another hospital (in Lansing) and added
many ancillary services, such as laboratories and outpatient facilities.
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The collective bargaining relationship began as traditionally adver-
sarial. Contract negotiations in 1991 were very difficult, and a media-
tor from the U.S. Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS)
was called in to help reach an agreement. Similarly, in 1994, an FMCS
mediator was also called in after a strike vote was taken. The issue at
the center of the 1994 conflict was staffing, as many employees—
nurses, in particular—were concerned for the well-being of patients.
Despite its history of traditional adversarial bargaining, the labor–man-
agement relationship changed in 1993, when management began to
consult more with union leadership on key decisions that would have
an impact on bargaining unit members. These initial cooperative prac-
tices were well received, as both parties sensed that a new relationship
was needed.
In late 1994, PECSH and Sparrow management, with the assis-
tance of a third party from Michigan State University, met to consider
developing a joint labor–management approach to redesigning patient
care. The initial meeting had positive results. The parties found that
their visions for what they wanted the union–management relationship
to become were similar and consequently agreed to a set of principles
that would guide their interactions with respect to the redesign process
and other matters. Those principles then formed the basis for new pro-
visions in the 1994 collective agreement that created a structure and
articulated a purpose for a formal joint labor–management committee.
This Mutual Gains Committee (MGC) became the forum through
which decisions regarding workplace restructuring that directly
affected employees would be made. The MGC ultimately took on a
range of issues including staffing and contract interpretation. 
COMPETITIVE PRESSURES CONFRONTING SPARROW 
HEALTH SYSTEM AND PECSH
Hospitals and the health care industry are under tremendous com-
petitive pressures, but it is pressure of a fundamentally different kind
than what manufacturing firms face. As noted, unlike manufacturing,
employment in health care is increasing. Sparrow’s competitive chal-
lenges are thus primarily related to the changing structure of the health
138 Polzin and Berg
care industry: increased local competition from rival health care orga-
nizations, and pressure from third-party payers—insurance compa-
nies—to keep fees as low as possible. The increase in surgical centers
and clinics has increased competition for health care services and good
personnel. Insurance companies continue to pressure hospitals to
reduce costs. Moreover, recent reductions in federal Medicare reim-
bursements, which have resulted in lower payments to hospitals, have
added to the cost pressures on hospitals. Customer expectations are
driving demands for utilization of emerging technologies and resources
and greater satisfaction with respect to the patient and family experi-
ence. Sparrow Hospital began to experience these competitive pres-
sures in the early 1990s, though they were not particularly unique to
Sparrow.
A major competitive pressure that was unique to Lansing, Michi-
gan, if not to Sparrow, in the 1990s was the merger of two major hospi-
tals in the city and, subsequently, the proposed buyout of that new
entity by a large, for-profit hospital chain (Columbia/HCA). That
would have led to the creation of one of the first for-profit hospitals in
the state. The buyout was ultimately unsuccessful after considerable
public outcry and intervention from the State’s attorney general. None-
theless, the consolidation of hospital services prior to the failed buyout
effort and the subsequent affiliation of the new merged hospital (and
now a much more significant competitor) with a health care system in
Flint, Michigan, prompted Sparrow to merge with St. Lawrence Hospi-
tal in 1997.
Competitive pressures, reductions in payments to hospitals, and
Columbia’s attempt to enter the Lansing market prompted other
changes at Sparrow. For example, purchasing practices were exam-
ined. In some cases, nursing staff felt that they could no longer get the
supplies they wanted, only what was cheapest. Employees reported
feeling a loss of input and control. Patient–staff ratios increased. Nurs-
ing staff believed that some nonnursing personnel were doing tasks for
patients that traditionally had been handled by nurses, and they feared
that patient care might be compromised. Financial benchmarking prac-
tices also took hold to the degree that a number system was applied to
the severity of patient illness. This was consistent with what most hos-
pitals were doing to address the lower payment issue. However, some
nursing staff were frustrated when the numeric indicators available
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were not sufficient to justify dedication of resource levels to a patient.
Some nurses feared that their ability to have input into prescribing the
care needed for their patients would be eroded. Contentiousness around
the contract reflected changes in these business practices. 
Sparrow responded to the pressure to reduce costs by benchmark-
ing its costs to other hospitals nationally. The benchmarks furthered the
argument that costs at Sparrow needed to be brought in line with hospi-
tals of similar size. Sparrow also responded by increasing nurse–
patient ratios to standards in place in other high-performance hospitals.
Sparrow also began to experience a shortage of nurses through an
interesting twist of fate. A national nursing shortage and a very high
patient census resulted in unintended consequences that even Spar-
row’s good intentions could not have foreseen. In order to have posi-
tions for all staff after the merger, Sparrow left dozens of vacant
positions unfilled so that they would be able to make and keep a prom-
ise of no layoffs as a consequence of the merger. No one counted on
the fact that a number of employees, mostly from the St. Lawrence
facility, saw the merger as an opportunity to seek other employment.
Because of the tight labor market, they found other employment rather
easily, which left Sparrow with many positions unfilled.
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, COMPETITIVENESS, AND 
EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION/CREATION
Changes in Contract Language
 Management’s proposal to introduce a patient care redesign initia-
tive had a significant impact on collective bargaining and the union–
management relationship at Sparrow. Management believed that
patient care redesign would improve quality and perhaps even increase
patient satisfaction by reducing the number of different employees
involved in delivering care. Instead, all services would be delivered
through patient-care teams. In 1992–1993, management brought in
consultants to help redesign patient care using a model known as
“patient-focused care.” Initially, there was no union involvement in
selecting consultants or in the process of exploring or designing the
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patient-care delivery system. Negative reaction was widespread
throughout the Sparrow Health System. Management realized that
there would be no acceptance of or commitment to a change this signif-
icant if employees were not involved in the effort. Consequently,
PECSH leadership was asked to join management in overseeing the
effort to redesign the patient-care delivery system. PECSH leadership
entered the discussions with an expectation that union and manage-
ment would work as equals, an idea readily accepted by management.
This attitude was consistent with the belief (shared by Sparrow man-
agement and staff and PECSH/MNA leadership, and supported by
Sparrow’s CEO) that people should be involved in making decisions
that affected them and their work. Consultants from Michigan State
University facilitated an initial meeting between union and manage-
ment leadership to explore the scope and boundaries of that work, as
well as to begin to construct a framework upon which that work would
be built. Their discussions resulted in a set of guiding principles that
union and management leadership agreed would undergird their work
together. The principles also formed the basis for the creation of a joint
labor–management mutual gains committee that was negotiated as part
of the 1994 collective agreement.
 Formal Structures
Sparrow used the Mutual Gains Committee to create a structure
and process for redesigning work around a patient-focused care model.
The committee visited other organizations, read books, and bench-
marked their practices against other hospitals as a way of developing
their own model of work organization. The Sparrow model decentral-
izes some nonnursing services, such as phlebotomy and housekeeping,
to the unit level. Typically, the redesigned unit forms teams led by reg-
istered nurses (RNs), who delegate responsibilities and monitor perfor-
mance outcomes. The teams consist of patient care technicians (PCT)
(formerly orderlies), who perform uncomplicated respiratory treat-
ments and suctioning, phlebotomy, and EKGs (along with licensed
practical nurses). Patient care assistants (PCA), formerly part of the
centralized housekeeping staff, are also part of the team on the unit.
The PCAs are responsible for cleaning the room, transportation, tray
passing and setup, and assisting with beds and baths.
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This redesigned work system that integrates functions is supposed
to increase patient, physician, and employee satisfaction, as well as
improve care and decrease expenses. The teams have yet to be widely
implemented across units in the hospital, and their effects seem to be
mixed. High patient volume and staff vacancies resulting in tight staff-
ing levels seem to particularly undermine the patient-focused care
model. Moreover, the lack of RN training in delegation skills (although
various leadership development training sessions were provided) and
some RNs’ unwillingness to accept authority—and some middle man-
agers’ reluctance to give it up—have hindered the implementation of
work redesign.
A national nursing shortage, as well as shortages of other key
occupations, put pressure on the ability of Sparrow staff to address
patient needs and enhance patient satisfaction. This also contributes to
additional overtime and recruitment costs and recruitment and reten-
tion problems. Indeed, the experience at Sparrow strongly suggests that
the success of the patient care redesign is predicated on having suffi-
cient staffing levels. Sparrow and PECSH decided, through the Mutual
Gains Committee, to address the shortages jointly. A joint labor–man-
agement committee was established to address recruitment and reten-
tion of nurses, pharmacists, and other occupations where there is the
greatest need. At the same time, the parties maintain their commitment
to having sufficient staff coverage at all times. Again, through the
Mutual Gains Committee, the parties developed minimal acceptable
staffing levels for all units. When staffing falls below the minimal
level, a joint committee awards $200 to the employees in the affected
unit, whose responsibility it is to cover the absent or unscheduled
employees. The employees in the unit are free to do what they wish
with the funds. 
When the merger occurred, all nurses and professional health care
employees from St. Lawrence were brought in to PECSH in such a way
that the St. Lawrence seniority became the seniority within the entire
bargaining unit. This was done because management and PECSH
believed this was the fair thing to do for the St. Lawrence staff, to build
support for the merger and make the new members feel welcome in
PECSH. Nonetheless, there was a wage differential between many of
the Sparrow employees and the St. Lawrence employees, due in part to
the difference in financial performance of Sparrow and St. Lawrence.
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Union and management negotiated a one-time, lump-sum bonus to be
paid to Sparrow employees, in lieu of a wage increase, so as not to
exacerbate the differential. PECSH and Sparrow also negotiated into
the 1998 agreement a performance-based, add-on gain-sharing plan.
Payout is based on achieving targeted hospital performance. 
Informal Actions and Programs 
The work redesign efforts have spun off informal applications of
the patient care model. In at least one department, the manager and
employees are using a participatory process to make changes. Though
there has been no formal redesign of that department yet, there is a con-
tinual focus on management and staff working together to make opera-
tional improvements. 
Conversations between PECSH and Sparrow prior to the merger
went far to strengthen their relationship, which helped to maintain a
positive community image during that period. Management kept the
union informed throughout the process and agreed early on to incorpo-
rate St. Lawrence professional staff into the PECSH bargaining unit.
That led to PECSH working to develop strategies to welcome and inte-
grate new staff into the Sparrow system. On the matter of the potential
entry of Columbia/HCA into the Lansing market, PECSH gave defini-
tive support to Sparrow at public hearings to add to the case against
entry of the for-profit chain into the local health care market. Other
actions enhanced the strength of the labor–management relationship,
which is significant in helping Sparrow respond to external competi-
tion. During a recent “Nurses Week,” PECSH and Sparrow manage-
ment joined forces in erecting a billboard that combined both a nurses
theme and a collaboration theme. For the past several years, Sparrow
management has funded several PECSH officers to attend a national
conference on “Unions and Health Care.” Prior to the merger, both
Sparrow and PECSH leadership presented ideas on joint labor–man-
agement cooperation to representatives of the Mercy Health Care Sys-
tem, the parent company of St. Lawrence. Both parties were pleased to
work together in support of the merger. Their cooperation helped facil-
itate completion of the negotiations and approval process.
The collective bargaining process itself was affected by the posi-
tive experience of working within the Mutual Gains Committee struc-
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ture. In the 1998 negotiations, the parties decided to incorporate an
explicit interest-based bargaining approach and brought in a third party
that was skilled in using this type of model. The consultant taught the
bargaining committees how to use the model through a formal educa-
tion program and then facilitated the bargaining process. An agreement
that was satisfactory to all was reached, albeit in the last week of nego-
tiations; when compensation was on the table, bargaining reverted to
the much more traditional distributive style. Contract administration
has also been affected positively by the cooperative efforts of the par-
ties. There are sincere attempts to settle grievances outside the formal
grievance process. In prior years, many managers were trained in non-
traditional problem-solving practices. Due to turnover in management
and union leadership, the parties recognize a need to recommit time to
ensure that problem-solving occurs in a manner consistent with the
mutual gains approach.
OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Though the mutual gains process has had a significant and positive
influence on the Sparrow Health System, the impact has been felt most
by those in leadership positions. Some union leaders think the process
is not as visible to many rank-and-file members. Others have difficulty
separating the mutual gains or joint labor–management approach to
problem solving or change from the patient-care redesign process
itself. For those who have not been involved in work redesign—and
that would still be the majority of employees at Sparrow—the only
opportunity they would have to see applications of the mutual gains
process would be through the day-to-day interactions within their
respective departments. Both union and management leadership
acknowledge that most middle managers have yet to be trained in inter-
est-based methods and techniques to apply to problems or conflicts that
arise. PECSH and Sparrow management have tried to make educating
mid- and first-level managers in the basics of the mutual gains or inter-
est-based process a priority, but the competitive pressures that Sparrow
has had to face in the past few years have taken a great deal of attention
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and diverted resources away from diffusing the mutual gains process
throughout the hospital.
For Sparrow Health System, the collective bargaining structure
and process has had a positive impact on factors related to competitive-
ness primarily through the mutual gains provisions in the agreement.
The mutual gains process gave all employees, both union and non-
union, a voice and a vote in the patient care redesign effort. Indeed,
before a redesign is implemented in a unit, it must receive at least a
majority vote from all employees in the unit. The mutual gains process
has also helped improve problem solving within departments, particu-
larly problems that might otherwise end up as grievances. More man-
agers are likely to support problem solving at the lowest level, and this
concept is strongly supported by the human resources department.
Over time, many managers have come to a different appreciation of
PECSH/MNA and no longer see it as a threat, but rather as a partner in
the delivery of high-quality health care. Many rank-and-file members,
once they see that management is approachable, go directly to their
supervisors to work out problems. Nonetheless, both parties acknowl-
edge that they need to reinvest time and energy in their relationship.
The relationship that PECSH and Sparrow management developed
as a consequence of mutual gains has also helped address the threat
from external competitors. PECSH and management spoke as a team
against the proposed entry of the for-profit Columbia/HCA into the
community-based Lansing health care market. PECSH leadership also
played a significant role in building acceptance for the merger with St.
Lawrence among its own members as well as among the affected
workers from St. Lawrence. In addition, PECSH took clear steps to try
to integrate St. Lawrence workers into the Sparrow system and to
reduce wage differentials that could adversely affect employee morale
and turnover rates. Through the Mutual Gains Committee, a committee
on recruitment and retention has met several times in an attempt to
reduce the shortage of nursing and other personnel, which adversely
affects patient care as well as cost of care, two measurements that are
important to evaluating the success of redesign efforts.
The degree of job retention and creation that can be attributed to
the collective bargaining structure and process at Sparrow is more dif-
ficult to assess. PECSH has only been in existence for about 11 years.
During that time, some services have expanded and some have con-
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tracted. Certainly, the merger with St. Lawrence resulted in a net gain
in jobs for the system as a whole, but with the serious nursing and pro-
fessional staff shortages that exist nationwide, many of those jobs
remain unfilled. It is true that some St. Lawrence employees did not
make the move to Sparrow when offered the opportunity and took
other employment instead, both with other area health care employers
as well as outside the health care field entirely. But it does not appear
to be the case that these employment choices had much to do with the
unionized status of Sparrow Health System. Rather, they seemed to be
based on various other factors such as personal preferences, high
patient volumes at Sparrow atypical of those at St. Lawrence, high
patient acuity, higher starting wages in some cases, and a desire for a
different workload than that anticipated at Sparrow. 
Job retention is taken very seriously at Sparrow, and the collective
agreement and the positive labor–management relations here provided
incentive to Sparrow to strengthen job retention practices. Sparrow
management learned several years ago when first exploring patient
care redesign that the only way they would get the acceptance, if not
the cooperation, of nursing and professional staff was to involve them
in designing and implementing the changes. Along with that, they also
acknowledged that to reduce fears about dislocation, they must address
issues of employment security. Management has a standing verbal
agreement with PECSH that no person would lose employment with
Sparrow Health System as a result of job redesign.
Issues remain, however, that will require additional attention from
PECSH and Sparrow management as they continue their efforts to
retain or increase their competitive standing. Patient care redesign
efforts have affected only a small portion of Sparrow departments and
employees. The amount of time needed to redesign patient care sys-
tems in a unit was grossly underestimated. Many nurses claim that they
do not feel empowered to make decisions, even though there is con-
tractual language to support them. Many managers have not been
exposed to the concepts of mutual gains and interest-based approaches
to problem solving, so there is disparity in the ways in which people
address problems and grievances. In some units, turnover rates are
fairly high—not necessarily higher than industry averages, but still
high enough to strain staffing levels. The gains achieved by units that
have been redesigned are not all that conclusive. Costs are up (perhaps
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as a consequence of staffing shortages), while quality indicators, such
as infection control and patient satisfaction, are improved. Staff often
report, however, that their satisfaction is mixed. Sparrow has long
practiced what is known as primary nursing—essentially because Spar-
row employed no aides; nurses did everything, affording them the
opportunity to develop strong and satisfying relationships with
patients. Typically, patient care redesign changes this situation so that
the role of the staff nurse is different. For some, this lessens the oppor-
tunity to develop strong and satisfying relationships with patients.
Changes in reimbursement patterns from public and private payers
continue to drive changes in Sparrow to a degree that significantly con-
trols choices that are made and how work gets done. The amount of
paperwork has been increasing profoundly, which results in managers
and staff increasing their workload without having additional impact
on operations. The excess demands on managers mean that they have
less time to look at fundamental changes that would improve work.
This leads to managers leaving their jobs because of the perceived loss
of impact. 
Wage differentials between Sparrow and St. Lawrence employees
continue to exist and fester, despite mechanisms in place from the 1998
negotiations to reduce such inequalities. Reports of people working
side by side doing the same job yet receiving different salaries are
commonplace. The merger with St. Lawrence added many issues to
Sparrow’s mix and they will likely require attention for some time.
PECSH/MNA and Sparrow management can point to much
progress since mutual gains provisions were included in the 1994 col-
lective agreement. These improvements followed from intentional
changes in attitudes and degree of support from management and
PECSH/MNA leadership toward an improved working relationship in
the preceding two years. If all of the competitive issues have not been
effectively addressed, then at least the Mutual Gains Committee and
the resulting cooperative labor–management process provides a forum
with which to address them. The health care industry will continue to
offer challenges to organizations like Sparrow as it continues to
develop growth strategies in an industry dominated by fewer but larger
organizations competing to provide a range of health services, such as
outpatient and laboratory services rather than simply inpatient health
care. The cooperative labor–management mechanisms that PECSH/
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MNA and Sparrow have forged through their collective bargaining
process are likely to serve them well as they continue to provide high-
quality service to the residents of mid Michigan.
Notes
In addition to those mentioned in the references section, the authors would like to
extend special thanks to Mr. Chris Marin, human resources director, Sparrow Hospital;
Ms. Shirley Stephenson, senior human resource assistant, Sparrow Hospital; and Ms.
Catherine Dunn, chairperson, Professional Employees Council of Sparrow Hospital/
Michigan Nurses Association (PECSH/MNA) for their assistance, cooperation, and
support in providing access to officials from Sparrow Hospital and PECSH/MNA. 
Unless noted parenthetically in the text, the material in this chapter is based on inter-
views with Aldridge et al. (1999), Barron et al. (1999), Certo et al. (1999), and Daly et
al. (1999).
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Overview and Conclusions
Richard N. Block
Michigan State University
As discussed in Chapter 1, the collective bargaining system in the
United States is embedded in a belief system that gives great weight to
individualism in employment, property rights, and employment solely
as a creator of economic value. As compared with the industrial
democracies of Europe, the employment relationship is viewed as hav-
ing very little social content. Whereas in Europe, collectivization of
employment as a means of equalizing the influence of employer and
employee is the norm, in the United States the norm is an employment
relationship between the employer and the individual employee that is
based on the economic value each derives from the relationship. Col-
lectivization of employment in the United States does occur but it is
not the norm. In 2001, only about 9.7 percent of private-sector employ-
ees were covered by collective bargaining agreements (U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics 2002). 
Thus, examining Chapter 2, on the legal, institutional, and eco-
nomic contexts for collective bargaining, employment protection/cre-
ation, and competitiveness, it is not surprising that no actor, institution,
or subsystem in the United States encourages the collective bargaining
system to be used for those—or any—purposes. Public policy toward
employment and collective bargaining, which reflects the individualis-
tic, transactional belief system discussed in Chapter 1, is the most
important single influence on the nature of collective bargaining in the
United States. With no commitment to a collective bargaining system,
public policy neither encourages nor discourages collective bargaining
as a method of establishing terms and conditions of employment.
Rather, public policy is designed to protect the choice of employees as
to whether they wish to be represented by a union/labor organization
for the purposes of collective bargaining. Employees make these
choices individually, in the privacy of the representation election vot-
ing booth. These choices are made on the basis of individual bargain-
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ing units, which are legally required to be the employer, plant/facility,
or subdivision thereof. In other words, even where employees choose
to collectivize, the scope of the collectivity is often quite narrow.
Consistent with the property rights orientation of employment,
employers have substantial flexibility in addressing competitiveness
through employment system. The unit-by-unit unionization system
means that there is no necessary relationship regarding unionization in
firm facilities. Thus, it is not unusual for employers to have both union-
ized and non-union facilities, and to have multiple unions representing
employees in the unionized facilities. It may be difficult for unions in
different facilities to work together, and it is often very difficult for
unions to organize facilities not currently organized (Block, Beck, and
Kruger 1996). Employers, through their property rights, have competi-
tiveness options that exclude a union, where one exists, and/or incorpo-
rate the potential to require unions to internally compete with one
another. The collective bargaining system will be so used to encourage
competitiveness and job security/protection only if both parties wish it.
If only one party resists, it won’t happen. Put differently, labor law
simply enables collective bargaining to be used for competitiveness
and job security; it does not require or even encourage it to be used for
that purpose. 
As noted, there is no presumption in U.S. public policy that collec-
tive bargaining is a “normal” process of establishing terms and condi-
tions of employment. Rather, “normal” is unilateral employer
determination. The underlying assumption is that collective bargaining
impairs the ability of firms to compete.1 A large literature has devel-
oped to examine this assumption, and this literature was reviewed in
Chapter 3. The discussion in that chapter observed that unions and col-
lective bargaining are more frequently associated with higher produc-
tivity and lower production costs than they are with lower productivity
and higher production costs, but that unions are associated with
reduced profits. There is no evidence that collective bargaining is asso-
ciated with reduced investment, but there is some evidence that collec-
tive bargaining is associated with reduced firm survival. There is no
evidence that unionization is also associated with a greater rate of
worker displacement among union members. There is some evidence
that collective bargaining innovations, such as labor–management
cooperation, have a positive effect on product quality, but the effect of
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collective bargaining innovations on other measures such as productiv-
ity, job security, and training was minimal. Finally, focusing on
employment, where there were employment gains, unionized gains
were lower; where there were employment losses, unionized losses
were greater.
This research suggests the powerful orientation in the United
States toward property rights and the support of labor markets that are
permitted to operate under a transaction assumption with little govern-
mental involvement or employee protection. Under such a system,
unionism and collective bargaining must compete with non-union
employment systems that are closely aligned with the market assump-
tions of the United States labor market. Thus, it is not surprising that
unions may have some negative employment effects, as firms, using
their property rights, are likely to be tempted to invest less in unionized
facilities than in non-union facilities. 
Overall, it appears that much of the presumed impact of unionism
and collective bargaining on firm performance is not borne out by the
research. The effects of unionism are far more complex than would be
believed based on economic theories. This chapter will return to this
theme. 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, EMPLOYMENT, AND FIRM 
PERFORMANCE: PLANT- AND FIRM-LEVEL 
PERSPECTIVES
Unlike Chapter 1, which examined collective bargaining at a sys-
temic level, and Chapters 2 and 3, which provided an economy-level
perspective on collective bargaining, Chapters 5–8 took a micro view
by presenting four case studies of the relationship between collective
bargaining, job protection/creation, and firm competitiveness. As dis-
cussed in the methodology chapter, Chapter 4, the case studies repre-
sented a range of products, production processes, and market
constraints. The four sites studied were Alcoa–Rockdale, Texas, and
United Steelworkers of America Local 4895; General Motors–Lansing,
Michigan, and UAW Local 652; Lear–Elsie, Michigan, and UAW
Local 1660; and Sparrow Health Care Systems, Lansing, Michigan,
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and the Michigan Nurses Association. Three were manufacturing sites,
and one was a health care service sector site. This section will summa-
rize common themes across all four case studies by examining market
issues common to all the cases and differences in how the market
affected each firm. The chapter will then summarize the collective bar-
gaining response and provide a brief conclusion.
Market Factors
The employment relationship in the United States is based on value
created for the employer. Value in this context is determined primarily
by the product market for the good or service produced by the
employee. Thus, it is not surprising that a common theme across all the
case studies is the importance of the product market as the driver of the
collective bargaining relationship. As there are few societally created
legislative buffers to insulate the parties from the effects of the product
market, the parties in each relationship were required to adjust to the
forces affecting the product market for the goods or services produced
by the employer and by the workers. In the Alcoa–USW and GM/Lan-
sing–UAW cases, the market forces were direct globalization and
increased competition. For the Lear–UAW case, globalization was a
level removed, but the cost and quality pressures that the globalized
auto industry placed on Lear’s customers, the auto manufacturers, were
the direct cause of pressure on Lear. In the Sparrow–MNA case, the
market pressure came from managed care and the pressure from payers
to reduce their insurance outlays. This pressure has caused Sparrow to
develop a broad-based strategy of diversification from inpatient care.
In the Alcoa case, the main change in the economic environment
was the globalization of the market for aluminum. Whereas for much
of the twentieth century Alcoa had been the dominant firm in the alu-
minum market, able to sets its prices based on cost, this was no longer
the case by the late 1980s. The emergence of the London Metal
Exchange in the early 1980s, combined with the increased world sup-
ply of aluminum, meant that Alcoa was subject to world demand and
supply pressures. 
Globalization of the market, albeit for automobiles, also affected
GM–Lansing and the UAW. It caused GM to lose market share, with a
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subsequent reorganization that placed plants in competition for product
allocation.
Globalization has also encouraged the auto companies to outsource
(subcontract) more of their parts work in an effort to reduce costs. This
outsourcing was both a threat and an opportunity to a supplier like
Lear. While it provided Lear with the opportunity to grow the business,
as indicated by employment growth in the industry, the small number
of potential purchases and the large size of the purchase also placed
extreme cost pressures on Lear in order to obtain that business and to
make that business profitable. Sparrow and the Michigan Nurses Asso-
ciation have been required to respond to pressures from the major
health care payers and changes in the structure of the health care indus-
try.
Firm-Level Variation
Property rights and the absence of aggregating structures permit
firms to create their own responses to market pressures. Thus, the
increased market pressure on these relationships had different effects,
depending on the firm response. For Alcoa–Rockdale and the USW,
the major impact was an increased saliency of the plant’s energy cost
disadvantage due to its use of coal, forcing the union to reduce labor
costs to offset the plant’s energy cost disadvantage. For GM–Lansing
and UAW Local 652, these pressures manifested themselves in a reor-
ganization by GM. This reorganization forced the Lansing production
facilities into the GM allocation system. Thus, the new goal was to
encourage GM to allocate the product to Lansing. For Lear, the market
pressure is coming from their customers. The market for seat assem-
blies, while potentially large, is characterized by a small number of
potential buyers, namely, those firms in the auto assembly business.
The loss of one contract can have a substantial effect on employment.
Management and the union must be constantly attentive to this small,
identifiable group of customers.
For Sparrow and the MNA, the market pressures are constant.
They emanate from the true payers for most health care in the United
States, the insurance companies and the government. This cost pres-
sure is placing increased pressure on the traditional resident care busi-
ness while causing Sparrow to move into tertiary areas, such as
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outpatient clinics and labs. From a business 20 years ago in which
demand was determined by physicians and somebody else paid the
bills, Sparrow and the MNA find themselves in a cost-conscious world
with a few large buyers.
Collective Bargaining
Despite these differences, all the parties have maintained the tradi-
tional written collective bargaining agreement. This structured, legalis-
tic, formal agreement of fixed duration, which explicates the terms and
conditions of employment and the rights and obligations of both parties
and is enforced by a grievance procedure ending in a final and binding
arbitration decision, is the basis of the U.S. system of industrial rela-
tions. It is the bedrock on which all of these relationships are based. 
At the same time, recognizing the importance of market forces to
value-based employment, the parties in these relationships have estab-
lished joint, extracontractual structures to permit flexibility, with the
purpose of maintaining or improving the competitiveness of the facility
as the source of maximizing employment. The partnership teams at
Alcoa–Rockdale, the “star system” at GM–Lansing, the joint steering
teams and planning teams at Lear–Elsie, and the Mutual Gains Com-
mittee at Sparrow all represent extracontractual joint activities that
were deemed by the parties to be consistent with the collective agree-
ment. It is important to point out, however, that involvement in these
joint activities normally represented a willingness by management to
cede its rights under the formal collective agreement to make decisions
on such matters as how the product or service was produced. It also
meant that the union was, for all practical purposes, giving up its right
to grieve management decisions, since the decisions made by these
extracontractual structures were, in fact, joint decisions rather than
management decisions.
Case Study Conclusions
The four case studies presented provide concrete examples of how
collective bargaining in the United States can be a vehicle for creating
firm competitiveness and employment protection and creation. Despite
the variation in the sources of market pressure on these relationships,
Overview and Conclusions 155
the parties in all four relationships have developed joint methods of
operating. While each structure is specific to the parties’ relationship, a
common characteristic is a willingness of the firm and the union to put
aside their contractual rights and engage in a joint, extracontractual
process for competitiveness purposes. Competitiveness, in this context,
means success in the product market. Value-based employment
requires such success.
Of the four sites, only GM–Lansing and the UAW operate in an
environment of some administered job security, through the JOBS pro-
gram in the GM–UAW national agreement that covers the members of
Local 652 and the Lansing site. The JOBS program, however, is
designed to prevent layoffs or job reductions associated with increas-
ing productive efficiency, so as to create incentives for GM and the
UAW to work jointly to increase competitiveness. It is not a job guar-
antee in that it does not operate in the event of a volume decline due to
market-related conditions. Thus, overall, it is accurate to say that job
security in the United States is market-based rather than administered.
Consistent with the principle of value-based employment, these four
cases have accepted that principle and work within in it.
Given the importance of property rights in the United States, one
would expect substantial variation in the structures of these systems,
and that is what is seen. The GM–Lansing system is the most formal,
with multiple functions reporting to a union joint activities coordinator.
Given the size and geographic scope of the GM–Lansing system, this
would be expected. Lear and UAW Local 1660 organized its structure,
the joint steering team, by function. Sparrow and the Michigan Nurses
Association organized the Mutual Gains Committee by the patient care
system. Alcoa–Rockdale and the Steelworkers created a structure that
was organized by department within a single facility producing alumi-
num. 
These case studies support the conclusions from the review of the
literature. Collective bargaining, broadly defined to include not only
the formal collective agreement but also joint extracontractual struc-
tures, can be a vehicle for both competitiveness and employment pro-
tection in the United States. The collective bargaining system in the
United States works within the constraints of property-rights-based,
value-based employment. Collective bargaining has been successful in
promoting these twin goals where the bargaining system has respected
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the unique characteristics of the production process and the parties to
each collective bargaining relationship. 
CONCLUSION
Taken together, the overview sections and the case studies rein-
force several important themes. First, due to a large extent to the influ-
ence of employer property rights, there is wide variation in industrial
relations in the United States. This has been documented elsewhere
(Block, Beck, and Kruger 1996), and it was reinforced by the case
studies here, with the range of options they implemented.
The second important theme is the importance of market-based job
security in the United States. The principle of value-based employment
means job security comes not from administrative rules in collective
bargaining agreements, but from the market success of the firm. 
The third important theme is the essential decentralization of col-
lective bargaining in the United States. This is the result of property
rights, unit-by-unit bargaining, and local union autonomy.
Fourth, business unionism, as discussed by Perlman ([1928], 1966)
has reasserted itself in the United States. There is a narrow local union
focus on job security of its members, the incumbents. Given the impor-
tance of the job to the worker, it can be argued that principles of union
democracy and local union autonomy require a focus on incumbents. 
Fifth, and related to the third point above, even in a labor market as
strong as that of the United States in the late 1990s, job security is par-
amount. This demonstrates the importance of the seniority system
incorporated in the vast majority of collective bargaining agreements
and the continuing existence of a union wage premium, at least for the
workers at these sites.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The five themes discussed above can be collapsed into two major
points that could inform a policy debate regarding the role of collective
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bargaining in encouraging firm competitiveness and employment pro-
tection creation. The first major point is derived from the discussion in
Chapter 2 of the institutional framework under which collective bar-
gaining addresses issues of competitiveness and job protection/cre-
ation. The second major point is derived from the research on
collective bargaining and competitiveness discussed in Chapter 3, and
the case studies in Chapters 5–8.
In regard to the institutional framework, public policy views col-
lective bargaining in an employee choice framework, indifferent as to
whether there is a strong collective bargaining system. Policy also has
little to say about collective bargaining, competitiveness, and employ-
ment protection/creation. This follows quite logically from the transac-
tion view of employment. Employment in the United States is a
voluntary economic transaction between two individuals with minimal
social content. The terms and conditions of employment should be sub-
ject to only a minimum of government regulation. 
The literature review in Chapter 3 and the case studies in Chapters
5–8 provide a basis for rethinking this view. The literature review in
Chapter 3 has shown that research has demonstrated that collective
bargaining and firm competitiveness are compatible. Thus, employees
can fully participate in their work lives through independent represen-
tation, and have industrial democracy, while at the same time encour-
aging competitiveness in the firms in which they work. The case
studies in Chapters 5–8 provided examples of how this compatibility is
manifested at the firm or plant level.
Therefore, it may be time for policymakers to rethink the current
indifference to collective bargaining as a vehicle for competitiveness,
and employment protection/creation, and develop policies that would
encourage it. Such policy changes would likely have the advantage of
reducing the social costs of unemployment and the disruption associ-
ated with the many changes firms must undergo to remain competitive.
Employees often have the largest stake in a firm’s competitiveness,
especially those at the lowest education levels who are the least mobile.
What are possible policy changes? First, the National Labor Rela-
tions Act should be amended to make all firm decisions that affect
employment, even those that involve a change in the basic nature of the
business, subject to collective bargaining. One never knows what sug-
gestions employees will have unless they are given a chance, through
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their union, to make them. There is no obligation on either side to
agree, but what is lost by forcing the parties to bargain about these mat-
ters? In addition, making all such decisions negotiable will bring cer-
tainty to the law, and will reduce the incentive to litigate over whether
a matter should be the subject of negotiations.
Second, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) should con-
sider a broader conceptualization of the notion of bargaining unit
accretion to permit collective bargaining to be a more viable option
than it currently is in questions of intrafirm allocation of resources. For
firms with a large number of unionized facilities, the law should
decrease the barriers to including in one of those bargaining units a
non-union facility that produces a product similar to a proximate and
similar unionized facility. Currently, the NLRB permits accretion of a
new or acquired facility to an existing bargaining unit based on a con-
sideration of such factors as 1) the degree of interchange of employees
among facilities; 2) geographical proximity; 3) integration of opera-
tions, machinery, and product lines; 4) centralization of administrative
and labor relations control; 5) similarity of working conditions, skills,
and job duties; and 6) the number of employees (Harden and Higgins
2001). By giving greater weight to criteria such as product similarity
and job duties, and less weight to criteria such as employee interchange
and common labor relations control, and by considering proximity less
as a criterion for accretion per se and more as a criterion for identifying
the host unit, collective bargaining as a vehicle for encouraging firm
competitiveness and job security can be strengthened.
Third, Congress should create a permanent labor–management
committee to advise it on issues of firm competitiveness and employ-
ment protection/creation. Such a committee would not replace the cur-
rent partisan advocacy through such organizations as the Chamber of
Commerce, National Association of Manufacturers, Labor Policy
Association, and the AFL-CIO. It would, however, add a new voice to
the mix. It would also be a vehicle for labor and management, at a high
level, to find common ground. Such a committee would be a mere
shadow of the social partnership notion prevalent in Europe, but it
would establish the principle of the importance of creating and aggre-
gating labor–management organizations.
These proposals are modest attempts to increase the status of col-
lective bargaining as a tool for encouraging firm competitiveness and
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job protection/creation. The proposal on expanding the subject matter
of bargaining does not change the substantive obligations encompassed
in the duty to bargain. The proposal on non-union facilities, while
novel, is nothing more than a modification of an established NLRB
principle, unit accretion. The proposal on a labor–management com-
mittee places no requirement on the committee; rather, it establishes
the principle that one should exist. These proposals could be imple-
mented with minimal disruption to the current collective bargaining
system in the United States.
Equally important, based on the work shown here, there is no
inconsistency between collective bargaining and firm health. Enhanc-
ing employee rights in the context of collective bargaining, and sup-
porting collective bargaining, can be obtained at little if any cost to
firm competitiveness. In other words, the price of industrial democracy
may be much lower than is generally believed.
FINAL OBSERVATIONS 
Overall, the work in this book demonstrates that collective bar-
gaining, job protection/creation, and firm competitiveness are compati-
ble in the United States. Employees can enjoy the rights and
protections inherent in collective bargaining, and shareholders and
other firm stakeholders can prosper. This research has shown that the
established view that these are incompatible is at best an oversimplifi-
cation based on extremely lean economic theories that do not take into
account the complexity and flexibility of “real world” employment. At
worst, this is a view based on values, ideology, and unstated assump-
tions. Policymakers concerned about collective bargaining, firm com-
petitiveness, and job protection/creation should understand this as they
consider policies in these areas. 
Note
1. An example of this assumption can be found in Schiller (2002).
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